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Abstract 
This thesis will examine the implications the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1973 (2011) poses to sovereignty and its current understanding in 
relation to military intervention for the protection of civilians in an internal armed 
conflict.  Resolution 1973 provides an opportunity to examine: the development 
of sovereignty from its earliest inception to its position within the modern 
international system of states; the challenge humanitarian intervention posed to 
accepted principles of sovereignty, non-interference and the use of force; the 
recent addition of the concept of the Responsibility to Protect which re-
conceptualised sovereignty as responsibility; and the Security Council's 
established practice in relation to authorising armed intervention, which is integral 
to this thesis.  Supporting this body of work is the Charter of the United Nations 
(1945) which articulates the body of rules that states are guided by in matters of 
international peace and security, and the protection of human rights, and which 
also determines the parameters of Security Council action.   
This thesis aims to establish that Resolution 1973 is a substantial contribution to 
the incremental development of sovereignty and how it is currently understood 
within international law. 
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1. Introduction 
In order to understand whether United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 
(2011) has substantially developed the contemporary notion of sovereignty within 
international law, a detailed examination of the concept of sovereignty from its 
earliest inception to its position within the United Nations system is required.  The 
scope and breadth of this question requires careful analysis of the concept of 
sovereignty, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, the recent concept of the 
Responsibility to Protect, and the role of the Security Council and its relationship 
with armed intervention for the protection of civilians. Tracing the evolution of 
the concept of sovereignty through time will help clarify whether or not the 
situation in Libya and the Security Council authorised armed intervention, has 
contributed to a developmental change in how sovereignty is currently 
understood. 
 
The concept of sovereignty entered political legal theory in 1576 in Jean Bodin's 
innovative work Les Six Livres de la Republique (The Six Books of the 
Commonwealth).
1
  By using Bodin as the starting point, we can see how 
sovereignty has initially been understood as an expression of centralised power 
within the state (internal sovereignty).  The concept of sovereignty is then 
progressed by subsequent authors who develop the perception of sovereignty as 
not only a power that is expressed within the state, but also a functional quality 
that imbues relations between states (external sovereignty).  The theoretical 
development of sovereignty is further progressed by practical application with the 
Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919, 
and the establishment of the United Nations in 1945.  By traversing the landmark 
events in the life of the concept of sovereignty it will clarify whether the primary 
elements of the concept of sovereignty have departed radically from their first 
inception, or remain relatively unaltered. 
 
The development of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has followed a 
similar form of development as the concept of sovereignty, with its origins 
                                                 
1
 Jean Bodin, Les Six Livres de la Republique (translated ed. M.J Tooley (translator) Jean Bodin 
Six Books of the Commonwealth (Basil Blackwell, Oxford (1955)). 
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extending back to the Crusades.
2
  The contemporary understanding of 
humanitarian intervention is drawn from the 19
th
 century,
3
 and involves the use of 
armed force for the protection of individuals or groups of individuals within a 
targeted state.
4
  This has since been developed further by the establishment of the 
United Nations, and the Security Council.  When undertaken without Security 
Council authorisation, humanitarian intervention is viewed by many as a violation 
of the principle of state sovereignty, and its associated principles of non-
interference and the prohibition on the threat or use of force. 
 
However, a strict interpretation of the Charter results in a prohibition on 
intervention for humanitarian purposes.  Yet it appears that over time, specific 
instances where the Security Council has authorised armed intervention for 
humanitarian purposes is slowly bridging the divide between intervention for the 
protection of civilians with the inviolable principle of sovereignty.  To illustrate 
this point further, instances where the Security Council has authorised forcible 
intervention for humanitarian purposes, and also when it has not authorised armed 
intervention will be discussed.  These instances illustrate the development of the 
Security Council's approach to internal conflicts where gross human rights abuses 
are occurring, and also its inconsistency in responding to humanitarian 
catastrophes aggravated by conflict situations.  Respect for sovereignty still 
restricted a uniform reaction from the Security Council and the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention was not the cure for this. 
 
The development of the concept of the Responsibility to Protect by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was a 
concerted attempt to address the conflict between sovereignty and armed 
intervention for humanitarian purposes.  The report
5
 of the ICISS delivered in 
2001 was a comprehensive document that contained; a definition of the concept, 
                                                 
2
 Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne “The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian 
Intervention: Its Current Validity under the U.N. Charter” (1973-1974) Cal W Int'l J 203. 
3
 Francis Kobi Abiew The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention 
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1999) at 33. 
4
 Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (7
th
 ed, Oxford University Press, 2008) at 
742. 
5
 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty “The 
Responsibility to Protect” (International Development Research Centre, Canada, 2001) [ICISS 
Report]. 
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the legal foundation for it, and the principles and processes that would support the 
successful implementation of it.  It was a new way to view sovereignty and 
established that sovereignty was contingent upon state authorities upholding the 
responsibility to protect their population from serious harm resulting from internal 
war, repression, insurgency or state failure.
6
   
 
The concept did not remain static, subsequent reports developed and refined (or 
restricted) the meaning and scope of the concept.  The 2005 World Summit 
Outcome document contains the unanimously accepted definition of the concept.  
It condensed the lengthy original understanding of the concept contained in the 
ICISS report into two paragraphs.  It limited the application of the concept to 
certain crimes under international law.  Consistently as the concept was developed 
through each phase of reports, the Security Council was given the primary 
responsibility for determining whether to undertake forcible action under Chapter 
VII of the Charter.  In contrast, with the gradual development of the concept of 
sovereignty, and the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, the swift and 
unanimous acceptance of the concept indicates a shift not only in how sovereignty 
is perceived, but how humanitarian situations should be addressed. 
 
Under the Charter the Security Council holds the primary responsibility of 
maintaining international peace and security, and to this end, has been delegated 
the right to use force in or against states in situations that pose a threat to this 
peace and security.  Security Council resolutions that authorise the use of force are 
perceived as necessary in order to carry out an armed intervention in a sovereign 
state with the proper legal basis.  The forcible measures contained in Chapter VII 
of the Charter and the process required in order to utilise them does not contain 
specific reference to humanitarian crises.  The issue then arises of how the 
Security Council can respond to situations of internal armed conflict that threaten 
the civilian population while still maintaining respect for a state's sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence. 
 
The Security Council is a political entity, the nature of its composition and the 
                                                 
6
 ICISS Report, above n 5, at XI. 
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construction of the Charter have often been detrimental to authorising armed 
intervention in internal conflicts for the protection of civilians.    Security Council 
resolutions are the product of the political negotiations within the Security 
Council itself, but also contain decisions that carry legal force.  A retrospective 
analysis of Security Council resolutions indicate that gradually, a pattern is 
emerging that indicates that authorisation of military intervention for humanitarian 
purposes is permissible.  Whether this represents an evolution in international law, 
that state sovereignty can be compromised in order for armed intervention to be 
authorised for the protection of civilians is the key question of this thesis.   
 
The events in Libya leading up to the authorisation of armed intervention, and 
Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) provide the opportunity to examine the 
impact that the Security Council resolution, the concept of the Responsibility to 
Protect, and intervention carried out for a humanitarian purpose has had on the 
current understanding of sovereignty within international law.  The spontaneous 
eruption of an internal armed conflict in Libya and the subsequent Security 
Council authorised armed intervention represent a landmark occasion, as it was 
the first time in the Security Council's history that it had authorised military 
intervention without the target state's consent for humanitarian purposes. 
 
The events during the Libyan conflict: the excessive use of force, the threat of 
mass atrocity, the potential crimes against humanity, the formation of a political 
entity for the Libyan opposition forces, the resignation of diplomats from 
Gaddafi's government, and the persuasive response from multiple regional 
organisations, were contributing facts in the passing of Resolution 1973. 
The passing of this resolution is as much a response to the events that took place 
during the conflict as it is a reflection of the political machinations within the 
Security Council.   
 
The political motivations for passing the resolution are an important part of 
analysing the approach the Security Council took to authorise armed intervention.  
However, it is the legal consequences that the resolution carries that are of equal 
interest here.  Does Resolution 1973 indicate that the Security Council's practice 
has evolved to include the authorisation of armed force for the protection of 
 5 
 
civilians regardless of the respect for sovereignty?  Are interventions for 
humanitarian purposes no longer contrary to the inviolable principle of state 
sovereignty?  Has the concept of the Responsibility to Protect changed the 
international community of state's perception of sovereignty to the extent that it 
now influences state's behaviour?  Are humanitarian considerations, and the 
concept of the Responsibility to Protect now influencing the methods of response 
by the Security Council to internal armed conflicts to such a degree that it can be 
asserted that there has been a significant shift in the current conception of 
sovereignty? 
Analysis of sovereignty, humanitarian intervention, the Responsibility to Protect, 
and the Security Council all contribute to understanding whether or not 
Resolution 1973 represents this conceptual shift in the current understanding of 
sovereignty.   
 
Supporting this body of work are the texts and journal articles of scholarly 
authorities.  In particular: Bruno Simma (ed) The Charter of the United Nations, A 
Commentary
7
 which draws together diverse scholarly analysis of the articles of 
the Charter relevant to this thesis.  Nicholas J Wheeler Saving Strangers, 
Humanitarian Intervention in International Society
8
 which contains a broad and 
authoritative analysis of humanitarian intervention, its history, and application 
following the Cold War; the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document,
9
 for its 
authoritative and unanimously accepted description of the Responsibility to 
Protect Concept.  Also supporting the analysis of the concept of the Responsibility 
to Protect is the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty
10
 for its detailed description of the legal foundation for the concept; 
and Alex J. Bellamy, Sara E. Davies, and Luke Glanville (eds) The Responsibility 
to Protect and International Law,
11
 which draws together various scholarly 
authors analysis of the concept in a variety of contexts within international law. 
 
                                                 
7
 Bruno Simma (ed) The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary (Oxford University 
Press, United Kingdom, 2012). 
8
 Nicholas J. Wheeler Saving Strangers, Humanitarian Intervention in International Society 
(Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2002). 
9
 2005 World Summit Outcome Document GA RES 60/1 A/RES/60/1 (2005). 
10
 ICISS Report, above n 5. 
11
 Alex J. Bellamy, Sara E. Davies, Luke Glanville (eds) The Responsibility to Protect and 
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands, 2011). 
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Analysis of the role of the Security Council is supported by, inter alia, the edited 
text of Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, Dominik Zaum (eds) The 
United Nations Security Council and War,
12
 as well as Inger Osterdahl's 
informative article “The Exception as the Rule: Lawmaking on Force and Human 
Rights by the UN Security Council”.13  Also invaluable to this analysis are the 
resolutions passed by the Security Council, such as Resolution 678 (1990)
14
 
Resolution 794 (1993),
15
 Resolution 940 (1994).
16
  The inclusion of these 
resolutions is to establish the emerging pattern within the Security Council's 
practice of responding to humanitarian situations, and discovering the political 
motivations behind doing so, and the potential legal consequences. 
 
Finally, in support of the analysis of Resolution 1973 and the events around the 
conflict in Libya, the text edited by Jared Genser and Bruno Stagno Ugarte The 
United Nations Security Council in the Age of Human Rights,
17
 provides scholarly 
analysis of the Libyan conflict and the events leading to the passing of Resolution 
1973.  Also, Paul R Williams and Collen (Betsy) Popkent's journal article 
“Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya: A Moment of Legal & Moral 
Clarity”18 provides a useful analysis of the text of Resolution 1973 and its 
implications.  This is just some of the literature relied upon which supports this 
thesis and its aim to establish an answer to the question of whether Resolution 
1973 (2011) represents a shift in the current understanding of state sovereignty; or, 
whether it is an example of armed intervention been authorised for the protection 
of civilians at the expense of state sovereignty. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, Dominik Zaum (eds) The United Nations 
Security Council and War (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008). 
13
 Inger Osterdahl “The Exception as the Rule: Lawmaking on Force and Human Rights by the 
UN Security Council” (2005) J Conflict & Sec L 10(1) 1. 
14
 SC Res 678 S/RES/678 (1990). 
15
 SC Res 794 S/RES/794 (1993). 
16
 SC Res 940 S/RES/940 (1994). 
17
 Jared Genser and Bruno Stagno Ugarte The United Nations Security Council in the Age of 
Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2014). 
18
 Paul R. Williams & Colleen (Betsy) Popkent “Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya: A 
Moment of Legal & Moral Clarity” (2011) 44 Case W Res J Int'l L 225. 
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2. The Principle of Sovereignty Within International Law 
 
2.1 Introduction 
To answer the question of whether the United Nations Security Council authorised 
military intervention in Libya has substantially evolved the current conception of 
State sovereignty, an examination of how State sovereignty has evolved since its 
earliest inception is necessary.  How the concept of sovereignty evolved over time 
should illuminate whether or not the events of Libya have substantially 
contributed to an evolution of sovereignty as it is currently understood.  The 
concept of sovereignty was first introduced into political legal theory by Jean 
Bodin in 1576.  Bodin's work focussed largely on how sovereignty was exercised 
internally within the realm of a nation, and later theorists, Hugo Grotius, Thomas 
Hobbes, Samuel von Puffendorf and Emmerich de Vattel, further expanded on the 
nature of external sovereignty,
19
 and how it is exercised between states.  Has 
sovereignty as it is understood in international law changed radically since it was 
first introduced by Jean Bodin in 1576, or have the primary elements of this 
concept remained relatively unchanged?   
 
2.2 Sovereignty 
It is widely understood that the nature of sovereignty exists in two distinct but 
related spheres, the domestic sphere, internal sovereignty, and the sphere of 
international relations between states, external sovereignty.   
Within the state, a sovereign power exercises its internal sovereignty by making 
laws with the assurance that these laws are “supreme and ultimate” and that their 
“validity does not depend on the will of any other, or 'higher', authority.”20  
Internal sovereignty gave rise to a centralised power as a means of addressing and 
                                                 
19
 Hugo Grotius De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres, (translated ed: Louise R. Loomis (translator) 
Hugo Grotius The Law of War and Peace (Walter J. Black, INC., New York, 1949), Thomas 
Hobbes Leviathan (J. M. Dent & Sons LTD., London, 1914), Samuel Pufendorf De Jure 
Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo (translated ed: C. H. Oldfather and W. A. Oldfather (translator) 
Samuel Pufendorf On the Law of Nature and Nations (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1934), 
Emmerich de Vattel Le Droit de Gens (translated ed: Joseph Chitty (translator) The Law of 
Nations; or Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and 
Sovereigns (R. Milliken & Son, Dublin, 1834). 
20
 Bardo Fassbender “Article 2 (1) in Bruno Simma (ed) The Charter of the United Nations, A 
Commentary (3rd edition, Oxford University Press, United Kingsom, 2012) 133 at 136. 
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subjugating intermediary powers within a territory.
21
  Sovereignty, and the 
exercise of sovereignty, is largely concerned with how power is situated and 
controlled within a state territory, which is determined by the constitutional 
frameworks established by the state.
22
 Internal sovereignty encapsulates a state's 
freedom from outside interference by other states, it shields the internal 
authorities' decisions and actions from external forces or external authorities.
23 
 In 
the Corfu Channel case Judge Alvarez describes it as: 
 By sovereignty, we understand the whole body of rights and attributes which a State 
 possess in its territory, to  the exclusion of all other States, and also in its relations with 
 other States.
24 
The exercise of the internal sovereignty of a state can therefore be understood and 
described as: a state government's authority to exercise the functions of a state 
within its domestic jurisdiction over its people and territory, and to regulate the 
intrinsic matters of state free from external interference. 
 
External sovereignty is manifested when states interact with each other as 
sovereign states.  Externally a sovereign state bows to no higher authority, is not 
subject to the legal power of another state, and is in principle, equal to other states 
regardless of any economic, or military disparity.
25
 
 It was the idea of external sovereignty which, together with the transformation of 
 medieval feudal structures into the modern State, led to the development of modern 
 international law.  In the external relations of States, sovereignty was understood as legal 
 independence of a prince or republic from all foreign powers, in particular the Pope and 
 the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, and the impermeability protecting the respective 
 territory against all outside interference.
26
 
International law governs and guides relationships between states,
27
 and in turn 
international law depends on the “will of the sovereign states”.28 
 International law govern relations between independent States.  The rules of law binding 
 upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by 
 usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to 
 regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view 
 to the achievement of common aims.  Restrictions upon the independence of States 
                                                 
21
 Fassbender, above n 20, at 136. 
22
 Christian Henderson, “The Arab Spring and the Notion of External State Sovereignty in 
International Law” (2014) 35 Liverpool L Rev 175 at 176. 
23
 Oyvind Osterud “Sovereign Statehood and National Self-Determination A World Order” in 
Marianne Heiberg (ed) Subduing Sovereignty: Sovereignty and the Right to Intervene,  (1994) 
18 at 19. 
24
 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Albania) (Separate 
Opinion of Judge Alvarez) [1949] 39 at 43. 
25
 Robert Lansing “Notes on Sovereignty in a State” (1902) AJIL 105 at 124. 
26
 Fassbender, above n 20, at 137. 
27
 S.S. “Lotus” (France v Turkey) (Judgment) [1927] PCIJ (Series A) No.10 at 18. 
28
 Malcolm Shaw International Law (6th ed, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom) at 
29. 
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 cannot therefore be presumed.
29
 
The state was then internally supreme, but also had to refine its relationships with 
other states to maintain its external sovereignty.   
 
By acknowledging the external sovereignty of other states, states were 
recognising the rights and obligations that came attached to sovereignty, and they 
are also externally expressing the “supremacy of the state as a legal person”. 
Sovereignty, both externally and internally is one of the earliest concepts of 
international law, and one of the most powerful.  It is an abstract concept that has 
accumulated an “almost mythical quality”.30  It is a legal notion, but it is imbued 
and integrated with a political dimension.  How it has been defined, and how it 
has evolved throughout history goes some way to understanding its significance 
historically, and in a contemporary world.  The remainder of this chapter will 
outline this development through the work of theorists and historical events. 
 
2.2.1 Jean Bodin (1530-1596)  
Jean Bodin was a French jurist and political philosopher and is widely credited 
with introducing the term 'sovereignty' into legal theory, and elucidating its 
meaning, in his book Les Six Livres de la Republique (The Six Books of the 
Commonwealth) in 1576.
31  
Bodin based his study of the State on his 
understanding of European politics, with particular emphasis on the necessity for 
a sovereign power within the state that would make the laws, without being bound 
by them.  The sovereign would be subject to the laws of God and nature alone.
32
   
 From all this it is clear that the principal mark of sovereign majesty and absolute power is 
 the right to impose laws generally on all subjects regardless of their consent.
33
 
Bodin's presentation of sovereign power and the state is a study of the internal 
“structure of authority” within the nation state itself.34   
 
For Bodin, it was a key attribute of sovereignty that, at least internally, there was 
no other greater power than the sovereign, 
                                                 
29
 S.S “Lotus”, above n 27, at 18. 
30
 Fassbender, above n 2, at 135. 
31
 Shaw, above n 28, at 21; Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto State Sovereignty and International 
Criminal Law: Versailles to Rome (Transnational Publishers, New York, 2003) at 8. 
32
 Shaw, at 21. 
33
 Bodin, above n 1, at 32. 
34
 Shaw, at 21. 
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 The first attribute of the sovereign prince therefore is the power to make law binding on 
 all his subjects in general, and on each in particular.  But to avoid ambiguity one must add 
 that he does so without the consent of any superior, equal, or inferior necessary.
35 
The sovereigns power over all matters of state and subjects was absolute, and 
Bodin went to great lengths to describe the particularities of sovereignty. 
These attributes were numerous: the power to make laws, un-make laws, make 
peace and war with other states, hearing appeals from sentences of all courts; 
appointing and dismissing officers of state, raising taxes, granting privileges and 
exemptions to all subjects, appreciating and depreciating the value and weight of 
coinage, and receiving oaths of fidelity from subjects and his liege vassals.
36
  
These attributes of sovereignty were considered by Bodin to be indivisible,
37
 and 
describe sovereignty as an absolute power, where the sovereign is the origin of the 
law, above the law, with no other superior to challenge his status. 
Sovereignty became a key characteristic in determining what constitutes a state.
38
  
A commonwealth (or state) without a sovereign power, could not be considered a 
commonwealth.
39
   
 
Bodin sought to characterise sovereignty of state in such a way as to provide a 
state with the legal means to “secure itself against external enemies or internal 
disorders.”40  At a time when religious wars were rife, Bodin linked sovereign 
authority to territory by consolidating the sovereign and subject into “one body 
politic.”41  This consolidation was a remedy to the religious fracturing occurring in 
France at the time of Bodin's writing.  The integration of ruler and ruled within 
territory, was an abstract concept.  The unification between the power of the ruler, 
and the ruled provided the basis of the conception of the state.  So complete was 
this unification between supreme authority, territory, and subjects, that to separate 
these ideas became unimaginable.
42
  Bodin's theory was not a cure all for the 
religious warfare that dominated European politics. Hugo Grotius would expand 
on Bodin's work during the 30 Years War, and introduced, inter alia, his own 
                                                 
35
 Bodin, above n 1, at 43. 
36
 Bodin, above n 1, at 77-83. 
37
 Bodin, at 86. 
38
 Panu Minkkinen “The Ethos of Sovereignty: A Critical Appraisal”, (2007) Human Rts Rev 33 
at 33. 
39
 Bodin, at 41. 
40
 Bodin, at 109. 
41
 Jarat Chopra “The Obsolescence of Intervention under International Law” in Marianne 
Heiberg (ed) Subduing Sovereignty (Pinter Publishers, New York, 1994) 33 at 41. 
42
 Chopra, above n 42 at 42. 
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theories regarding a more externalised understanding of sovereignty. 
 
2.2.2 Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) 
Fifty-three years after Bodin's work, Hugo Grotius,
 
a Dutch legal scholar, 
published his seminal work, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres (On the Law of War 
and Peace) in 1625.  At the time of Grotius' writing, war was prevalent in Europe, 
the Thirty Years War began in 1615 and did not end until 1648.  The Thirty Years 
War was an extension of the religious intolerance between Catholic and Protestant 
groups.
43
  Grotius sought to remedy the power struggle between religion and 
sovereigns by excising theology from international law.
44
  The primary aim of De 
Jure Belli ac Pacis was to develop rules of war and peace that existed apart from 
the theological and political controversy, and depended on only Natural law, or 
rather, human reason.
45
 
 
Grotius moved beyond an internal conception of sovereignty, and balanced 
Bodin's internal conception with an external one.
46
  Grotius considered the subject 
of sovereignty to be the state,
47
 and sovereign power to be a legal power, the 
possession of which could not be under control of an external power or taken 
away by an external power.
48
  The law of nations was, according to Grotius, 
derived from the authority and will of all or many nations.
49
  Sovereignty could be 
divided geographically (territorial sovereignty), but was itself the unification of 
power within the state that could not be divided.
50
  The emphasis within Grotius' 
work progresses from the divine law that influenced Bodin's writing and moves 
toward a more “human” rational approach.51  International law was based upon 
custom
52
 and while it was dependent upon the will of states it also served to limit 
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and bind states engaging with each other in their sovereign capacity.
53
 
 
The principle that sovereign power was not under the legal control of another 
extended to the relationship between the sovereign authority and its people, 
internal sovereignty.  Grotius rejected the idea that: 
 There are others who imagine a kind of mutual subjection, in which the whole people are 
 bound to obey a king who governs well, but a king who governs badly is subject to the 
 people.
54 
For Grotius, the state possessed greater rights over the people, than the people 
possessed against the state.  If the sovereign state was subjecting its people to 
harm or injury, then that harm should be borne rather than resisted.
55
  However, 
Grotius did consider situations where a sovereign oppressed their people “in ways 
odious to every just man”56 and when that occurred, going to war to help others 
was the “the most far reaching reason” based on the “common tie of humanity”.57   
Sovereignty, according to Grotius, when engaged in war with other nations, or 
with its own people, becomes subject to both legal and moral considerations.
58
 
Grotius developed a “just war” doctrine which looked to answer the question of 
“who has the right to engage in war, what reasons may justify a war, and what 
rules and procedures must be respected in the inception, conduct and conclusion 
of a war.”59  Grotius based his work upon reason, and a foundation of law, as a 
means to remedy wanton destruction amongst nations. 
 Hugo Grotius observed with despair some 350 years ago that there is “no lack of men” 
 who make light of the international rules system “as if it were nothing but an empty name. 
 … that for a kind or a free city nothing is wrong that is to their advantage.
60
 
 
Grotius would not live to see the end of the Thirty Years War, and twenty-three 
years after Grotius published On the Laws of War and Peace the Thirty Years War 
was concluded through inter-state negotiations resulting in the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648.
61
  The Treaty of Westphalia was contained in two separate 
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treaties, the Treaty of Munster, concluded between the Catholic parties, and the 
Treaty of Osnabruck, concluded with the Protestant parties.
62
   
The Peace that was negotiated through these two treaties signified the first major 
instance of organised international cooperation between sovereign states.  It 
marked the end of bitter religious conflict throughout central Europe and 
essentially created the “modern secular nation state arrangement of European 
politics.” 
 
 
2.2.3 The Peace of Westphalia 1648 
The Peace of Westphalia 1648 could be considered as the “starting point for the 
development of modern international law”63 as Leo Gross wrote: 
 The Peace of Westphalia, for better or worse, marks the end of an epoch and an opening 
 of another.
64
 
The Treaty of Westphalia represented the origin of the modern nation state where 
the sovereign had “supreme power” which was exercised internally (or 
domestically) and externally in its relations with other states.
65
 
 In the political field it marked man's abandonment of the idea of a hierarchical structure 
 of society and his option for a new system characterized by the coexistence of a 
 multiplicity of states, each sovereign within its territory, equal to one another, and free 
 from any external earthly authority.
66 
State sovereigns came together to establish a lasting peace, but the reality was that 
while the Treaty of Westphalia represented an evolution in international law, it 
also created an era of “sovereign absolutist states which recognized no superior 
authority”.67  A new international system was formed, based on the sovereignty of 
nation states, which, externally coexisted with the plurality of nations and, 
internally, was personified as the unlimited power and authority held by the 
sovereign in the territories that they held by virtue of their sovereignty.
68
  This 
system is often described as a Westphalian model of sovereignty, and as such it 
clearly delineated the bounds of sovereignty in a practical application, rather than 
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theoretical as was the case with Bodin and Grotius, though legal and political 
theorists would continue to build and develop the notion of sovereignty. 
 
The effect of the Peace of Westphalia also brought into being a more positivist 
approach to international law, where it had previously been based on Natural law, 
which is primarily based in theory and deductive reasoning.
69
  Positivism based its 
approach on facts, what actually happened between states, agreements and 
customs that were adhered to by states, were deemed to be the essence of the law 
of nations.
70
  So when states came together to negotiate the Treaty of Westphalia 
as sovereign states, it marked the factual (positivist) origin of a “modern” system 
based on the nation state.  The Peace of Westphalia also correlated to the theories 
put forward by Bodin, and later by Thomas Hobbes, which embraced an absolute 
form of internal sovereignty, and the sovereignty of states.
71
 
 
2.2.4 Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) 
Thomas Hobbes was an English philosopher and legal theorist, who published the 
Leviathan in 1651.
72
  Hobbes' writings in the Leviathan would be coloured by the 
execution of the English King, Charles I, carried out by the King's own subjects 
after he was accused of being a tyrant, traitor, and murderer. Hobbes, a strict 
monarchist, fled England for France following the deposing of the King, and two 
years after Charles I was executed the Leviathan was published. 
 
Hobbes asserted that the Sovereign was conferred by upon one man or an 
assembly of men for security against foreign powers so that all could live in 
peace.
73
  This unification of the power of a multitude onto a person, or assembly 
of persons, was considered to be, by Hobbes, the formation of a commonwealth, 
or state.  The power conferred was a sovereign power, and all those beneath it 
were considered subjects.
74
   
 For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the Commonwealth, he hath 
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 the use of so much power and strength conferred on him that, by terror thereof, he is 
 enabled to form the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their 
 enemies abroad.
75 
This protectorate state formed around the mutual relationship between ruler and 
ruled has been described as a social contract, whereby individuals united and 
surrendered their individual autonomy to another, who would then govern, for the 
benefit of personal security, and security of property.
76
  Once a Commonwealth, or 
State had been constituted it could not be un-constituted by its people. 
 
Hobbes described sovereignty in absolute terms, Hobbes declared the people to be 
the “authors” of all the sovereign did, and based on this logic Hobbes stated that: 
 Fourthly, because every subject is by this institution author of all the actions and 
 judgements the sovereign  instituted, it follows that whatsoever he doth, can be no injury 
 to any of his subjects, nor ought he to be by any of them accused of injustice.
77 
 
It would be a great injustice if the Sovereign's people were to put him to death, or 
punish him for how he treated his subjects, by Hobbes' logic, they would only be 
punishing themselves for actions they themselves had authorised the sovereign to 
do.  Regardless of whether an individual consented to the conferring of sovereign 
power to one man, Hobbes asserted that the people were now the “authors” of all 
the sovereign's actions and judgements.  The people could not “cast off” 
sovereignty and return to the state they occupied before sovereignty had been 
conferred, they could not be freed from the subjection that they had placed 
themselves under, and they could not depose of their sovereign.
78 
 
And therefore, they that are subjects to a monarch cannot without his leave cast off 
 monarchy and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude; nor transfer their person 
 from him that beareth it to another man, other assembly of men; for they are bound, every 
 man to every man, to own and be reputed author of all that already is their sovereign shall 
 do and judge fit to be done; … and therefore if they depose him, they take from him that 
 which is his own, and so again it is injustice
.79 
 
While the sovereign may have attained sovereignty via a social contract he was 
also separate from it, 
 Secondly, because the right of bearing the person of them all is given to him they make 
 sovereign, by covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them, there can 
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 happen no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign; and consequently none of his 
 subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection.
80
 
Hobbes' interpretation of sovereignty has often been interpreted as suggesting, due 
to the nature of the covenant, or social contract put forward, that the sovereign 
does not have any responsibility in regard to his subjects, or owe them any 
obligations.
81
   
 
In this sense, the protectorate state created by the social contract theory is purely 
for the protection from external or foreign threats. 
However, Hobbes also noted that according to Natural law, all men had a right to 
protect themselves when there was no other who could do so. 
 The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long, and no longer, 
 than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them.  For the right men have by 
 nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no covenant be 
 relinquished.  The sovereignty is the soul of the Commonwealth; which, once departed 
 from the body, the members do no more receive their motion from it.  The end of 
 obedience is protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his own or in 
 another's sword, nature applieth his obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintain it.  And 
 though sovereignty … be immortal: yet is it in its own nature, not only subject to violent 
 death by foreign war, but also through the ignorance and passions of men it hath in it, 
 from the very institution, many seeds of a natural mortality, by intestine discord.
82
 
So, unlike Bodin and Grotius, Hobbes contemplated situations where, in spite of 
the “immortal” nature of sovereignty it can be subjected to a “violent death”, by 
foreign war and no longer being able to protect its citizens, or more significantly, 
by internal or civil war.
83
  This marks an advancement on previous legal theories 
on the nature of the sovereign state and sovereignty itself.  It contemplates the 
idea that while sovereignty may be absolute both internally, and externally, it is by 
no means impervious.  
 
Like Bodin and Grotius, Hobbes also agreed that the Sovereign had the power to 
make laws, war, and peace, appoint people to positions of power within 
government, and levy taxes.  Hobbes also put forward that the Sovereign was the 
only power that could determine what doctrines, or beliefs, were appropriate for 
the masses.  These were some of the hallmarks by which sovereignty could be 
recognised, and to Hobbes they were “incommunicable and inseparable”.84   
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2.2.5 Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694) 
Not long after Hobbes published the Leviathan Samuel von Pufendorf, a German 
political philosopher, entered his own work into the intellectual musings on the 
meaning of sovereignty when he published De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri 
Octo (On the Law of Nature and of Nations) in 1672.  Pufendorf endeavoured to 
align international law with Natural law, which he perceived as a moralistic 
system,
85
 the moral aspect of Pufendorf's writing came through strongly in his 
approach to the relationship between sovereign and subject. 
 
Like other theorists before him, Pufendorf concluded that men came together with 
other men, and formed a “common confederacy” (sovereign state) by “pooling 
resources, mutually intertwining their safety, and warding off perils” that they 
could not do as individuals.
86
  Pufendorf opposed the notion that sovereignty was 
an extension of the divine (God), and proposed that it resided in the “association 
of men as a civil state.”87  Pufendorf did hold that sovereign power was “supreme” 
and no man could be superior to the sovereign.
88
  Like preceding authors who 
advanced the theory that sovereignty was established for the protection and 
security of society, Pufendorf also agreed with this stance, 
 Just as supreme civil sovereignty is established for the preservation of mankind, and in 
 order to put an end to the infinite miseries of a state of nature, so it is to mankind's 
 greatest interest that it be held sacrosanct and inviolable by all its members
.89 
This state would perform its functions through a “supreme sovereign” whether 
that sovereign was an individual or a council, whomever, or whatever held 
sovereignty would have supreme control over laws and property.
90
  The “supreme 
sovereign” was vested with legislative power, judicial power, the right of war and 
peace, the power to appoint ministers and magistrates, and other state functions.
91
 
 
As Pufendorf described sovereignty as supreme, his logic followed that the 
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sovereign could have no other superior, the acts of the sovereign could not be 
voided, and as such the sovereign could not, and would not be liable for his 
actions.
92
  This can be understood as meaning that externally, the sovereign state 
would submit to no other foreign power, and internally, there was no higher 
authority than the sovereign power. 
 
However, in the exercise of sovereign power within the state, Pufendorf had this 
to say: 
 For in submitting his will to the will of his prince, a man is understood to have done so 
 with the thought in mind that his sovereign would will nothing but what is just and for the 
 advantage of the state.  On this point it seems we must say, that an action which proceeds 
 from an abuse and debasing of the public will, is still in itself a public action belonging to 
 the state, because it is performed by the sovereign as such.
93 
This reflects Pufendorf's Natural law approach to sovereignty, as a more 
moralistic rather than explicitly legal theorem.  It also illustrates that while 
sovereign authority may be supreme, it must also be just, and that deviation from 
'just' behaviour by the sovereign is still considered to be a sovereign act.  
Internally, the sovereign will do as he sees fit, the ideal would be that his actions 
are conscionable, but if the acts do not fit that ideal, it does not render them void. 
While sovereignty was a supreme form of authority, Pufendorf also believed that 
there existed a “pact” between sovereign and citizen.  This pact formed the basis 
of a sovereign's duty to their people, which Pufendorf described in the following 
way: 
 The duty of a prince concerns his subjects either as a whole or individually.  He owes 
 them as a whole his care for the safety of the whole state, and this if he is absolute, 
 according to his own judgement, if he is limited by certain laws, according as they define 
 the manner of his government
.94 
 
While Pufendorf did assert that the sovereign was supreme, he disagreed that the 
nature of supreme sovereignty was absolute.  For Pufendorf, absolute sovereignty 
existed in theory, but not always in practice. 
 Therefore, it lies entirely within the will of free peoples, when they grant a king 
 sovereignty, as to whether they wish it to be absolute or restricted by certain laws, 
 provided, of course, such laws have in them nothing impious, and do not obstruct the end 
 of sovereignty itself.
95 
So while sovereignty was, according to Pufendorf, the supreme power within a 
state, it was not an absolute power, its restriction and limitation existing in the 
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constitutional arrangements of the state.
96
  Sovereignty was not only limited 
constitutionally, but also morally.  Sovereigns were obligated upon taking the 
throne, to administer their sovereignty justly, to secure the state from threats 
justly, but what course of action he chose would be left to his own judgement.  
However, though the administration of sovereignty could be restricted according 
to laws, which if the sovereign broke signified a breach of faith between sovereign 
and subject, citizens had no form of recourse, and were powerless to disobey the 
sovereign, or to make his actions void: 
 For if the king says that the safety of the people, or the real welfare of the state, demands 
 that (and such a presumption always attends the acts of a king), the citizens have nothing 
 to reply, since they have not the power to take cognizance as to whether or not the 
 necessity of the state demands such measures.
97
 
 
By describing the relationship between sovereign and citizen in this way, 
Pufendorf essentially placed a limitation on the exercise of an absolute power, 
morally at least, by the sovereign as he relates to his subjects.
98
 
But this sovereign power, whether absolute or limited, was exercised in much the 
same way as imagined by previous authors.  The different powers of sovereignty 
were; legislative, judicial, the power to make war and peace, and the power to 
appoint people to official positions of government.
99
  These powers, according to 
Pufendorf, as all preceding authors have noted, are indivisible in nature, and their 
indivisibility is a necessity for maintaining state unity: 
 … these parts of supreme sovereignty are naturally so united and bounded up with one 
 another, that, if we should imagine some of them to be independently within the control 
 of one man, and some within the control of others, the regular form of a state would be 
 entirely destroyed.
100
 
 
Sovereignty is then the primary force that binds together individuals within a state 
and maintains peace and unity within it.  Essentially, Pufendorf's theory of 
sovereignty was somewhat of a compromise between Grotius' and Hobbes' own 
conceptions.  He sought a more pragmatic foundation anchored in natural law, and 
introduced a supreme, but moral form of sovereignty.  It was not essential to 
Pufendorf, for the sovereign to be absolute, and these ideas would dominate in 
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Germany up until the French Revolution.
101
 
 
2.2.6 Emmerich de Vattel 
Following Pufendorf, the first explicit attempt that linked sovereignty with the 
international legal order was Emmerich de Vattel's Le droit des Gens, (The Law of 
Nations), in 1758.   According to Vattel, a Nation, or State, was a political body, a 
unified society of men who came together to achieve mutual welfare and 
security.
102
  To Vattel, internal sovereignty was how sovereignty was exercised 
within the state, through the “public political authority” that was intended to 
govern.
103  
A public authority was established by the society of men coming 
together to form a State, it had a utilitarian existence, and its nature would not be 
changed whether it existed in a Monarchy, or a council of men.
104
   
 
According to Vattel, every State that governed itself, and did not depend upon any 
other State, was a sovereign State.  It was truly independent, governed by its own 
authority, and by its own laws.
105
  To Vattel, the Law of Nations was “the law of 
sovereigns”:106   
 Of all the rights possessed by a Nation that of sovereignty is doubtless the most 
 important, and the one which others should most carefully respect if they are desirous not 
 to cause for offense.
107
 
The Law of Nations presented Vattel's ideal, that in a society of nations, the 
members of such a society enjoy equality as sovereign states.
108
  Vattel used the 
nature of man as an analogy, men by nature were equal, and the rights and 
obligations they possessed were equal also, to describe the equality, and rights and 
obligations, of the Nation state.  The equality of Nations was described by Vattel 
in the following way: 
 A dwarf is as much a man as a giant is; a small Republic is no less a sovereign state than 
 the most powerful kingdom.  From this equality it necessarily follows that what is lawful 
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 or unlawful for one Nation is equally lawful or unlawful for every other Nation.
109
 
So internally, a State was free to govern its subjects as it saw fit to do without 
another State interfering, but externally, a State could not commit acts that would 
affect the external rights of another State.
110
  The external rights that states 
possessed arose from their respect for each other as members of the society of 
Nations.
111
  Vattel understood States were fully independent from each other, but 
were bound together by their mutual interests.
112
 
 
Vattel's apprehension of sovereignty is akin to Westphalian sovereignty – that 
states should not intervene in the internal affairs of other states, that states are 
independent, and should determine their own form of governments.
113
   
 
Internally, when the citizens of a state recognise one as a legitimate sovereign, 
they then owe their sovereign “faithful obedience” and by submitting to a 
sovereign citizens accept a diminishing of their own rights.
114
  However, for 
Vattel, obedience and the diminishing of personal rights did not mean blind 
obedience in the face of grave injustice. 
 But when it is a case of clear and glaring wrongs, when a prince for no apparent reason 
 attempts to take away our life, or deprive us of things without which life would be 
 miserable, who will question the right to resist him?  The care of our existence is not only 
 a matter of natural right but of natural obligation as well; not many may give it up entirely 
 and absolutely; and even though he could give it up, is it to be thought that he has done so 
 by the compact of civil society when he entered into it for the sole purpose of obtaining 
 greater security for his personal safety?
115
 
According to Vattel, the sovereign power can be limited by the fundamental laws 
of a state.  It is then the responsibility of the sovereign to honour and adhere to 
these laws.  They are part of the constitutional make up of the state.  The 
constitutional purpose of these fundamental laws', is as a foundation for peace 
within society, and to support the sovereign's own authority.
116
  However, if a 
sovereign violated these fundamental laws it would be an act of tyranny, his 
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subjects had a lawful cause for revolt, and resistance.
117
  If a situation arose, 
where citizens revolted against a tyrannical sovereign, the principle of non-
intervention no longer held true, and a foreign state could assist citizens in their 
plight with aid if it was asked for.
118
  This was the only time that the shield of 
sovereignty and non-intervention could be pierced by a foreign nation, otherwise 
in all other aspects of government internal sovereignty was paramount. 
 
2.2.7 Napoleonic Wars and World War I 
Following the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries, which were an era of intellectualism and 
rational philosophy that contributed to the development of the concept of 
sovereignty and international law as a whole, the 19
th
 century would be marked by 
an expansionist and positivist era, led by the Napoleonic wars.
119
  During the 
French Revolution, and Napoleonic wars, between 1789-1814 international law 
seemed “non-existent”.120  Napoleon embraced expansionism (the expansion of 
state boundaries by military force) under the guise of liberty and self-
determination, but really sought only to dominate western Europe through 
military force.
121
  European States acted together collectively in an anti-
Napoleonic coalition to defeat France, and ended the war with the signing of the  
Treaty of Paris.
122
  Europe had almost been reconfigured by the Napoleonic wars, 
and following the conclusion of the war, the Congress of Vienna, an “assemblage 
of statesmen” came together to “reconstruct the States System of Europe”.123 
 
This marked the first time, since the Peace of Westphalia, that sovereign states 
endeavoured to form some kind of “world unity” known as the Concert of 
Europe.
124
  This system was not rigidly formalised, but consisted of the Allied 
powers in a “loose system of consultation” exercising hegemonic control over 
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other European states.
125 
 It also embraced a notion of sovereignty that was 
Westphalian in nature, absolute, unlimited authority. While not a perfect state 
system, and not without challenges, it avoided an all out inter-state war until 1914, 
where the result of imperialism, militarism, and colonialism and “sovereign 
excesses”126 led to the outbreak of World War I.127 
 
World War I had a devastating effect, both for the excessive loss of life, but also 
the treatment of civilians by their own government (Turkey) and the aggression 
shown by Germany to other European states.
128 
 At the end of the First World War, 
the United States of America's President Wilson developed his Fourteen Points, 
these Points were principles that were a foundation for peace to be established.  
The Fourteen Points were brought into discussion at Versailles the Treaty of 
Versailles 1919 was written into the Covenant of the League of Nations,
129
 it was 
signed in 1919, and came into effect in 1920. 
 
2.2.8 The League of Nations 
The League of Nations was the first attempt at collective security in an 
international society based on states.  The Covenant of the League expressed its 
purpose as “international co-operation to achieve international peace and security” 
by accepting the obligation not to resort to war, and (inter alia) accepting 
international law as a rule of conduct amongst Governments.
130 
 Sovereignty was 
not explicitly recognised as a founding principle of the covenant, political 
independence was the focus rather than sovereignty.
131
    
 
Membership of the League was not universal, Articles 1 and 2 of the Covenant 
specified the ways in which States became members.  Article 1 covered “Original 
Members”, States that were signatories to the Treaty of Peace (regardless of 
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whether they had ratified it or not), and neutral States that were named in the 
Annex of the Covenant.  Article 2 related to Membership by admission of any 
“self-governing State, Dominion or Colony”.132  States had no qualms leaving the 
League.  Germany, as a former enemy State, was restrained from entering the 
League until 1926, it left shortly after when Hitler ascended to power in 1933.  
Japan's occupation of Manchuria in China, led the League to send a commission 
of inquiry, leading Japan to leave the League in 1933.  Italy left the League in 
1937 after the League declared Italy an aggressor for its invasion of Ethiopia in 
1935.  The League had ordered sanctions against Italy, but they were never 
enforced.  The Soviet Union which had not become a member until 1934 was 
expelled in 1941 following its invasion of Finland.
133 
 The United States never 
became a member of the League, believing that the League would have too much 
influence upon its internal sovereignty.
134
  Opponents in the United States asserted 
that the League impaired congressional, presidential, and federal authority, over 
internal issues, that would detrimentally limit the exercise of internal state 
sovereignty.
135
 
 
The League formed a Council, which was composed of the five great powers, and 
four states elected from the remaining members.  The Council of the League of 
Nations was responsible for issues that concerned collective security.  The 
resolutions issued by the Council did not carry binding force, and required the 
unanimous consent of all members of the League.
136
 
 
While sovereignty may not have been an explicit principle expounded by the 
Covenant, the League did take into account issues relating to state sovereignty, 
although, in a somewhat negative fashion.  The League of Nations refused to 
admit Liechtenstein in 1920, and cited that Liechtenstein had passed over some of 
the attributes of sovereignty to another state, and in doing so would be unable to 
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carry out its obligations under the Covenant.
137
 
 
The first foray into a system of collective security founded on the State in the 
form of the League of Nations collapsed.  Germany had been militarily weakened 
substantially, but the inability of the League to perform resulted in Germany's 
transformation into a military power once again in 1939.
138
 
The League's powers under the Covenant were revolutionary at the time of its 
inception, but their effectiveness was severely limited by States governments' un-
willingness to use them.
139
  When the Second Word War began, it was apparent 
that the League of Nations had failed the purpose for which it had been set up.  
The foundering of the League of Nations was the impetus for the international 
community to consider a new inter-governmental organisation.  
 
2.2.9 The United Nations 
The lesson that the international community learnt from the failure of the League, 
and the second outbreak of world war, was the need for collective action to 
prevent future threats to international peace and security, and prevent aggression 
by States towards other States.
140
  Eric Engle described the repercussions of World 
War I and II in the following way: 
 In the end the myth of the nation state proved itself to be a bloody nightmare.  Rather than 
 enabling humans to reach their maximum capacities, the nation state had become an idol 
 which sought human sacrifices on the plains of Belgium in 1914 and throughout the 
 European continent between 1939 and 1945.
141
 
In order to prevent such a catastrophic war in the future, States took an active 
interest in developing an international organisation that would not falter.  At a 
conference in Moscow held in 1943 the governments of the United States, the 
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China made the declaration that an 
international organisation based on sovereign equality, with universal membership 
by all states, was a necessity for assured international peace and security.
142
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The new international organisation and its founding Charter went through phases 
of development.  First, private individuals, and private groups put forward their 
proposals and ideas for how a lasting peace could be achieved.
143
  Secondly, 
expert bodies, diplomats, bureaucrats, and government ministries began to frame 
up what such an organisation would look like.
144
  Third, from 1943 on, heads of 
state, and ministers, addressed the establishment of a new international 
organisation in conferences and communiques.
145
  The Dumbarton Oaks 
Conference in 1944 made significant progress, but not without difficulty, with two 
meetings between the UK, United States and Soviet Union, then the UK, United 
States and China taking place.
146
  A measure of agreement was reached in 
principle regarding the establishment of an international organisation, and 
produced a paper 'Proposals for the Establishment of a General International 
Organisation', which became a key document in the subsequent Yalta and San 
Francisco conferences.  The San Francisco conference concluded the efforts of a 
multitude of individuals working on behalf of their states, and state leaders 
themselves, the Charter of the United Nations was unanimously adopted on 25 
June 1945, and the following day, the representatives of the fifty participating 
states signed the Charter without reservations.
147
 
 
The Charter of the United Nations upheld the principles of sovereign equality, 
non-intervention, and refraining from the use of force, but it also provided for the 
establishment of a Security Council, that was charged with maintaining 
international peace and security, and determining threats to that peace and 
security.   
The significance of the principle of sovereignty in international law was 
recognised when it was codified in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.  
Article 2(1) of the Charter states that: 
 The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.148 
Article 2 contains some of the elements that have defined the term 'sovereignty' 
since it was first introduced into political and legal discourse by Jean Bodin in his 
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work The Six Books of the Commonwealth (Les Six Livres de la Republique) in 
1572. 
Article 2(4) states that- 
 All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
 against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
 manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
149 
Article 2(7) states that- 
 Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene 
 in matters which  are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall 
 require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but 
 this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 
 VII. 
150 
 
Article 2(4) and 2(7) reflect the principle of internal sovereignty in relation to 
other States, that a State should be free from external interference in matters 
exclusively within its jurisdiction.  Article 2(7) is the codification of the protection 
of state sovereignty.  However, there is a progression in how sovereignty can be 
perceived, no longer can states be protected absolutely by their inherent internal 
sovereignty.  Sovereignty no longer means “absolute power, or complete 
independence”, but can now be interpreted as sovereign independence within the 
confines of international law, though this formal interpretation does not indicate 
whether there are substantive attributes of sovereignty,
151
 as there were when it 
was first introduced into political legal theory.   
 
The most significant aspect of the establishment of the United Nations, was the 
constitution of the United Nations Security Council.  The Security Council's 
specific purpose is the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 
24(1), and its powers are contained in Chapter VII of the Charter.  The Security 
Council is composed of fifteen members, eleven made up of member states of the 
United Nations, the remaining five positions are held permanently by the Republic 
of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.  
The permanent members of the Security Council possess the right to veto 
decisions on any procedural matters.
152
  Formerly, an attribute of sovereignty was 
the right of any sovereign to make peace or war (as long as it was “just”), the 
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Charter through  Articles 2(4) and (7), has limited that right, and force can only be 
used in self-defence (Article 51 of the Charter),
153
 or as authorised by the United 
Nations Security Council. 
 
The Security Council in fulfilling its functions now determines under Article 39 
whether a threat to peace and security exists.  If it has been determined that a 
threat does exist, States are encouraged by the Security Council to settle the 
dispute via peaceful means (Article 33(2), and if this is not successful, the 
Security Council can authorise military, and non-military enforcement measures, 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, which are binding on member states.  The effect 
of creating an organisation for the purpose of collective security has bound 
sovereign states together within an international legal forum, and has also created 
a tentative balance between international law, collective peace and security, and 
state sovereignty. 
 
With the advent of the United Nations, and its subsidiary organ the Security 
Council, the power of sovereignty could no longer be considered absolute, 
sovereign states could no longer act with impunity towards their citizens, without 
fear of repercussion from the international community.  However a new challenge 
to sovereignty and the effectiveness of the UNSC would begin when the Cold War 
began.  It was an “ideological and military rivalry”154 between “East” and “West”, 
based on power politics that managed to limit some of the foreseen benefits from 
the previous strides that had been made after WWII in expanding the definition of 
state sovereignty.
155  
During this time, the United Nations and the Security Council 
were somewhat incapacitated to deal with inter-state war, or,  intra-state 
tyranny.
156
  The ideological differences between Western, and Eastern nations 
rendered the Security Council ineffective in making decisions regarding inter-state 
disputes due to the exercise of the veto.  It also brought to the forefront internal 
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state sovereignty, the relationship between a state government and its citizens 
were still the domestic domain of the state in question.
157
 
 
The fall of the Berlin wall marked the end of the Cold War,
158
 and inducted a time 
when states were able to settle old disputes, and inter-state conflicts declined.  
They were replaced however, by intra-state conflicts that offered up their own 
challenges for the international community in addressing and containing conflicts 
that were, by their very nature, under the sovereign state's internal jurisdiction.
159
   
Human rights, and humanitarian concerns became the focus within the 
international community.  State sovereignty was viewed as a barrier to the 
effective implementation of human rights within states, and internal state 
sovereignty became the subject of international examination.
160
  The “old ideas” 
regarding state sovereignty were being challenged by the international 
community, and citizens of states where unaccountable governments committed 
heinous atrocities against them.
161
  Members of the international community 
would try to challenge the prohibition of intervention in a state's internal 
sovereignty by promoting the principle of intervention for humanitarian 
reasons.
162
 
Intervention in a state's internal jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons has been 
described as the “greatest erosion of sovereignty”,163 but it is also described as an 
ambiguous theory.
164
 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
Examining how sovereignty has evolved since its earliest inception has indicated 
that evolution, in terms of expanding the understanding of the doctrine, takes 
place in several ways.  From its earliest inception, sovereignty as a concept was 
expanded upon by legal theorists and jurisprudential thought based in a European 
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context.  The theory was and still is a reaction to conflict and warfare, and 
sovereignty is viewed as an answer, or remedy to mitigate the ill effects of armed 
conflict.  
This was followed by practical application, the concept of sovereignty in action, 
with the negotiation of the Peace of Westphalia by sovereign states.  Subsequently 
the development of sovereignty is theoretical, followed by engagement between 
sovereign states externally via expansionist actions, and then through the 
negotiation of peace treaties.  This continues until multiple states observe that a 
collective form of peace and security would circumvent violations of state 
sovereignty.  There is a lack of theoretical support for the development of the 
League of Nations, but not so for the United Nations.  The effort put into 
developing a lasting international organisation for the purpose of peace and 
security has managed to sustain itself, even during times where dominant states 
diplomatic relationships have disintegrated.  The 1990s saw a rise in states 
experiencing humanitarian crises that the international community found difficult 
to respond to, due to entrenched respect for sovereign equality, and state's own 
internal sovereignty.  How sovereignty has evolved following a period where 
humanitarian intervention has become a significant consideration will be 
examined in the following section. 
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3. Humanitarian Intervention 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The military intervention that took place in Libya was authorised by the UN 
Security Council.  The Security Council considered that the attacks carried out by 
the Libyan government could amount to crimes against humanity.
165
  The military 
intervention was carried out, among other things, to “protect civilians” and ensure 
the “unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance.”  Resolution 1973 is the first 
time the UN Security Council has authorised intervention in the affairs of another 
state, without that functioning state's consent.
166
  Prior to the formation of the 
United Nations interventions have been carried out by states without the 
intervened state's consent
167
, and the greatest example of a humanitarian 
intervention carried out without the intervened state's consent or the authorisation 
of the Security Council was the NATO intervention in Kosovo. 
 
States argued that the Libyan government, by its reprehensible actions, had lost its 
legitimacy,
168
 and that the Security Council had to act in order to protect the 
civilian population of Libya. Humanitarian intervention that has not been 
authorised by the UN Security Council has, by some authors,
169
 been viewed as a 
violation of international law, and the inviolable principle of state sovereignty.  
Has the concept of sovereignty changed?  Are humanitarian interventions now 
acceptable, if authorised by the Security Council, regardless of state consent as 
long as their purpose is for the protection of civilians, and, the government has 
lost legitimacy in the eyes of the international community?  How has 
humanitarian intervention been addressed in international law in the past? 
 
3.2 A Brief History of the Concept of Humanitarian Intervention 
The origin of the concept of humanitarian intervention has been traced back as far 
as the Crusades by Fonteyne, and also during the religious wars of the 16
th
 and 
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17
th
 centuries.
170
  During the wars of the 16
th
 and 17
th
 century, a state would 
intervene in the affairs of another state for the protection of citizens who faced 
oppression from the ruling authority for their religious beliefs, but shared the 
same religious faith as the intervening state.  It was “religious solidarity” rather 
than humanitarian motives that resulted in interventions.   
 
Humanitarian intervention as it is understood today, was largely constructed in the 
19
th
 century.
171  
While earlier humanitarian intervention relied on religious 
commonality, the 19
th
 century saw the development of intervention for 
humanitarian reasons.
172
 States began to explicitly refer to humanitarian reasons 
as justifications for interventions.
173
  Ian Brownlie describes the late 19
th
 century 
model of humanitarian intervention as one that is characterised by, 
 A state which had abused its sovereignty by brutal and excessively cruel treatment of 
 those within its power, whether nationals or not, was regarded as having made itself liable 
 to action by any state which was prepared to intervene.  The action was thus in the nature 
 of a police measure, and no change of sovereignty could result.
174 
Brownlie was critical of interventions carried out in the late 19
th
 century and 
described them as a “cloak for episodes of imperialism” citing the invasion of 
Cuba by the United States in 1898 as an example of such imperialism.  Brownlie 
also declared that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention did not last beyond 
1919.
175
   
 
Following World War I, the humanitarian principles that underscored some of the 
reasons for state intervention in another state, were demonstrated in treaties for 
the protection of human rights.  These guarantees were vested in the League of 
Nations, which at the time was the organ charged with ensuring the terms of 
treaties were adhered to.  With the break down of the League of Nations in the 
face of the break out of another World War, States were no longer willing to 
intervene, individually, or collectively, for humanitarian purposes.
176
 
 
During World War II, acts of aggression carried out by Germany toward Austria, 
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Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and acts of oppression against minorities, and finally 
the genocide of Jews in the 1930s, the international community of States were 
unwilling to intervene.
177
  Post-World War II and the United Nations system 
changed the perception of humanitarian intervention within international law, as 
this section will demonstrate.  While Malcolm Shaw accepted that in the 19
th
 
century the doctrine of humanitarian intervention may have been accepted in 
international law, it would become difficult to reconcile the doctrine with the 
relevant provisions of the UN Charter in the 21
st
 century.
178
 
 
3.3 Humanitarian Intervention: Defined in a Post-UN Charter World 
A strict interpretation of the provisions of the Charter results in a prohibition on 
humanitarian intervention.  However, an observance of State practice, the practice 
of regional and mutual defence organisations, and the UN's subsidiary organs, 
lends itself to the conclusion that exceptions are being made on a case by case 
basis, and the gap between legality and legitimacy is becoming more and more 
fluid.
179
  Humanitarian intervention is a concept distinct from humanitarian 
assistance, or aid.  Humanitarian intervention, in this paper, is primarily concerned 
with military or forcible intervention for the purpose of preventing or stopping 
gross human rights abuses. 
 
Defining the concept of humanitarian intervention can be difficult, some authors 
have defined humanitarian intervention according to their own personal views on 
its validity.
180
  The myriad of definitions can produce a nuanced understanding of 
humanitarian intervention.  The definitions presented are in essence alike, but also 
contain subtle differences. 
 
In 1948 Hersch Lauterpacht has defined humanitarian intervention as: 
 … dictatorial interference by a State in the affairs of another State for the purpose of 
 maintaining or altering the actual conditions of things.  Such intervention can take place 
 by right or without right but it always concerns the external independence or territorial or 
 personal supremacy of the States concerned.
181 
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Lauterpacht's definition highlights some key elements and issues regarding an 
intervention, such as the impact that an intervention will have on the intervened 
state's external independence, and territorial integrity.  The use of the words 
“dictatorial interference” is a reference to how intervention had been defined 
under classical international law, and is used to imply the necessity in intervention 
for the use of force or a similar form of “imperative pressure”.182 
 
The 1970 Declaration on the Friendly Relations among States
183
 adopted by the 
UN General Assembly, provided its own definition concerning intervention in a 
state, The Declaration addresses relations between sovereign States, and gives 
expression to the consensus regarding the concept of intervention and its 
relationship with international law.  The Declaration defined intervention as: 
 No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
 whatever, in the  internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed 
 intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the 
 personality of the State or against its political, economic and  cultural elements, are in 
 violation of international law.
184 
States are obligated under this Declaration to refrain from using coercion in order 
to subordinate another State in its exercise of its sovereign rights.
185
  The 
Declaration, as consensually decided, broadens the concept of intervention, it 
takes into account the nature of the act of intervention, and the effect that 
intervention will have on a State.
186
 
 
In the 1986 judgment Nicaragua case
187
 the ICJ confirmed the broad concept of 
intervention as it was described in the 1970 Declaration: 
 In this respect it notes that, in view of the generally accepted formulations, the principle 
 forbids al1 States or groups of States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or 
 external affairs of other States. A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing 
 on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty. to 
 decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political,  economic,  social and cultural 
 system, and the formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses 
 methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain free ones.
188 
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According to the Court, intervention that would affect a sovereign state's ability to 
freely decide its course of action on matters distinctly related to its nature as a 
sovereign state was prohibited.  The Court did consider the impact that human 
rights and humanitarian considerations may have on the legality of the US 
intervention in Nicaragua.  It determined that the use of force was not “the 
appropriate method” to ensure respect for human rights.189  Nor did the Court 
consider that the methods used by the US (mining ports, destruction of oil 
installations, training, arming and equipping the contras) as in keeping with a 
humanitarian objective.
190
  Two things can be surmised from this; one is that in 
the Nicaragua case the Court did not support the use of force as the means by 
which human rights should be protected, and secondly, that certain military 
activities are not compatible with a humanitarian objective,
191
 and neither can be 
used as a justification for intervention.
192
 
 
Scott H Fairley's definition in 1980 of humanitarian intervention included his 
views of the type of action that should be taken, his definition was: 
 … humanitarian intervention occurs when a state or groups of states interferes, by the use 
 of force in order to impose its will in the internal or external affairs of another state, 
 sovereign and independent without its consent for the purpose of protection of individuals 
 or groups of individuals from their own state or within the territory of a state where the 
 governing authority permits gross abuses of human rights or itself maltreats its subjects in 
 a manner which shocks the conscience of mankind.
193 
Fairley's definition also refers to consent.  Lack of consent from a state engaging 
in gross human rights abuses warrants the imposition of an external state (or 
states') will in its internal, or external, affairs.  The will of an external state is 
imposed for the purpose of protecting civilians from their own government.  
Fairley's definition is akin to Grotius's assertion that the most “far reaching 
reason” for going to war with another state is to “protect the subjects of another 
ruler”.194  For Grotius, the “common tie of humanity” was a sufficient reason for 
going to war with another state, although he did question the legality of such a 
war as “every ruler has claimed a special right over his own subjects.”195 
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Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts defined humanitarian intervention in 
1992 in terms of its legal basis: 
 … when a State renders itself guilty of cruelties against and persecution of its nationals in 
 such a way as to  deny their fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience of 
 mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity is legally permissible.
196 
Jenning's and Watts' definition introduces the idea that humanitarian intervention 
is legally permissible in situations where the denigration of human rights has 
reached such a level that humankind would be collectively appalled.  Intervention 
carried out for the sake of humankind's very humanity is therefore legal and 
warranted.  The implications of this definition is that there may be some kind of 
threshold required to warrant a humanitarian intervention.  According to Jenning's 
and Watts' definition it would be a situation that would “shock the conscience of 
mankind” which indicates that the threshold would be a high one to meet in terms 
of shock value, and loss of human life.   
 
Also in 1992, Wil Verwey defined humanitarian intervention as: 
 The threat or use of force by a state or states abroad, for the sole purpose of preventing or 
 putting a halt to a serious violation of fundamental human rights, in particular the right to 
 life of persons, regardless of their nationality, with protection taking place neither upon 
 authorisation by relevant organs of the United Nations nor with permission by the 
 legitimate government of the target state.
197 
Verwey goes further than previous definitions; Verwey's definition does not 
require authorisation from the United Nations, or the consent of the government 
within the state. 
 
In 2003, J. L Holzgrefe defined humanitarian intervention as: 
 the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at 
 preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of 
 individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose 
 territory force is applied.
198 
In defining humanitarian intervention in this way, Holzgrefe excludes non-forcible 
intervention, and intervention for the protections of the intervening state's own 
nationals.  The focus of this definition is directly related to the question of 
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whether states can use force to protect the fundamental human rights of 
individuals within another state.
199
 
Definitions of humanitarian intervention hve often been limited to unilateral 
action (action without Security Council authorisation) taken by states, this form of 
definition should be tempered by the debate surrounding the scope of the UN 
Charter to allow for humanitarian intervention.  Susan Breau defines humanitarian 
intervention, in 2005, in terms of the Charter, and the legality of the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention as follows: 
 Actual or threatened military action by a state or group of states with or without 
 authorisation from the Security Council of the United Nations on the territory of another 
 state or groups of states without permission from that state. 
 A major purpose of the intervention for the intervening state or states is for the protection 
 of individuals or  groups of individuals from their own state, where the governing 
 authority of the state or group of states has permitted actual or threatened extreme 
 violations of human rights. 
 
 These violations of human rights could involve actual or threatened loss of life on a large 
 scale, indiscriminate use of torture and sexual assault on a large scale and could result in 
 the actual or potential massive displacement of the population.
200 
The purpose of undertaking humanitarian intervention can be for the protection of 
civilian citizens in the intervened state, or for the protection of a state's own 
nationals residing or located within a foreign state.  Susan Breau describes the 
protection of a state's nationals within another state as an extension of the doctrine 
of self-defence, a type of self-help, not a form of humanitarian intervention.
201  
 
Terry Nardin's 2006 definition of humanitarian intervention supports Breau's 
assertion that protection of a state's own nationals by intervening in another state 
does not constitute a humanitarian intervention, and describes the concept of 
humanitarian intervention in the following way: 
 Intervention is the exercise of authority by one state within the jurisdiction of another 
 state, but without its permission.  We speak of armed intervention when that exercise 
 involves the use of military force.  An armed intervention is humanitarian when its aim is 
 to protect innocent people who are not nationals of the intervening state from violence 
 perpetrated or permitted by the government of the target state.
202 
 
According to Nardin, intervention that is humanitarian in nature is for the purpose 
of protecting civilians (innocents) who are “not nationals” of the state intervening.    
The perspectives are divergent, according to some, the right of states to intervene 
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to protect their own nationals in another state appears to have been relegated to 
history, or at least, to the period of time before United Nations Charter law, 
according to others, it has become customary law.
203  
 
There have been several examples of States transgressing the territorial integrity 
of other States in order to rescue their own nationals.
204 
 Based on the examples of 
States intervening to protect their own nationals, it has been argued that a 
customary law to rescue State nationals exists, or is at least unlawful, but in order 
to see that the prohibition of force is not undermined, rescue of nationals is only 
permitted in certain conditions.
205
  Due to these divergent views, the protection of 
nationals abroad as an aspect of humanitarian intervention is still subject to some 
dispute. 
 
Three years after Nardin's definition, Sean D Murphy offers this explanation of 
humanitarian intervention: 
 The doctrine of humanitarian intervention essentially contemplates the use of military 
 force by one state (or a group of states) against another state not in self-defence but, 
 rather, to prevent the widespread deprivation of human rights.  While such use of force 
 might occur pursuant to authorization of the Security Council, the doctrine's principal 
 relevance is to serve as potential legal justification for a state or states to act without 
 Security Council authorization, conduct sometimes referred to as “unilateral” 
 humanitarian intervention.
206 
Murphy defines humanitarian intervention, but also qualifies its application.  The 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention, is in itself, sufficient legal justification for 
states to act individually, or collectively, without Security Council authorisation, 
to intervene in the internal jurisdiction of another state.  It would seem that 
Murphy is advocating for a form of collective security that resides outside the 
purview of the Security Council,    However, Murphy goes on to qualify this form 
of intervention by reference to “consent”. In situations where states do not consent 
to intervention by another state, authorisation from the Security Council must be 
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sought.
207  
From this, it can be concluded that without consent from the intended 
State, or without Security Council authorisation, an intervention carried out for 
humanitarian purposes lacks sufficient legal justification. 
 
From the preceding definitions some commonalities can be identified.  
Humanitarian intervention is undertaken by an external state using military force 
(armed intervention, or forcible intervention) against the “target” state. It crosses 
into the “target” state's territory, and into its internal jurisdiction, and in doing so, 
undermines the sovereignty of the “target” state. The purpose of humanitarian 
intervention is to protect civilians from gross human rights violations by the 
governing authority.  Where these civilians are in fact nationals of the intervening 
state, then it may be considered an act of self-defence, not humanitarian 
intervention (though in certain circumstances, a case could be made for a 
customary right of intervention).   
 
Some humanitarian interventions take place with the authorisation of the United 
Nations Security Council.  Some humanitarian interventions do not have UN 
Security Council authorisation.  Some authors believe the former is a requirement 
where consent has not been granted by the “target” state, other authors believe 
that neither consent, nor UN Security Council authorisation is a requirement for 
humanitarian intervention to take place.   
There can then be two forms of humanitarian intervention, the first is UN 
authorised humanitarian intervention, and the second is a state, or states acting 
without UN authorisation, which is often described as “unilateralism”.208  This 
form of action is one where States choose to accomplish an intervention 
independent from other States or the United Nations.  They can also act multi-
laterally, where a group of States choose to act outside of the United Nations 
system.
209
 
 
With these commonalities some issues arise regarding the legal basis of 
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humanitarian intervention.  Humanitarian intervention presents a challenge, not 
just to state sovereignty, but also to the provisions within the United Nations 
Charter.  The prohibition on the threat, or use of force, is one challenging aspect 
of humanitarian intervention.  The principle of non-intervention in the internal 
jurisdiction of another state is another challenge.  Lastly, and most importantly, 
humanitarian intervention poses a challenge to sovereignty, which is the 
fundamental principle of international law. 
 
3.4 Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention Within the Context of the 
 Charter 
The Charter of the United Nations upholds the principles of sovereign equality, 
non-intervention, and the prohibition on the threat or use of force.  Articles 2(4) 
and 2(7) reflect the principles that sovereign states should be free from 
interference in their internal jurisdiction and free from the threat of force, or have 
force used against them.  The drafting of the Charter in this way was intentional 
and considered to be a necessity to preserve and assure international peace and 
security.  Sovereign independence and territorial integrity are now considered 
within the framework of the United Nations system and international law. 
 
3.4.1 Article 2(1), 2(4) and 2(7) 
Intervention in the internal jurisdiction of another state violates the fundamental 
principle of state sovereignty within international law.  Sovereignty is the 
foundation on which international relations rests, and its significance has been 
recognised in the Charter of the United Nations in Article 2(1).   
 
For States undertaking forcible intervention by military means in another state for 
humanitarian reasons, or otherwise, would appear to be a violation of the 
fundamental principle of sovereignty, the prohibition on the threat or use of force, 
and the principle against intervention in another state's internal jurisdiction.  
Humanitarian intervention, from the numerous definitions above, is intended to 
permit intervention in States by violating the territorial integrity of a State for the 
purpose of protecting civilians.  If humanitarian intervention is a violation of these 
fundamental principles, and it is a sovereign right of States to determine its own 
social, political, economic, and cultural institutions, does it then follow that it is a 
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sovereign right of states to use excessive force, rape, ethnic cleansing, genocide, 
and other war crimes, as a means of determining its internal institutions?  With the 
ascent of international human rights law, and international criminal law 
particularly the classification of crimes against humanity, genocide, and war 
crimes, as crimes (although it is individuals not states held responsible) under the 
Rome Statute,210 the inviolability of these principles is brought into question. 
 
3.4.2 The Threat or Use of Force, and Intervention 
 Article 2(4) 
 All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
 against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
 manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
211
  
 
An aspect of the principle of state sovereignty is that it is inviolable.  
Humanitarian intervention, in principle, if applied, pierces the inviolable nature of 
sovereignty, as provided for in Article 2(4), this inviolability prohibits the use of 
force against the “territorial integrity” or “political independence” of a state.212  
The purpose of the prohibition on the threat or use of force is as a preventive 
measure against war.  Article 2(4) was also intended to prohibit States acting 
unilaterally by limiting control of the use of force within the Security Council, 
under Chapter VII of the Charter.
213
  Up until the 20
th
 century, States were free to 
wage war,
214 
and it wasn't until the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 
that the international community came together and began its effort to limit States' 
ability to resort to war so freely.
215
   
 
After World War I, and the establishment of the League of Nations, greater efforts 
were made to restrain States in their freedom to resort to war.  However, within 
the framework of the League of Nations system, the right to resort to war was 
decelerated by the League's processes, it was not prohibited completely, and it was 
only in certain cases that were States prohibited from resorting to war.
216
  The 
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Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1924), and 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) both contained provisions restricting the right to 
resort to war for the purpose of self-defence.  However, the Protocol, and the Pact, 
each had its own limitations, the former was not binding law upon States, and the 
latter was not supported by a robust system of sanctions.
217
 
The short-comings of the earlier treaties regarding the freedom of States right to 
resort to war (in other words: use force against other States) was addressed by the 
Charter of the United Nations in Article 2(4).  Article 2(4) prohibited the use of 
military force, and was also: 
 ...characterized by a contextual relationship with the multilateral system of enforcement 
 provided for in Chapter VII UN Charter.
218 
Article 2(4) specifically, prohibits the use of force, rather than the right to resort to 
war, and it also extends to the threat of force, unlike the attempts to limit the right 
to resort to war in previous treaty law.  Article 2(4) is supported by the collective 
sanctions contained in Articles 39-51 of the UN Charter.
219
  Now, Article 2(4) is 
integral to any discussions within international law regarding a State's threatened 
use, or use of, force.
220
   
 
Under the Charter system, individual States are no longer able to include the use 
of force as an instrument of their foreign policy.
221
  Within the UN Charter, there 
has been no provision made for the concept of humanitarian intervention.  The 
judgment of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case is clear in its determination that there 
are no exceptions permitted under the Charter system to allow for humanitarian 
intervention.   
 The Court concludes that  acts constituting  a breach of the customary principle of non-
 intervention will also, if they directly or indirectly involve the use of force, constitute a 
 breach of the principle of non-use of force in international relations.
222
 
 
As such, the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) is a part of treaty and 
customary law, as well as being ius cogens.  As there is no provision in the 
Charter for humanitarian intervention, some critics have argued, that since Article 
2(4) is ius cogens that there is an absolute prohibition on the use of force in 
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international law.  However there is no definitive agreed statement as to the 
breadth of this prohibition.
223  
The disagreement regarding the scope of the 
prohibition is predicated upon the words of Article 2(4) “against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations”.  Should these words be interpreted as a 
rigid prohibition on all and any use of force against another State, or is there room 
for an interpretation that allows for the use of force as long as it is not for the 
purpose of overthrowing a government, or seizing territory of another State, and 
the force is in keeping with the purposes of the UN?
224
  This question regarding 
the interpretation of Article 2(4) is integral to the debate over the legality of 
humanitarian intervention. 
 
Those who support establishing humanitarian intervention as a legitimate and 
legal intervention using force propose that Article 2(4) does not explicitly prohibit 
humanitarian intervention.  The language of Article 2(4) states that force should 
not be used in a “manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations.”  
When applying force to prevent genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity, it is argued, that the use of force is not entirely inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the Charter.
225
  Others have been more critical of interpreting the 
Charter as permitting the use of force in certain situations.  While humanitarian 
intervention may have had some basis in international law prior to the Charter, 
Article 2(4) has essentially removed any recourse to the use of force by one state 
against another.
226
 
 
The General Assembly passed several resolutions on the use of force which 
outlaw any kind of forcible intervention, opposition to an interpretation that 
allows for humanitarian intervention as an exception to the prohibition in Article 
2(4) relied on these General Assembly resolutions to support their position that the 
prohibition in Article 2(4) cannot be altered without universal agreement.
227
 
The 1974 General Assembly resolution on the 'Definition of Aggression' is an 
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example of how the use of force has been interpreted and outlawed, it states that -  
 Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
 integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
 with the Charter of the United Nations as set out in this Definition.
228 
Article 6 states that nothing in the Definition enlarges or diminishes the scope of 
the Charter, including the Charter provisions where the use of force is lawful.  
While this definition, and the resolutions of the General Assembly may be 
informative and contain a principled approach, they are not binding and have no 
controlling force. 
 
The Security Council determines whether to resort to the use of force under 
Chapter VII of the Charter.  This practice, arguably, creates “contextual” 
exceptions to Article 2(4) of the Charter.
229
  In situations where the Security 
Council decides to forego the use of force for the purpose of intervention, then it 
is also arguable that it has protected the prohibition contained in Article 2(4), but 
also, that the SC treats each situation differently depending on certain factors.
230
  
These factors are: 
 … whether alternative remedies had been exhausted and whether the consequences that 
 were likely to have ensued had the violation not occurred would have exceeded in gravity 
 the consequences of the violation.  The differences in national law between exculpation 
 and mitigation may be considerable; however, in international law, the differences are 
 almost imperceptible.
231 
So when authorising the use of force, and potentially violating Article 2(4), the 
Security Council must consider whether the consequences of such a violation does 
not outweigh the consequences of not authorising the use of force.  Is it too much 
to expect that an international organisation made up of a multitude of States, each 
with their own distinctive sovereign character, can be capable of such foresight? 
 
Part of the consideration of authorising the use of force, is the correlating 
principle of non-intervention contained in Article 2(7).  When the Security 
Council authorises the use of force, they are essentially authorising a forcible 
intervention in a sovereign State.  Article 2(7) states: 
 Article 2(7) 
 Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene 
 in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall 
 require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but 
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 this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 
 Vll.  
The language of Article 2(7) provides protection from acts of intervention by the 
United Nations, but not, explicitly, acts of other states.  However, Article 2(7) has 
often been interpreted as the embodiment of the principle of non-intervention.
232
  
It has been argued though, that a strictly rigid interpretation of Article 2(7) would 
prevent the principle from evolving to reflect the present day conundrum of how 
the international community should respond to internal conflicts.
233
   
 
For international lawyers and scholars, (like Brownlie), every intervention is a 
violation of international law. 
 To them, no amount of state practice can change the law, because each new instance of 
 intervention is branded as a violation of the law.  This is another example of the 
 fundamental deficiencies of international law doctrine.  Custom appears and disappears; 
 sometimes practice creates law, sometimes it does not.
234 
When a situation arises within a State and the Security Council considers armed 
intervention, State representatives argue the validity of facts, the proportionality of 
the force that will be used, the necessity of the use of force, and any potential 
motives of the parties to the dispute.  The Security Council will then decide 
whether to act, or not to act as the case may be.
235
  Franck describes this process 
of the debates in the Security Council, both before and after recourse to the use 
force, as a form of “jurying”.236 
 
The instances in which the Security Council has acted to authorise the use of 
force, and in doing so authorised a forcible intervention, are just as illuminating as 
the instances when it has decided against authorising the use of force, and thereby 
limiting Member States ability to find recourse for intervention.  Humanitarian 
considerations are often at the crux of Security Council deliberations regarding 
whether or not to authorise the use of force.   
 
3.5 Resolutions Authorising the Use of Force for Humanitarian Purposes 
The debate around humanitarian intervention and its place within the international 
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legal system of states is best illuminated in context.  The following examples 
provide context for situations when humanitarian intervention has occurred, and 
when it hasn't.  The contrast between authorised humanitarian intervention, and 
unauthorised humanitarian intervention help clarify some of the challenges around 
intervention for humanitarian purposes. 
 
3.5.1 Iraq 
Resolution 688 (1991) concerning the Iraqi government's treatment of the Kurdish 
people did not authorise the use of force, but the resolution was later relied on by 
France, the U.K, and the U.S.A in justifying their interventionist actions.  The 
debate within the Security Council prior to adopting Resolution 688 (1991) 
contained direct reference to Article 2(7).  State representatives response ranged 
from viewing the resolution as a “flagrant, illegitimate intervention”,237 
“inconsistent”238 with the provisions of the Charter, and that by adopting such a 
resolution the Council was acting outside its purview by intervening in Iraq's 
internal affairs,
239
 and “contradicting” Article 2(7).240  On the other hand, during 
the debates, other States were reassured that respect for Iraq's territorial integrity 
and sovereignty would not be impacted and was supported by preamble's 
reference to Article 2(7) in Resolution 688.
241
  Ultimately, Resolution 688 was 
adopted by a vote of 10 in favour, 3 against,
242
 and two abstentions.
243
  When 
France, the U.K, and the U.S.A intervened in Iraq, they asserted that the 
authorisation of the use of force was “implied” under the resolution.244  As this 
“legal” justification became more and more flimsy, the U.K attempted to rely on 
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, and when wider State support could not 
be garnered for their actions, the illegality of their intervention was widely 
accepted.
245
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3.5.2 Somalia 
In Somalia, the peace-keeping force UNOSOM I (United Nations Operation in 
Somalia) established under Resolution 751 (1992)
246
 was unable to carry out its 
functions under its mandate due to continued tensions and lack of cooperation 
between the warring factions in Somalia.
247
  Initially, the Security Council was 
slow to respond to requests from aid agencies to intervene in Somalia to prevent a 
humanitarian crisis, it was held up by its concerns that intervening would be a 
violation of Article 2(7) of the Charter.  The fear from states, like Russia and 
China, was that intervention would set a “dangerous precedent”.248  Later though, 
the Security Council,  sought to address the continuing violence by passing 
Resolution 794 (1992)
249
 by a unanimous vote, and authorising the deployment of 
a multi-national military force to use “establish … the necessary conditions for the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance” in Somalia.250   
 
Within the resolution, the Security Council endorsed recommendations made by 
the Secretary-General in a letter
251
 addressed to the President of the Security 
Council.
252
  In this letter the Secretary-General referred to the “lack of 
government” in Somalia, that it was time to re-examine action under Chapter VII, 
and provided five options for the Security Council to consider.
253
  The focus of 
these five options was the delivery of humanitarian relief, as well as the creation 
of “political conditions” that would aid Somalia in resolving its political and 
economic problems.  The first option was to continue with the deployment of 
UNOSOM, which by the Secretary-General's own admission was untenable due to 
the deteriorating situation in Somalia, and resistance from the de-facto authorities 
operating in Somalia. 
 
The second option was for military to no longer protect the delivery of 
humanitarian relief, and humanitarian agencies would be left to negotiate the 
                                                 
246
 SC Res 751 S/RES/751 (1992). 
247
 Gray, above n 194, at 222. 
248
 Hilaire, above n 161, at 48. 
249
 SC Res 794, above n 15,. 
250
 SC Res 794, at [2]. 
251
 Letter Dated 29 November 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council S/24868 (1992) [“Secretary-General Letter S/24868]. 
252
 Secretary-General Letter 254,S/24868, above n 254. 
253
 Secretary-General Letter S/24868, above n 254. 
 48 
 
delivery of humanitarian aid with the Somali factions and clans, as best they 
could.  Again, another untenable option, as the Secretary-General admitted that 
without the presence of military personnel, humanitarian aid would become a part 
of Somalia's lawless economy, and not serve the purpose for which it was 
intended.  With these “options” clearly redundant, the Secretary-General put 
forward three more options that would, in some way, utilise force as provided for 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
Of the three options that would fall under Chapter VII, only option four was 
presented in language that made it viable.
254
  Option four, a country-wide 
operation carried out by Member States under the authorisation of the Security 
Council.  The United States had already proposed to lead such an operation, and 
the Secretary-General outlined several possibilities for the Security Council to 
consider in drafting the enabling resolution.  The intention behind a resolution 
authorising the use of force in this instance was, according to the Secretary-
General's letter, “how to create conditions for the uninterrupted delivery of relief 
supplies to the starving people of Somalia”,255 and also, to create conditions that 
would resolve the political and economic problems in Somalia.
256
 
 
Resolution 794 embraced the recommendation provided by the Secretary-General 
and acting under Chapter VII authorised Member States to “use all necessary 
means” to establish a secure environment in Somalia.257  Within the Security 
Council debate regarding Resolution 794, State representatives were careful in 
their use of language in discussing the application of the use of force. 
 … the question of Somalia is a unique situation that warrants a unique approach.  
 However, any unique situation adopted create of necessity a precedent against which 
 future, similar situations will be measured.  Since the situation in Somalia is the first of its 
 kind to be addressed by the Council, it is essential that it be handled correctly.
258 
The representative of Ecuador also referred to the exceptional nature of the 
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situation in Somalia, and the Security Council's response to it. 
 … the Somali crisis is an exceptional one, so much so that it requires a fresh kind of 
 analysis: political as well  as legal.
259 
The Belgian representative described the situation in Somalia as “atypical”,260 and 
the Venezuelan representative described the measures of the Resolution 794, and 
the situation in Somalia as “extraordinary”.261  The situation in Somalia, and the 
Security Council's response to it was exceptional.  It was an internal conflict, 
though it had an “international dimension”,262 the Security Council considered the 
“magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict” and the obstacles to the 
delivery of humanitarian aid to be a “threat to international peace and security”.  
The consideration that human tragedy was a threat to international peace and 
security indicated an expansion of the boundaries of what constituted a “threat”, 
and that it now included human tragedy.
263
  However, by describing the situation 
in Somalia as “unique”, “extraordinary”, and the Security Council's response as 
“exceptional”,264 the Security Council limited the application of an expanded 
concept of the use of force within this resolution, it would not apply to future 
resolutions and nor would the jurisprudence behind it. 
 
The situation in Somalia was also unique as there was no functioning government, 
the intervention undertaken by the Security Council did not contravene the will of 
the Somali government, as there was no government present.  When State 
representatives argued that the situation in Somali was “unique”, “extraordinary”, 
and “exceptional” due to the lack of government, they were ensuring that  the 
principle of sovereignty was not diminished by the setting of a new precedent 
allowing for humanitarian intervention in an internal armed conflict.
265
  
Authorisation of the use of force resulting in a military intervention in Somalia 
was potentially a violation of the principle of non-intervention contained in 
Article 2(7) of the Charter.  While a lack of government was a pertinent factor in 
the Security Council, and the Secretary-General's consideration of the situation in 
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Somalia, Wheeler makes the valid point that it is States that bear the rights and 
duties of sovereignty, under international law, not governments.
266
 
 … this argument is predicated upon the claim that the non-intervention rule was not at 
 stake because the state had ceased to exist.  This identifies the correct subject of rights 
 and duties, but, applied to the statements in the Security Council, it is tantamount to 
 arguing that the state had collapsed because the government had collapsed.  However, it is 
 clear from the customary law relating to state recognition that government and state are 
 not synonymous, with the former being a criterion for, but not wholly constitutive of, 
 statehood. Consequently, it is by no means certain that the collapse of the Somali 
 Government meant that the Somali state had ceased to exist in a juridical sense.
267 
Had the Security Council relied on the justification that the use of force was 
allowable due to Somalia being a failed State, it would have “exceeded its legal 
competence”, the authorisation of the use of force was, therefore, required to be 
based upon the devastating effect of human suffering as a “threat to international 
peace and security”.268 
 
The response by the Security Council was extraordinary not only because it was 
guided by humanitarian concerns, but also because it authorised the use of force 
and military intervention in an internal conflict.
269
  However, it was never 
explicitly stated that action under Chapter VII was legitimate due to the human 
rights abuses that were occurring.  This again seems to indicate the cautious 
approach taken by the Security Council to ensure that the authorised use of force 
in Somalia would not be seen as a precedent of State practice that could be used as 
a justification for future military interventions in other States.  The Member States 
of the Security Council recorded that their action regarding the situation in 
Somalia was a clear demonstration that the international community had the 
“intent and will to act decisively” in regard to “peace-keeping problems” that 
posed a threat to “international stability”.270 
 
 While the Security Council's authorisation of the use of force under Chapter VII 
was intended as a reflection of the desire of the international community to ensure 
the delivery of much needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia, it was never 
explicitly described as a humanitarian intervention.  While the representative of 
the United States of America believed that the “decisive” action by the Security 
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Council was an indication of how the Security Council would behave in future, 
this was sadly not the case.
271
 
 
 
3.5.3 Rwanda 
The situation in Somalia was characterised by the massive human rights violations 
occurring, and the civilians of Somalia's desperate need for humanitarian 
assistance, the same can be said of the internal crisis that affected Rwanda.  In 
Rwanda, the slaughter of Tutsis and moderate Hutu were triggered by the death of 
the President of Rwanda when his plane was shot down by a missile as it was 
coming in to land in Kigali (Rwanda's capital) on April 6 1994.
272
  Over the 
course of the first 100 days following the President's death, over one million 
Tutsis and moderate Hutus were murdered in an act of genocide.
273
  A peace-
keeping force was already stationed in Rwanda at this time, but were helpless to 
stop the mass killing.
274
  The Security Council's initial response was to condemn 
the violence, but also to urge Rwandan security forces to “cooperate fully” with 
the peace-keeping force (UNAMIR) sent in by the UN to protect civilians.
275
   
 
There was much deliberation and discussion in the Security Council regarding the 
situation in Rwanda,
276
 but States were largely unwilling to undertake the risk of 
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leading, organising, and conducting a military intervention in Rwanda.
277
  On 20 
June 1994, France proposed to intervene unilaterally,
278
 and on 22 June 1994 the 
Security Council in Resolution 929 (1994) authorised a: 
 … temporary operation under national command and control aimed at contributing, in an 
 impartial way, to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians 
 at risk in Rwanda...
279 
This authorisation was given under Chapter VII and included the phrasing: “using 
all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives”, these objectives had 
been set out in Resolution 925 (1994).
280
  Acting under this resolution, the French 
government took it upon themselves to intervene in Rwanda.  The French 
government intervened with humanitarian goals as its impetus, and proclaimed 
that it had acted without any self-interest, and that its humanitarian goal had been 
“largely attained”:281 
 Should we have refrained from taking action, since no economic or strategic interest 
 appeared to warrant such  intervention, thereby justifying those who criticize the 
 international community for acting only when powerful interests are at issue?
282 
 
Critics of the French intervention observed that the French forces did not assist 
government troops, and allowed more casualties, and strategic losses to take 
place.
283
  After only two months in Rwanda, French forces pulled out and the 
French government urged the UN to send in replacements.   
The French intervention in Rwanda is supported by Resolution 929, and is 
therefore, legal as there was no violation of Article 2(4) or 2(7).  It was legally 
justified, but it was a case of 'too little too late', the damage in Rwanda had been 
done leaving one million dead, and many more displaced.  The lack of political 
will that had been so optimistically declared when intervention was authorised in 
Somalia in 1993 had fizzled out only two years later.
284  
The lacklustre behaviour 
by the Security Council, the slow reaction, and then the ineffective use of military 
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force during the intervention stage, rendered the Security Council actions, and the 
intervention itself ineffective. 
 
3.5.4 Kosovo 
In 1999, NATO decided to intervene in Kosovo
285
 even though there was no 
authorisation from the Security Council to do so.
286
  The Security Council had 
determined that the situation in Yugoslavia was a threat to international peace and 
security.
287
 
 
When NATO began bombing Kosovo the Security Council met, following the 
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation's letter to the President of the 
Security Council.
288
  The representative of the Russian Federation expressed their 
position regarding the NATO intervention, and its use of force. 
 The Russian Federation is profoundly outraged at the use by the North Atlantic Treaty 
 Organization (NATO) of  military force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  In 
 recent weeks, when we were constantly hearing threats – detrimental to the negotiating 
 process – that there would be missile strikes against Serbian positions in Kosovo and 
 other parts of Serbia, the Russian Government strongly proclaimed its categorical 
 rejection of the use of force in contravention of decisions of the Security Council and 
 issued repeated warnings about the long-term harmful consequences of this action not 
 only for the prospects of a settlement of the Kosovo situation and for safeguarding 
 security in the Balkans, but also for the stability of the entire modern multi-polar system 
 of international relations.
289 
The Russian Federation did not accept that prevention of a “humanitarian 
catastrophe” was sufficient justification for NATO's use of force, and that the 
consequences of such intervention would only be more harmful.   
 
The representative of the United States responded to Russia's concerns: 
 We and our allies have begun military action only with the greatest reluctance.  But we 
 believe that such action is necessary to respond to Belgrade's brutal persecution of 
 Kosovar Albanians, violations of international law, excessive and indiscriminate use of 
 force, refusal to negotiate to resolve the issue peacefully and recent military build-up in 
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 Kosovo – all of which foreshadow a humanitarian catastrophe of immense proportions.290 
The United States position, and the military intervention undertaken my NATO 
was expressly supported by Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom during the meeting.
291
 
Other States supported returning to diplomatic means to resolve the conflict, while 
Russia was supported by some States, who relied on arguments based on the 
prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4) to attack NATO's actions. 
 It has always been our position that under the Charter is its the Security Council that bears 
 primary  responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.  And it is 
 only the Security Council that can determine whether a given situation threatens 
 international peace and security and can take appropriate action.  We are firmly opposed 
 to any act that violates this principle and that challenges the authority of the Security 
 Council.
292 
The United Kingdom's representative stated simply: “The action being taken is 
legal.”293  The U.K based its position on the premise that NATO's action was an 
“exceptional measure” and was been conducted to prevent a “humanitarian 
catastrophe”. 
 
There are only two exceptions to the prohibition contained in Article 2(4) under 
the Charter, the first is where it is mandated by the Security Council, and the 
second is the principle of self-defence.  NATO's intervention, and use of force 
clearly had no mandate from the Security Council, and as such, it would seem 
obvious that its actions would be deemed illegal and a violation of Articles 2(4) 
and (7),
294
 nor was it an act of self-defence as there was no threat from the 
government of Yugoslavia.
295
  Brownlie contends, that often overlooked is the 
political dimension to the intervention, that NATO member States, and UN 
Member States may have supported the intervention on humanitarian grounds, this 
was undermined by the threat of force based upon political demands regarding the 
political status of Kosovo.
296
  Disagreement with the legality of this intervention 
is based on the fundamental principle of Article 2(4). 
 
Two days after NATO began its campaign on March 26 1999, Russia sponsored a 
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draft resolution demanding the cessation of the use of force against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.
297
 
The draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation was never adopted due 
to the exercise of the veto by three permanent members of the Security Council.
298
  
In all 12 members of the Security Council voted against Russia's draft Resolution, 
however, China and Namibia supported it. 
The vote on the draft resolution is viewed as a historic occasion, seven members 
of the Security Council “excused or acquiesced” to the use of force outside of a 
Security Council mandate on humanitarian grounds.
299
  Also, of these twelve to 
vote against the draft resolution, only eight made public speeches, each referring 
to humanitarian considerations as the reason for their negative vote.
300
 
 
It has been argued that for the intervention in Kosovo by NATO to be considered 
legal, was if unilateral intervention had somehow achieved the status of jus 
cogens.
301
  However, looking back at the jurisprudence contained in the 1986 
Nicaragua case the Court made this relevant statement to the development of 
customary rules: 
 The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the 
 corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order 
 to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct 
 of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State 
 conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of 
 that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule. If a State acts in a way prima 
 facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to 
 exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's 
 conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm 
 rather than to weaken the rule.
302
 
Following this line of thought, the intervention in Kosovo by NATO, and the 
subsequent discussions in the Security Council have not established a new rule 
regarding humanitarian intervention.  Rather, by utilising arguments around the 
use of force, and intervention for humanitarian purposes, States have only 
reinforced the fact that the rule regarding the prohibition on the use of force, and 
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non-intervention retains potent force. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Each of the previous situations, Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, and Kosovo, present 
examples of when the international community has acted with humanitarian 
principles in mind.  Each situation though, is unique and offers a sample of the 
arguments used by States to support, or not support, contravening the prohibition 
on the use of force contained in Article 2(4), or to intervene, either in accord or 
not, with Article 2(7).  Each example supports in some way, that humanitarian 
principles are inextricably linked to States, and the Security Council's decisions to 
use force against a State perpetrating massive human rights violations.  Each 
situation also lends support to the premise that when considering the use of force 
in an intervention in a States internal affairs, the consideration of Articles 2(4) and 
(7) become enmeshed within each other.  They are closely linked, and action taken 
under Article 2(4) inevitably impacts upon a States internal jurisdiction, territorial 
integrity, and sovereignty.  However, it cannot be definitively stated here, that a 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention is supported by international law as it 
currently stands. 
 
While States must rely on settled principles of international law, achieving 
consensus to address humanitarian catastrophes is difficult and uncertain.  The 
consequences of States acting unilaterally, as they did in Kosovo, does not 
necessarily broaden the understanding on the settled principles on non-
intervention, and the use of force, but serve to stifle consensus within the Security 
Council.  The effectiveness of intervention in Somalia served as a deterrent for 
swift and measure action in Rwanda, leading to an ineffective intervention that 
lacked complete support form Member States of the United Nations. 
These instances are a reflection of State practice, and as the ICJ stated in the 
Nicaragua case, serve to reinforce the rules regarding the prohibition on the threat 
and use of force, and non-intervention.   
 
Sovereignty, non-intervention, and the prohibition on the threat or use of force, are 
fundamental principles of State relations in international law.  In themselves they 
are unchallenged by the effects of a humanitarian crisis in a States internal 
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jurisdiction.  The challenge exists in how the international community, and 
international organisations choose to address humanitarian catastrophes, genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and other war crimes that are perpetrated by State 
governments.  At the turn of the 21
st
 century, Kofi Annan, in his capacity as 
Secretary-General of the United Nations posed this question: 
 Still others noted that there is little consistency in the practice of intervention, owing to its 
 inherent difficulties and costs as well as perceived national interests – except that weak 
 states are far more likely to be subjected to it than strong ones.  I recognize both the force 
 and importance of these arguments.  I also accept that the principles of sovereignty and 
 non-interference offer vital protection to small and weak states.  But to the critics I would 
 pose this question: if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
 sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and 
 systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common 
 humanity?
303 
 
This question was viewed as a challenge, and the Government of Canada along 
with a group of major foundations announced the establishment of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty which sought to 
address the “legal, moral, operational and political issues”304 around this question.  
The result of its work was the development of a new principle dubbed the 
'Responsibility to Protect', a new way of perceiving sovereignty that would 
address the legal challenges and pitfalls posed by humanitarian intervention, and 
gross human rights abuses perpetrated by sovereign state governments.  This 
principle will be examined in the following section. 
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4. The Responsibility to Protect 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Sovereignty as a concept, and as the foundation of the international legal system 
of States has had a few hundred years to develop since it was first introduced by 
Bodin in 1572.  Since then, the development of sovereignty as a concept has been 
incremental, taking time to synthesise academic legal thought (from the likes of 
Bodin, Grotius, Pufendorf etc) into its conceptual nature and eventually becoming 
part of its fabric as a legal norm. 
 
The doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention has often been viewed (when carried 
out with or without Security Council authorisation) as a violation of State 
sovereignty.  But these “violations” have not invalidated305 the legal norm of State 
sovereignty.  Humanitarian interventions have created political and legal tension 
which has had unfortunate consequences both when interventions have been 
carried out, and when they have not. 
 
When Kofi Annan assumed office as the UN Secretary-General in 1997, he 
proposed extensive institutional reforms to the inter-governmental system in order 
to “do better” and to “maximise the institutional effectiveness” of the United 
Nations.
306
  The proposals for reform were considered to be a “process” not an 
“event” and the Secretary-General utilised his position to initiate dialogue for 
change in certain areas of the United Nations system.  One such area was the 
considerable tension between State sovereignty and the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention.  In his Millennium Report at the start of a new century, Annan would 
broach the subject of intervention, and how it could be reconciled with State 
sovereignty. 
 
Annan acknowledged that armed intervention must “remain the option of last 
resort”, but also acknowledged the notorious tension between sovereignty and the 
protection of the humanity of suffering State populations. 
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 Few would disagree that both the defence of humanity and the defence of sovereignty are 
 principles that must be supported. Alas, that does not tell us which principle should 
 prevail when they are in conflict.
307 
While he acknowledged the validity of the tension between the principle of state 
sovereignty and the option of resorting to the use of force in an intervention, he 
also asked the question -  
 But to the critics I would pose this question: if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an 
 unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica
 —to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our 
 common humanity?
308 
Annan stated that the United Nations could not shoulder the burden of addressing 
the challenges posed by states that commit these violations, that states shared the 
responsibility of acting together to ensure, and maintain international peace and 
security in accordance with the UN Charter, and that the threats posed must be 
managed multilaterally.
309
 
 
As a direct response to the question Annan asked, the Canadian government in 
tandem with major foundations,
310
 and the British and Swiss governments, 
established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS).  This report brought forth the “new” concept of the Responsibility to 
Protect.  Subsequent reports followed, and together, the ICISS Report, the Report 
of the High-Level Panel on Threats (2004), Challenges and Change, the Secretary-
General Report – In Larger Freedom (2005), and the Report of the Secretary-
General on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (2009) have all developed, 
and then refined the meaning of the Responsibility to Protect.   
 
4.2 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
 Report on the Responsibility to Protect  
The choice of name for the Commission was carefully considered.  In initial 
proposals the Commission had been named “commission on humanitarian 
intervention” but this was considered too “politically controversial” and changed 
to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.
311
  The 
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Commission was made up of 12 members, from different nations,
312
 and in their 
position as commissioners they were not acting as direct representatives of their 
respective States.  There has been criticism of the composition of the 12 members, 
the lack of representation for other parts of the world,
313
 and the fact that of all 
members of the commission there was only one female.
314
 
 
This Commission had as its primary goal, the objective of reaching some sort of 
common understanding that would reconcile the principle of State Sovereignty 
with the diametric doctrine of humanitarian intervention for human protection.
315
   
 Millions of human beings remain at the mercy of civil wars, insurgencies, state repression 
 and state collapse.  This is a stark and undeniable reality, and it is at the heart of all the 
 issues with which this Commission has been wrestling.
316
 
This work was carried out over a year, in many countries (including those of the 
five permanent members of the Security Council), involving wide consultation 
with a multitude of states, intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies, 
affected parties and civil society representatives.
317
  This process was also 
supported by an advisory board for the purpose of grounding the Commission's 
work in a contemporary political reality and finding broad international 
consensus.
318
  The work of the Commission was also supported by a research 
directorate.  
 
In 2001 the following year after the Commission was established, the Commission 
delivered a comprehensive report on a brand new concept they hoped to introduce 
successfully into international law.  Intervention was understood in the context of 
the Report as:  
 … action taken against a state or its states leaders, without its or their consent, for 
 purposes which are claimed to be humanitarian or protective.
319 
The primary focus was military intervention carried out for human protection 
purposes, as well as also considering alternatives to military intervention.  The 
                                                 
312
 Australia, Algeria, Canada, USA, Germany, Switzerland, South Africa, Philippines, India, 
Guatemala and Russia. 
313
 Bellamy, above n 314, at 37. 
314
 Hilary Charlesworth “Feminist Reflections on the Responsibility to Protect” in Alex J. 
Bellamy, Sara E. Davies and Luke Glanville (eds) The Responsibility to Protect and 
International Law, (2011) 139 at 147. 
315
 ICISS Report, above n 5, at 2. 
316
 ICISS Report at 11. 
317
 ICISS Report at 2-3. 
318
 Bellamy, above n 314, at 37.  
319
 ICISS Report, at 8. 
 61 
 
Commission consciously refers to “intervention” or “military intervention” rather 
than humanitarian intervention in order to address concerns held by humanitarian 
agencies and organisations that; using the term 'humanitarian intervention' as 
interchangeable with 'military intervention', would essentially militarise the term 
'humanitarian'.  As indicated in the previous section, the concept of humanitarian 
intervention has often been defined as forcible, or military intervention carried out 
against a targeted state, or state government for human protection purposes.
320
  In 
order to not only address the concerns of humanitarian organisations and agencies 
by utilising the terms 'intervention' or 'military intervention', the Commission 
sought to progress the debate around military intervention by re-framing the 
language used to describe it. 
 
 Gareth Evans, former Australian Foreign Minister and co-Chair of the 
Commission first brought forth the idea of changing the terms of the debate 
regarding intervention and State sovereignty.  After spending “a few mornings 
under the shower … toying with a score or more of different word combinations” 
he arrived at the phrase “the responsibility to protect”.321  After submitting his 
phrase to the Commission there was initial reluctance to accept it, but later, it 
became the defining catchphrase to describe the re-conceptualisiation of 
sovereignty in relation to intervention.  This re-conceptualisation that the primary 
element of sovereignty was the 'responsibility to protect' was in order to combat 
some of the barriers to intervention associated with sovereignty, such as non-
intervention, and the prohibition on the threat or use of force against another state. 
 Thinking of sovereignty as responsibility, in a way that is being increasingly recognized 
 in state practice, has a threefold significance.  First, it implies that the state authorities are 
 responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion 
 of their welfare.  Secondly, it suggests that the national political authorities are 
 responsible to the citizens internally and to the international community through the UN.  
 And thirdly, it means that the agents of state are responsible for their actions; that is to 
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 say, they are accountable for their acts of commission and omission.  The case for 
 thinking of sovereignty in these terms is strengthened by the ever-increasing impact of 
 international human rights norms, and the increasing impact in international discourse of 
 the concept of human security.
322 
The effect of re-framing intervention linguistically as a responsibility to protect, 
draws the two spheres of internal and external sovereignty closer together.   
The focus has then shifted from a debate surrounding military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes, to understanding the principles that underscore the new 
concept of the 'responsibility to protect'.  This shift has been described as a 
“rhetorical trick”,323 but the intention behind it was to move legal thought away 
from the political and legal quagmire of humanitarian intervention to the “less 
confrontational” concept of the Responsibility to Protect.324 
 
The Commission contended that by shifting the terms of the debate, the result 
would be a three-fold change in perspective.  Firstly, this new perspective would 
mean that the focus would shift from the states considering intervention, to those 
who needed or sought support.  Secondly, that the envisioned 'responsibility' was 
first and foremost with the state in question, but in situations where that state 
perpetrated violations of this responsibility, or was unwilling, or unable to meet 
this responsibility, it would then fall on the “international community” to uphold 
it.  This then creates a complementary responsibility between the nation state and 
the wider international community of states.
325
 
Lastly, the 'responsibility' entailed not just reacting to situations, but also a 
“responsibility to prevent” and a “responsibility to rebuild”.326  This expands the 
notion of intervention considerably.  The Responsibility to Protect passes through 
phases of execution – to prevent, react, and rebuild, and these are the three 
essential elements to understanding the overall concept of the responsibility to 
protect. 
 
4.2.1 The Responsibility to Prevent 
The “responsibility to prevent” internal conflict is firstly the responsibility of the 
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state and its internal government, but also the responsibility of the international 
community. 
 By showing a commitment to helping local efforts to address both the root causes of 
 problems and their more immediate triggers, broader international efforts gain added 
 credibility – domestically, regionally, and globally.327 
The ICISS described the “responsibility to prevent” as the most important aspect 
of the Responsibility to Protect. 
 For the effective prevention of conflict, and the related sources of human misery with 
 which this report is concerned, three essential conditions have to be met.  First, there has 
 to be knowledge of the fragility of the situation and the risks associated with it – so called 
 “early warning.”  Second, there has to be understanding of the policy measures  available 
 that are capable of making a difference – the so called “preventive toolbox.”  And third, 
 there has to be, as always, the willingness to apply those measures – the issue of “political 
 will.”328 
Early warning and analysis requires, under the Responsibility to Prevent, 
resources to be expended on the collection of accurate information, analysing that 
information and transforming it into policy, this in turn is intended to result in the 
accurate prediction of events in order to prevent them.
329
  Under the 
Responsibility to Prevent, looking at the “root causes” of conflict, such as poverty, 
political repression, and the uneven distribution of resources, and finding 
solutions for them would greatly enhance conflict prevention.
330
  The solutions 
proposed by the ICISS to address the root causes of conflict included:  
 … addressing political needs and deficiencies, and this might involve democratic 
 institution and capacity building; constitutional power sharing, power-alternating and 
 redistribution arrangements; confidence building measures between different 
 communities or groups; support for press freedom and the rule of law; the promotion of 
 civil society; and other types of similar initiatives that broadly fit within the human 
 security framework.
331 
The final element of prevention in the Report is 'direct prevention efforts' which 
entail political and diplomatic measures, economic, and legal prevention 
measures.  Political and diplomatic measures included: fact-finding missions, 
friends groups, eminent persons commissions, dialogue and mediation, 
international appeals, and dialogue and problem solving workshops.  Economic 
prevention included: positive and negative inducements such as funding or 
investment, and advantageous trade terms.  Legal measures could include offers of 
mediation, arbitration, or in some cases adjudication.
332
 
The stated purpose of these measures is that they will make it “unnecessary” for 
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coercive military force to be used in an intervention, even in situations where a 
state may be reluctant to consent to such measures taking place in its internal 
jurisdiction. 
 
From a critical perspective, it appears as if the measures proposed under the 
“responsibility to prevent” strike at the heart of a Sate's internal sovereignty, 
especially if they were to be carried out without that State's consent.  The principle 
of state sovereignty as it has been enunciated by the International Court of Justice 
in the Nicaragua
333
 case that: 
  A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each 
 State is permitted, by the  principle of State sovereignty. to decide freely. One of these is 
 the choice of a political,  economic,  social and cultural system, and the formulation of 
 foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to 
 such choices, which must remain free ones
334 
Prevention of conflict would be integral to the decision for a military intervention, 
but at the same time, the measures proposed would no doubt inhibit a State's 
freedom to choose its own political, economic, social and cultural systems.  The 
extent of the obligation that the international community bears in relation to 
prevention is unclear, and the language used by the Report frames the 
responsibility to prevent as a “policy suggestion” rather than a legal obligation.  It 
is left unclear as to what degree the international community is responsible for the 
prevention of mass atrocities, or what the potential legal consequences there could 
be if this responsibility goes unfulfilled.
335
 
 
4.2.2 The Responsibility to React 
When efforts to prevent are ineffective, and a state is unwilling or unable to 
address a situation where there is a need for human protection, then intervention 
from the broader community of states is required.  This intervention falls under 
the Responsibility to React, and the Commission considered military as well as 
non-military forms of reaction.
336
  Under the Responsibility to React, military 
intervention would only be considered in “extreme and exceptional cases”.337  The 
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report acknowledges the principle of non-intervention, and that intervention in 
some circumstances can actually have a destabilising effect.  The exceptional 
case, where intervention can be contemplated, is one where: 
 … all order within a state has broken down or when civil conflict and repression are so 
 violent that civilians are threatened with massacre, genocide or ethnic cleansing on a large 
 scale.
338 
 
In exceptional cases, the violence within the internal conflict must be so great as 
to “shock the conscience of mankind” and pose a danger to international security, 
and only then could military intervention be contemplated.
339
  The Report went on 
to provide six criteria, these are: right authority, just cause, right intention, last 
resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects.  Each of these criteria form 
a component in the decision as to whether or not to proceed with a military 
intervention.  The elements of just cause, and right authority are treated more 
expansively and separately, while the remaining four elements are treated 
somewhat collectively. 
 
The element of just cause is made up of two points:  
 large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which 
is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, 
or a failed state situation; or 
 large scale “ethnic cleansing,” actual or apprehended whether carried out by 
killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.
340 
For the 'just cause' requirement to be met, then either one or both of these 
elements must be present.     
 
The report was clear in what these two elements included or excluded.  Included 
are: actions defined by the Genocide Convention; the threat, or occurrence, of 
large scale loss of life as a product of genocidal intent or not – or as a product of 
state action or not; ethnic cleansing which may include systematic killing of 
members of a particular group, or systematic removal of members of a particular 
group from a particular area, acts of terror, systematic rape for political purposes; 
crimes against humanity, violations of the laws of war including those defined in 
the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols; the collapse of a state 
which results in exposing the population to mass starvation and/or civil war; 
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natural or environmental catastrophes.
341
  These events which are included in the 
two elements of 'just cause' are described as “conscience-shocking” situations.  
These principles make no attempt to distinguish between internal or international, 
and the Report clearly states, that its authors are confident that where such 
situations exist, they will no doubt be determined under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, that a threat to international peace and security exists.
342
 
 
 The element “just cause” then becomes a threshold which requires -  
 … either large-scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, carried out by killing, forced 
 expulsion, acts of terror, or rape.
343 
The principles associated with the criterion of “just cause” are clearly influenced 
from events that have taken place in past conflicts, like Rwanda, Srbrenica, 
Somalia, and Kosovo.  But it is not enough to satisfy the just cause threshold to 
warrant an intervention, according to the ICISS report,  the four remaining criteria 
that provide for a legitimate intervention are also just as important.
344
 
 
Humanitarian intervention has often been criticised for acting as a shield for states 
to hide behind in order to exercise a less altruistic agenda.  The principle of “right 
intention” under the Responsibility to Protect seeks to address this anomaly.  The 
Report proposes three ways to ensure that intervention is carried out with the 
“right intention”.  The first is for states to act multilaterally or collectively, rather 
than unilaterally.  The second is to determine whether the people for whom 
intervention is intended to help actually support the intervention, and to what 
extent it is supported.  Last, have countries in the region of the state targeted for 
intervention, expressed opinions supporting that intervention, and to what extent 
have their opinions been taken into account?  These three principles are 
considered as “sub-components” of the principle of “right intention”, not 
principles in their own right.
345
 
 
The principle of “Last Resort” expresses the idea that once all diplomatic and 
non-military measures have been exhausted, only then can military action be 
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justified.  The Responsibility to React can only be activated once all the 
responsibilities under the Responsibility to Prevent have been fulfilled.
346
  The 
principle of “Proportional Means” entails that all aspects of the military 
intervention (scale, duration, intensity) must be the lowest level required in order 
to achieve the humanitarian purpose of the intervention, while at the same time 
observing all international humanitarian laws.
347
  “Reasonable Prospects” under 
the Responsibility to React requires that the military action has a “reasonable 
chance of success” of abating the atrocities or humanitarian crisis that initially 
triggered the intervention.  In situations where protection of individuals requires 
greater military action that would only cause more harm to the region, then 
military intervention can no longer be considered viable.
348
 
“Right Authority” concerns who can authorise military intervention.  Even though 
the Security Council has a chequered history regarding its political willingness to 
intervene, and its generally inconsistent approach to intervention, the Commission 
considered the Security Council to be the most “appropriate body” to “deal” with 
military intervention.
349
   
 
The Commission recognised that military intervention was a violation of state 
sovereignty, although the Commission used the word “overriding”, and that in 
building consensus to intervene, the Security Council should be the central force 
in that discussion.
350
  The Commission also proposed a “code of conduct” in 
relation to the five permanent members exercising the use of their veto.  This code 
of conduct encapsulated the idea that in situations where intervention was 
contemplated in a state where a permanent member had no “vital national 
interests” then the veto would not be used.351   
 
In instances where the Security Council fails to act, the Report considered that the 
General Assembly could be the appropriate forum for building consent through 
endorsement from a majority of states, and that may provide legitimacy for action 
taken outside of Security Council authorisation.  In the alternative, it proposed 
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that regional, or sub-regional organisations may have a legitimate role in 
undertaking collective military intervention.
352
  The Report acknowledged that 
under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provision was made for regional 
organisations to settle disputes, but regional organisations under this Chapter 
could only intervene with Security Council authorisation.
353
 
 
The principles for military intervention, 'Just Cause', supported by the 
precautionary principles of 'Right Intention', 'Last Resort', 'Proportional Means' 
and 'Reasonable Prospects' followed by regard for the principle of 'Right 
Authority' make up the criteria for intervention under the concept of the 
Responsibility to Protect.  The Report had two messages for the Security Council, 
the first was that in situations where it fails to address “conscience-shocking” 
events within a state, it is unrealistic for it to expect that other states would rule 
out intervention.  The second message was that if states acted collectively outside 
of Security Council authorisation, but met the six criteria outlined under the 
Responsibility to Protect, and was successful both in outcome and in finding 
favour with public opinion, then it could have serious implications for the 
credibility of the United Nations.
354
  These messages could also be read as 
implying that intervention carried out collectively by states without Security 
Council authorisation, but fulfilling the requirements of the Responsibility to 
Protects criteria, could be considered as legitimate and not a violation of 
international law or state sovereignty. 
 
The ICISS introduced the Responsibility to Protect in its comprehensive and 
instructional report, and managed to shift the terms of the debate surrounding 
humanitarian intervention, to a more palatable Responsibility to Protect.  In doing 
so, the rhetoric around sovereignty has marginally shifted from sovereignty as 
control, to sovereignty as responsibility, and the spheres of internal and external 
sovereignty have become tangibly linked due to the parallel responsibility of a 
State to protect its population, and the international community's responsibility to 
fulfil that function if a State becomes unwilling or unable to do so.  The new 
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concept of the Responsibility to Protect found further development in 2003 in the 
High-Level Panel Report, where it was directly linked to United Nations 
institutional reforms.
355
 
 
4.3 Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
356
 
The High-level Panel was convened by Kofi Annan, in November 2003, the 
impetus behind establishing the High-level Panel was his alarm at the lack of 
consensus among Member States on what the appropriate role of the United 
Nations was in the collective security system, and the lack of consensus 
concerning some of the “most compelling threats” faced by the international 
community.
357
  The High-level Panel's Report was far broader in scope than the 
ICISS Report, linking poverty, disease, environmental degradation with 
international and intra-national conflict, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, as well as transnational crime.
358
  In its report, the Panel 
considered 'Collective security and the use of force' asking the question “What 
happens if peaceful prevention fails?”359. It drew much of its conclusions from the 
content of the ICISS Report.   
 
For the High-level Panel, the United Nations collective security system under the 
United Nations Charter became the context through which the Responsibility to 
Protect could be implemented, integral to this implementation was the role of the 
Security Council.
360
  The Panel went so far as to call the recently developed 
concept of the Responsibility to Protect an “emerging norm”.  Describing the 
Responsibility to Protect as an “emerging norm” implies that it is well on its way 
to becoming binding law.
361
 
 We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to 
 protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last 
 resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious 
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 violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved 
 powerless or unwilling to prevent.
362 
 
Only three years after the ICISS Report on the Responsibility to Protect, the Panel 
acknowledged that acceptance was increasing for the notion that; in situations 
where Governments are unable or unwilling to uphold their primary responsibility 
to protect their citizens from those “avoidable catastrophes” it will then fall on the 
broader international community to uphold that responsibility, and if required, 
rebuild the society of the affected state.
363
   
The Report went on to consider Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in 
relation to internal threats and the Responsibility to Protect, in a statement that 
reflected the language of the Responsibility to Protect report. 
 There is a growing recognition that the issue is not the “right to intervene” of any State, 
 but the “responsibility to protect” of every State when it comes to people suffering from 
 avoidable catastrophe – mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and 
 terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease.
364 
 
The Report also considered the Charter, and the Security Council to be 
fundamental to the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect. 
 In all cases, we believe that the Charter of the United Nations, properly understood and 
 applied, is equal to the task: Article 51 needs neither extension nor restriction of its long-
 understood scope, and Chapter VII fully empowers the Security Council to deal with 
 every kind of threat that States may confront.  The task is not to find alternatives to the 
 Security Council as a source of authority but to make it work better than it has.
365 
 
The High-level Panel recommended that for the Security Council to become more 
adept at preventing and responding to threats to international peace and security, it 
would need to utilise the provisions found under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.  
Complementary to this, the UN was advised that it should encourage the 
establishment of regional and sub-regional organisations, as they could offer 
valuable contributions to international peace and security.
366
  The contributions 
that regional and sub-regional organisations could add to international peace and 
security would not supervene the United Nations role as the primary force for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, nor would they contradict the 
United Nation's activities in maintaining peace and security.  Rather, regional and 
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sub-regional organisations should be well established within the framework of the 
United Nations, integrated within the infrastructure of the United Nations, and in 
doing so be able to work in accordance with the purposes and principles of the 
UN Charter.
367
  
 
The High-level Panel Report felt that by maintaining the Security Council as the 
centralised force behind decision making regarding intervention, building a lasting 
consensus could be achieved.  The Panel considered that for the Security Council 
to achieve consensus then some form of criteria regarding when the use of force 
for military intervention should be used would be beneficial.  These criteria were: 
the seriousness of the threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means, and 
balance of consequences.  These criteria reflect principles that originate from just 
war theory,
368
 and the report went on to say that these criteria should be 
“embodied in declaratory resolutions of the Security Council and General 
Assembly.”369 
 
The greatest emphasis, therefore, is placed on the Security Council and its role in 
the authorisation on the use of military force in interventions.  By restricting its 
focus to the Security Council and not some of the broader measures proposed by 
the ICISS Report, the High-level Panel has narrowed the approach to intervention, 
that the Responsibility to Protect Report had initially envisioned,
370
 while at the 
same time declaring it to be an “emerging norm”.  Declaring that the relatively 
new concept of the Responsibility to Protect is a “norm” even an emerging one, is 
quite radical.  It could be supposed that if the Responsibility to Protect is 
becoming a norm of international law, then there has been a shift away from the 
norm of non-intervention.
371
  However, an international norm implies that there is 
a pattern of behaviour amongst States, and depending on States actions/inactions, 
a norm will appear to have been adhered to, or violated.
372
  It would appear that 
the High-Level Panel Report may be a little premature in classifying the 
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Responsibility to Protect as an “emerging norm”, and the subsequent reports 
concerning the Responsibility to Protect take a more conservative formulation in 
enunciating their views on the Responsibility to Protect. 
 
4.4 In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human 
 Rights for All
373
 
The 2005 Secretary-General's report is an extension of Kofi Annan's commitment 
to the reform of the United Nations system.  His report focussed on four main 
areas
374
 which he believed were of the highest priority, and which would also 
benefit from reforms in order to resolve ongoing conflicts that were a threat to 
regional and global security. 
 
In this report the Secretary-General built on the approach to the use of force 
formed by the High-level Panel, and the ICISS Report and stressed that there must 
be consensus among states as to when and how force should be used to defend 
international peace and security, and also, whether States have a right, or 
obligation, to use military force in a protective capacity to “rescue citizens of 
other States from genocide or comparable crimes.”375  Like the High-level Panel, 
the Secretary-General also believed, that the starting point for answering these 
questions and building consensus among sovereign States, the UN Charter would 
be the foundation on which mutual understanding regarding these issues could be 
built.
376
 
While the Secretary-General concurred with the approach taken by the High-level 
Panel, he did not go as far as to say that the Responsibility to Protect had reached 
the stage where it could be considered an emerging norm. 
 
The Secretary-General, like the ICISS Report and the High-level Panel Report, 
did uphold finding a mutually agreeable criteria for authorising the use of force, 
and recommended that the Security Council adopt a resolution that would embody 
the Security Council's intention to be guided by principles regarding whether to 
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authorise the use of force.
377
  However, the Secretary-General did not refer to the 
Responsibility to Protect in the section of the Report that dealt with the use of 
force, rather it was mentioned within the section regarding the 'Freedom to Live in 
Dignity'.
378
  This was intentionally done to disassociate the concept of the 
Responsibility to Protect with the use of force.  Therefore the perception of the 
Responsibility to Protect would become less about the intervention, and more 
about “a strategy to promote the commitment of all nations to the rule of law and 
human security.”379   
 
The Secretary-General agreed with the High-level Panel's endorsement of the 
Responsibility to Protect. 
 While I am well aware of the sensitivities involved in this issue, I strongly agree with this 
 approach.  I believe that we must embrace the responsibility to protect, and, when 
 necessary, we must act on it.
380 
The Secretary-General reiterated that the State's primary responsibility, and duty, 
was to protect its population, and in situations where a State was unable or 
unwilling to do so, then it was up to the international community to use 
diplomatic, humanitarian, and other methods to do so.  The Secretary-General 
placed emphasis on exercising the more peaceful means available under the 
Responsibility to Protect.  When these methods became ineffective, the Security 
Council should take appropriate action in accordance with the UN Charter, and 
follow the criteria that the High-level Panel had set out for authorising the use of 
force.
381
 
 
The Responsibility to Protect has re-framed sovereignty as responsibility, but it 
also provides for the use of force by outsiders for the protection of populations 
experiencing mass atrocities.  The prohibition on the use, or threat, of force 
against States has long been an aspect of sovereignty which has also found 
codification within the United Nations Charter.
382
  Which is why, in this report 
and those preceding it, the authorisation of the use of force has been centred on 
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the Security Council and the United Nations as the appropriate forum for 
consensus regarding the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect.  This 
consensus building would find greater traction at the 2005 General Assembly 
World Summit. 
 
4.5 World Summit Outcome Document
383
 
The General Assembly World Summit 2005, adopted the essence of the concept of 
the Responsibility to Protect, and the statement made regarding the concept is 
viewed as the most authoritative
384
 statement on the Responsibility to Protect.
385
  
Following the Secretary-General's recommendations, heads of state and 
government spent months negotiating each one.  The negotiated result of how the 
concept of Responsibility to Protect should be included in the Outcome Document 
is found in the content of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Document.  While these 
paragraphs reflect the essence of the Secretary-General's recommendations 
regarding the Responsibility to Protect, the criteria proposed for the use of force 
did not survive the negotiations.
386
   
 
The inclusion of paragraphs 138 and 139 in this Document indicate a clear 
acceptance by all UN member states that there exists on all sovereign States, a 
responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.
387
   
 
In the World Summit Outcome Document, the General Assembly reaffirmed the 
position taken by the High-level Panel, and the Secretary-General, that the 
provisions of the UN Charter were “sufficient” to address threats to international 
peace and security.
388
  It also reaffirmed that the Security Council had the primary 
responsibility to maintain international peace and security, as well as the authority 
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to authorise “coercive action” to do so.389 
 
With regard to the Responsibility to Protect, the General Assembly appeared to 
endorse the “emerging norm”, and delivered their perception of what the 
responsibility entailed, but also limited its application to four crimes – genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. 
 138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, 
 war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the 
 prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
 means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international 
 community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this 
 responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning 
 capability.
390
  
The original ICISS Report did not specifically limit the application of the 
Responsibility to Protect to four crimes.  It had a broader approach to the types of 
situations in which the Responsibility could be invoked under the principle of 'Just 
Cause'.  The Report's broad approach to “conscience shocking” situations 
included large scale loss of life, and large scale ethnic cleansing, neither of which 
needed genocidal intent from the perpetrators to be present.   
 
The Outcome document is the most authoritative statement on the Responsibility 
to Protect to date,
391
 but it has also effectively limited the application of the 
Responsibility by narrowing the scope of the type of situations it can apply to.  
Gareth Evans does not see refining the Responsibility to Protect within the 
parameters of those four crimes as a limitation, or even significant,
392
 rather, the 
unanimous agreement regarding the use of the language of the Responsibility to 
Protect within the Outcome Document, was an achievement and cause for 
“celebration”, not disappointment.   
 
Evans also agreed with the emphasis placed on prevention in paragraph 138, and 
assistance given to states under stress by the international community in 
paragraph 139.
393
  Paragraph 139 states that in the context of protecting 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
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humanity, the international community is:   
 prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
 Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis 
 and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful 
 means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
 populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.  
 We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the 
 responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
 crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the 
 Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and 
 appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, 
 war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are 
 under stress before crises and conflicts break out.
394
   
 
This statement is seen as “vague”, the passage as a whole does not specify any 
particular legal obligations associated with the responsibility to protect, or any 
particular duty on the Security Council to intervene.  In particular following the 
difficult negotiations regarding these passages, the refrain that the Responsibility 
to Protect would fall on the international community in situations where States 
became “unwilling” or “unable” to uphold their duty to protect their population, 
was not included in the final product of paragraph 139.  Instead, the phrasing 
became “manifestly failing to protect” which could be perceived as a 
“significantly higher threshold” to establish when trying to determine if a State 
has abandoned their responsibility to protect their population from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity.
395
 
 
While the inclusion of the Responsibility to Protect in the World Summit Outcome 
Document was seen as a great achievement, there was also disappointment that 
the content was radically reduced from what had originally been contemplated in 
the initial draft of the Outcome Document.
396  However, paragraphs 138 and 139 
can be viewed as a unanimous declaration by States that they accept that their 
State sovereignty entails a responsibility to protect their populations from the four 
crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
397
 
The World Summit Outcome Document did much to clarify the principles of the 
Responsibility to Protect.  Each of the four crimes are grounded in international 
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law already, with their own legal meaning.
398
   
 
State's roles under the Responsibility to Protect, in relation to their internal 
population, and in relation to other States was also clarified by the Outcome 
Document.  The defining paragraphs that emerged from the World Summit 
concerning the Responsibility to Protect are quite different from its original 
genesis, however, the consensus produced within the World Summit Outcome 
document “carries immense political weight”.399  The dialogue around the 
Responsibility to Protect then shifted in 2009, from the meaning and parameters 
of its principles to its possible implementation. 
 
4.6 The Report of the Secretary-General on Implementing the 
 Responsibility to Protect (2009) 
This Report was Ban Ki-Moon's first on the implementation of the Responsibility 
to Protect.   Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon's Report encapsulated the principles 
of the Responsibility to Protect, and also emphasised the concept's institutional 
implications within the UN system.  It confirms that the concept is “firmly 
anchored in well-established principles of international law and enjoys wide 
support of States.”400   
 
The Report drew from the ICISS Report, but also comprised an approach to 
implementation based on “three pillars”, the meaning of each Pillar is drawn 
directly from interpreting the definition of the Responsibility to Protect, from 
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document.   
Pillar one is the “protection responsibilities of the State”, States have an enduring 
responsibility to protect their populations from the four crimes (genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing).
401
  Pillar two is - 
“International assistance and capacity building”, this Pillar is quite broad.  It 
entails “encouraging” States to meet the responsibilities under Pillar One, 
encourage States to exercise those responsibilities, help States to build capacity in 
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order to protect their populations, and assist States that may be experiencing 
situations that are precursors to the outbreak of conflict.
402
   
 
Pillar two relies, initially, on persuasion between States, and “mutual 
commitment” between the State and the international community to act in tandem 
to fulfil their responsibility.
403
  Pillar three  - “Timely and decisive response” 
requires that when a State is unable or unwilling to uphold their responsibility 
member States must take collective action in a timely and decisive manner” only 
when peaceful means have proven to be inadequate, and where a State's national 
authorities have failed to protect its population.
404  
These three pillars are not 
dissimilar to the element of the Responsibility to Prevent contained in the ICISS 
Report.
405
 
 
The Secretary-General made a recommendation to the General Assembly to 
explore ways that the Responsibility to Protect could be implemented.  He also 
made several moves that had more far reaching institutional implications.  The 
first was to reinforce the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of 
Genocide,
406
 which would also strengthen the early warning capacity of the 
UN.
407
  Secondly, the Secretary-General asked his Special Adviser
408
 to work 
closely with the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide for the 
Responsibility to Protect, and consult with Member States and the President of the 
General Assembly, on how best to proceed with a strategy for implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect.
409
  The first step towards considering the strategy for 
implementation was a debate in the General Assembly on the proposals of the 
Secretary-General's report. 
 
Following the Secretary-General's report, the General Assembly of states met 
informally to discuss the report, and the implications of Responsibility to Protect.  
State's appreciated the three pillar approach that the Secretary-General provided as 
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a means of interpreting the definition of the Responsibility to Protect in the World 
Summit Outcome document and essentially endorsed that the four crimes of 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing should be 
prevented.
410  
However, States raised concerns that intervention under the 
Responsibility to Protect could simply be a smokescreen for unjustified 
interference in a States internal affairs.
411
   
 Nevertheless, further clarification may perhaps be necessary to mitigate apprehensions 
 relating to the risk that some actors, individually or collectively, may abuse the 
 responsibility to protect to further aims that are incompatible with the noble objectives of 
 that doctrine.
412
  
 
Ecuador referred to the first pillar of the Secretary-General's report in relation to 
settled principles of international law: 
 As to pillar one, the concept of sovereignty and the implications of any form of 
 intervention can be subject to no interpretation that differs from that established under 
 international law.
413 
China was also concerned that the concept of the Responsibility to Protect and its 
implementation should not contravene the settled principle of state sovereignty. 
 Although the world has undergone conflicts and deep changes, the basic status of the 
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 purposes and principles of the Charter remains unchanged. There must be no wavering 
 with regard to the principles of respect for State sovereignty and non-interference in the 
 internal affairs of States.
414
  
China also expressed concern that the application of the Responsibility to Protect 
should not go beyond the four crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity.
415
 
 
Regarding the concern that States had that interference in internal affairs may be 
carried out as subterfuge for a hidden agenda, States “emphasized” that the scope 
of the Responsibility to Protect should not be broadened (or revert to its original 
form one could say) -  
 The World Summit agreement on R2P is clearly based on four crimes and three pillars. Its 
 scope is  specifically limited to those four crimes and violations.
416 
Also, many States believed that there should be guidelines that establish what 
constitutes a Responsibility to Protect situation, especially with regard to the use 
of force in interventions.
417
 
 Further clarity is required, for example, on the threshold for intervention and on who 
 determines that the threshold has been met;
418 
It would seem that the criteria that the ICISS, the High-Level Panel, developed as 
a guide for how and when the use of force should be applied, has fallen by the 
wayside, as each subsequent Report has developed the understanding of the 
Responsibility to Protect.   
 
There was also suspicion regarding “right authority” - who should be in control of 
implementing the Responsibility to Protect?  Could the Security Council be 
considered to be impartial?  How would the issue of the veto be addressed?
419
   
 Hence, if we, the General Assembly, imbue the Security Council with the power to invoke 
 R2P to justify action, the Council must also commit to exercising fully that grave 
 responsibility. And it must do so without fear or favour. At the very least, that would 
 entail the permanent five refraining from using the veto in relation to the four crimes.
420 
The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela disagreed with the 
continual assertion that the Security Council should be the central force behind 
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decisions regarding intervention. 
 There are those who argue that the Security Council would be the appropriate organ to 
 authorize armed or coercive action when the responsibility to protect must be enforced as 
 a last resort. On this point, I sincerely assert our delegation’s firm and consistent rejection 
 of such an approach. We agree that trust is at the heart of the discussion of the 
 responsibility to protect. Who can guarantee, however, that this approach will not be 
 implemented selectively?
421 
 
These questions seem to be traversing the same issues that the initial Report by 
the ICISS actually addressed.  Each of these issues were considered in depth and 
principles devised in order to address them, or at the very least, provide a 
framework that States and international organisations could use to work though 
them.  As each Report has developed and in some ways changed the 
Responsibility to Protect, the ICISS Report and its recommendations seem to have 
been overlooked by States, either conveniently, or unintentionally.   
 
The World Summit Outcome Document's definition of the Responsibility to 
Protect contained in paragraphs 138 and 139 have become the most authoritative 
definition of the Responsibility to Protect.  Following Ban Ki-Moon's Report on 
Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect, his three pillared approach has 
provided further interpretation on these significant paragraphs, which has been the 
focus of the subsequent General Assembly debates. 
 
Following the debates on the Secretary-General's report on implementation of the 
Responsibility to Protect, the General Assembly adopted a unanimous resolution 
that took note of the Secretary-General's report, and decided to continue its 
consideration of the Responsibility to Protect. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
The Responsibility to Protect represents an attempt to shift the traditional notion 
of sovereignty as a manifestation of control, to sovereignty that embodies certain 
responsibilities.  These responsibilities are held both internally and externally.  A 
State is responsible when exercising its internal sovereignty to ensure that its 
population is not subjected to genocide, war crimes, ethnically cleansing or crimes 
against humanity.  Externally, States in the wider international community also 
                                                 
421
 Venezuela A/63/PV.99, 5. 
 82 
 
have a responsibility to the population of another State, when that State is unable 
or unwilling to protect its population from the four crimes, but there is also a 
broader responsibility where States have to support States “build capacity” and 
provide assistance to States that may be struggling in situations considered to be 
precursors to an outbreak of conflict, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity. 
 
The understanding that a sovereign state bears certain responsibilities towards its 
population is not a new one.
422
  However, the extension of that responsibility to 
the wider international community of States is.  The International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty outlined in great detail the various elements of 
what was the Responsibility to Protect.  Since the High-level Panel Report, the 
Secretary-General's “In Larger Freedom” Report, the World Summit Outcome 
Document, and the Secretary-General's report on implementation, the original 
parameters of the Responsibility to Protect have been altered.   
 
Coercive military intervention was considered a “just cause” under the ICISS 
Report in situations where there was large scale loss of life, large scale ethnic 
cleansing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape, carried out by deliberate state 
action, state neglect, or in a failed state situation.  This language was subsequently 
refined to the four crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity, and States have been emphatic in limiting the application of the 
Responsibility to Protect to these four crimes alone, which is not necessarily a 
negative step. 
 
While States have intimated that they wish to confine the Responsibility to Protect 
to the four crimes, it is also clear that States have acknowledged that there is a 
responsibility to protect populations from these crimes, to take measures to 
prevent them, and to respond to them in a decisive manner.  With regard to the use 
of force in a coercive intervention in order to protect populations, States are less 
comfortable with contravening the traditionally held notions regarding non-
intervention and the prohibition on the use of force. 
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In terms of “right authority” - who should determine that military intervention 
should take place under the Responsibility to Protect?  The various reports have 
supported focussing this decision making role in the Security Council, but there 
are serious issues regarding the use of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council's veto power.  The General Assembly debates following the Secretary-
General's 2009 Implementation report reflect that not all States agree with making 
the Security Council the primary decision maker in situations where genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity may be occurring.  
States have also been reticent in embracing the proposal for regional and sub-
regional organisations to take up legitimate authorisation of the use of force in 
place of the Security Council.   
 
The consistent approach by the aforementioned reports regarding the centralised 
role of the Security Council in authorising the use of force for interventions 
indicate that the Security Council is still very much considered the appropriate 
forum for such authorisation to take place.  The Security Council can then be 
considered crucial to the development of the Responsibility to Protect in 
international law, if it remains an active consideration in its approach to 
maintenance of international peace and security.   The role of the Security Council 
in the authorisation of the use of force, military intervention and the 
Responsibility to Protect will be considered in the following section. 
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5. The United Nations Security Council 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Under the Charter system, States have the right to use force against another state 
in self-defence only.
423
  The use of force, for any other purpose that is not self-
defence has been delegated to the Security Council, which has the primary role of 
maintaining international peace and security.  The former sovereign right to use 
force in disputes or otherwise has been restricted to self defence, and the 
prohibition on the threat or use of force has become a norm (jus cogens) of 
international law.
424
  The Security Council is the centralised body, by which, its 
authorisation is seen as both authoritative and necessary to carry out an armed 
intervention in a sovereign state that has the necessary legal basis.   
 
The Charter itself does not include specific reference to humanitarian crises in 
terms of maintenance of international peace and security.
425
 
It was not until the late 1990s, in the Post-Cold War era, that the Security Council 
began to actively expand civilian protection norms.
426
  During the Cold War era, 
the Security Council did pass resolutions that were concerned with “non-conflict 
related” protection of civilians,427 but did not authorise the use of force for 
military intervention purposes.  However, there have been glaring instances during 
the Cold War, when the Security Council has remained silent and inactive while 
large scale killings of civilians, violent repression, and genocide took place in 
multiple sovereign states.
428
  The advancement of the significance of protecting 
civilians during armed conflict, whether intra-state or inter-state, has been 
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evolving steadily within Security Council practice, more recently, Resolution 
1674 (2006) is directly concerned with the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict.
429
   
 
Member States respect for state sovereignty is often blamed for the lack of action 
by the Security Council and Member States in addressing the protection of 
civilians in internal armed conflicts, and it does represent a complicating factor in 
the ability to protect civilians.  However, the Security Council's own practice and 
the political nature of its composition have also, at times, played a detrimental 
role in the protection of civilians.  What is of significance, to this paper, is the 
evolution that has occurred within Security Council practice.  It has gradually 
changed its approach to situations that constitute a threat or breach of international 
peace and security, to include the protection of civilians, and in “exceptional” 
situations, authorised the use of force for military intervention purposes to do so. 
 
How has such a change occurred?  The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era 
of positive activity for the Security Council.  During the Cold War period, there 
were two instances
430
 where the use of force was authorised, following the end of 
the Cold War, from the 1990's onward there have been many instances,
431
 where 
the use of force has been authorised, recommended, or delegated by the Security 
Council,
432 
with each operation either as a stand alone operation, or acting 
concurrently with a peacekeeping operation.  From this, it can be surmised that 
there has been some form of evolution within Security Council practice, at least, 
regarding the readiness to intervene militarily in internal armed conflicts, and for 
the purpose of protecting civilians.  However, whether this represents an evolution 
in international law, or that state sovereignty has been compromised in some way 
is a different matter.  Has Security Council practice challenged the settled 
principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, non-interference in another 
states domestic affairs, or the prohibition on the use of force?  
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In order to reach some form of answer to the above question, some relevant 
discussion regarding the history of the Security Council and the intention behind 
its establishment will be undertaken. Following this, discussion regarding the role 
of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, and 
how its powers impact sovereignty and the armed intervention for humanitarian 
purposes.  Also, an overview of some of the resolutions adopted by the Security 
Council that authorise the use of force, and their changing nature, will also be 
undertaken. 
 
5.2 The History of the Security Council 
The Second World War had not yet finished when world leaders were discussing 
the formation of a new international system of collective security.  It was this 
unique circumstance that brought together the powerful nations of Great Britain, 
the Soviet Union, and the United States of America, who were traditionally very 
different ideologically, but became allied against a common enemy.  These three 
states would essentially become the “architects” of the new collective security 
organisation, and they had the distinct advantage of hindsight.  Being able to learn 
from the flawed but idealistic shortcomings of the League of Nations is evident, 
nowhere more so than in the creation of a new and improved United Nations, and 
its subsidiary organ the Security Council.
433
  
 
War time conferences were held between Britain's Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill, American President Theodore Roosevelt, and Soviet leader Joseph 
Stalin.  These conferences provided a foundation for building consensus between 
these world powers.  At Dumbarton Oaks, a private estate in Washington DC, a 
series of “conversations” were held where more detailed proposals were put 
forward for consideration.  The proposals that were formulated in this series of 
discussions, that also included representation from the Chinese Chiang Kia-Shek 
regime, were the starting point for broader discussion at the San Francisco 
conference which would also include States that had declared war on the Axis 
powers during World War II.
434
  The proposals that came out of Dumbarton Oaks 
supplied a detailed overview of a new global organisation's “purposes, principles, 
                                                 
433
 Luck, above n 436, at 68. 
434
 Luck, at 12. 
 87 
 
procedures and structure.”435 
 
During the San Francisco conference, France became involved in the deliberations 
of the four big powers – Great Britain, United States of America, Russia, and 
China – and as a result would become the fifth power in what would be known as 
the “Big Five”. 
 
Four themes had been identified as particular issues that contributed to the 
eventual “failure” of the League of Nations and these four themes have been 
absorbed into the features of the United Nations Security Council.
436
   
 One, the new Council included all of the major powers and, in particular, would serve to 
 embed American  power and dynamism in the new structure.  Two, the most powerful 
 states were given special rights and responsibilities concerning the maintenance of 
 international peace and security.  Three, the new Council was to be of limited size, 
 without what the Dutch delegate labeled the “exaggerated equality between great and  
 small Powers” that characterized the consensus rule in the League's Council. … And four, 
 the new Council had the authority to enforce its decisions, while its members had the 
 capacity – and experience – to crush aggressors through the collective use of force if 
 necessary.  The Council, in short, was to be the centrepiece of the boldest attempt yet to 
 institutionalize collective security.
437 
The League of Nations was always hampered by inconsistent membership.  While 
the United States had played a pivotal role in the League's establishment under 
President Woodrow Wilson, the United States was never a member, along with the 
Soviet Union.  Other major state powers that joined did not feel bound to stay 
when their individual state interests conflicted with the League's aims and 
purpose.
438
 
 
The eventual failure of the League can be viewed as a learning experience for the 
drafting of the United Nations Charter, the articles contained in the Charter are 
“based upon the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations” though revised 
with the benefit of hindsight.
439
  The League had been largely concerned with 
preventing and combating acts of aggression, while in contrast, the Security 
Council is empowered to address wider international security concerns, which 
include acts of aggression, but also threats to, and breaches of, international peace 
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and security.
440
  The League was perceived as a failure in a system designed for 
collective security, and part of its weakness was related to it been unable to garner 
“major economic, military, and political” support from the major powers.441 
 
The composition of the Security Council is made up of the five permanent 
members (United States, China, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom) with 
ten elected non-permanent members.
442
  The League of Nations was formed in a 
time when European “homogeneity” was prevalent the United Nations has 
become more universal and inclusive.  This inclusiveness is reflected by an 
arrangement that five of the non-permanent seats are allocated to Afro-Asian 
states, two are allocated to Latin American states, with no specific geographical 
arrangement for the remaining two.
443
   
 
The need for binding coercive measures in the form of armed force or non-
forceful sanctions was apparent.  So, unlike the League, the Security Council is 
entitled to resort to the use of military force without first having to apply pacific 
sanctions.  States are prohibited from using force against another state in Article 
2(4), giving the Security Council, virtually total control over the use of armed 
force.
444
  The military measures available to the Security Council move beyond 
“advising or recommending” action to member states.445   
 
Universal membership in the League was yet another of its flaws, in order to 
create a collective security system that carried binding decisions, and had 
powerful political support the permanent five were given the power of a veto.  The 
veto ensured that the permanent five could disagree with proposed decisions that 
affected the permanent five member's political or national interests.
446
  In so many 
ways this gives the permanent five members an unfair degree of power, 
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particularly when considering the authorisation of force against a state for civilian 
protection purposes.  However, it did guarantee that the major political powers 
would support the institution of the United Nations, which as seen in the case of 
the League, would have floundered without them.  While the power of the veto 
can strike down a resolution, under Article 27 resolutions require an affirmative 
vote of nine members, permanent and non-permanent need to work together in 
order to create consensus in their decision making. 
 
Decisions to authorise the use of force are made under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
and in accordance with Article 39, 
 The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
 the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures 
 shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international 
 peace and security.
447 
and Article 42, 
 Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
 inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land 
 forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such 
 action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land 
 forces of Members of the United Nations.
448 
The enforcement measures contained in Article 42 require a determination to be 
made under Article 39 in order for the Security Council to be able to enforce its 
decisions.
449
  Chapter VII decisions are the product of a voting system conducted 
by sovereign states, there are no standards or guidelines for how these decisions 
are to be made, and as such they are purely political.
450
   
 
The broad phrasing of Article 39 and Article 42 gives the Security Council broad 
scope in how responds to situations, the method of its response and the time frame 
it chooses to respond in.
451
  This in turn allows member states of the Security 
Council to act according to their own national interests, which often supports the 
notion that the authorisation of the use of force in or against a sovereign state is 
unacceptable.  Over time though, as the remainder of this section will show, 
member states within the Security Council are becoming more willing to authorise 
armed intervention for humanitarian purposes, indicating that the protection of 
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civilians is a growing aspect of the international collective security system. 
 
5.3 Sovereignty, Humanitarian Intervention and the Security Council 
As previously stated, the nature of sovereignty exists in two distinct but related 
spheres.  Internal sovereignty exists within the domestic affairs of state, while 
external sovereignty denotes the form of international relations between states.  
Since its earliest conception, sovereignty has been described as absolute and 
supreme.  In many ways, depending on the constitutional arrangements of various 
states, this is arguably, still very much the case.  However, the establishment of 
the United Nations, and with it, its subsidiary organ the Security Council, the 
impenetrable veil that sovereignty provided to states externally, has often been 
disturbed by the Security Council's exercise of its powers under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
 
Through the previous sections of this paper, it has been demonstrated that 
sovereignty as it relates to states in international law, has not so much undergone 
drastic change, but incrementally over time, it has shed its absolutist nature 
externally, in order to promote greater international collective security.  This 
incremental change has been influenced primarily by the rise of human rights and 
humanitarian concerns regarding the treatment of civilians in times of conflict and 
war.  In contemporary international law, the United Nations, and in particular the 
Security Council, is at the forefront of change.  Whether this change has 
substantially affected international law as it relates to sovereignty and the 
protection of civilians, is of significant consideration for this paper. 
 
The Security Council occupies a central role in the maintenance and restoration of 
international peace and security.  It is a creature of Charter law, and as previously 
noted, during the discussions that took place between States at each pivotal stage 
in the development and acceptance of the new concept of the Responsibility to 
Protect, States unanimously agreed that the Security Council should remain 
central to any decisions relating to the authorisation of the use of force.
452
  This 
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indicates that the broader international community still regards the Security 
Council as the lynch pin of collective security and the most authoritative decision 
maker regarding the use of force and military intervention. 
 
In order to fulfil its primary responsibility to maintain and restore international 
peace and security under the Charter, the Security Council is able to transgress the 
traditional prohibitions on the threat, or use of force, and the principle of non-
intervention.
453
  This in itself suggests that, as Members of the United Nations, 
States have submitted an aspect of their sovereignty in order to become members 
of the organisation.  The powers under Chapter VII of the Charter clearly indicate 
that any State (or situation) that poses a threat to the peace, breaches the peace, or 
commits an act of aggression would be subjecting themselves to the potential use 
of the powers under either Article 41 or 42 of the Charter, under Chapter VII.
454  
Although the use of the veto by any member of the Permanent 5 ensures that this 
provision can never be used against any one of them. 
 
Under Article 42, the Security Council can authorise the use of force, as part of 
the measures available to it under the Charter, in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. 
 Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
 inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land 
 forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.  Such 
 action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land 
 forces of Members of the United Nations
455
. 
Authorisations of the use of force by the Security Council are contained within its 
resolutions, which are considered decisions, and as such, are binding on Member 
States.
456
   
 
Even in instances where States may have concluded obligations with other states 
under other international agreements, Article 103 of the Charter states: 
 In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations 
 under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, 
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 their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.
457 
When the Security Council passes a resolution containing the authorisation for the 
use of force, irrespective of any obligations upon a Member of the United 
Nations, they are required to uphold their obligation to the Charter first and 
foremost.  The Security Council is very much a political organism, guided by each 
member of the Security Council's particular foreign policy and political qualities, 
however, it is also a legal organism, producing resolutions containing decisions 
that have a “legally controlling” force.458 
 
This suggests that states have, in terms of the exercise of their external 
sovereignty, deference for the Charter, and to Security Council decisions.  
However, does it mean that Security Council decisions make or evolve 
international law? 
 Where the vast majority of states consistently vote for resolutions and declarations on a 
 topic, that amounts to a state practice and a binding rule may very well emerge provided 
 that the requisite opinio juris can be proved.
459 
 To consider whether the resolutions passed by the Security Council evolve 
international law, that some new or evolved form of customary law has arisen, 
evidence of state practice over time, in conjunction with opinio juris – the extent 
of the belief that the state is bound to act – must be present.460  Is it possible to 
determine an evolving custom – that military intervention for the protection of 
civilians will occur irrespective of respect for state sovereignty – from a pattern, 
though inconsistent, of Security Council practice, when the passing of resolutions 
may not be unanimous due to abstentions, and the attitudes of individual states are 
distinctly varying? 
 
The Security Council has been careful, when authorising military intervention for 
humanitarian reasons, not to create precedents that would create future obligations 
to which it could be bound to act in similar situations.  Though the Security 
Council has treated each response that has authorised military intervention as 
unique or exceptional, there is no provision within the Charter that either 
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prohibits, or allows, the Security Council to legally bind itself.
461
  The 
“inconsistency” in Security Council practice is an example of the Security 
Council's ability to choose a new course of action for each situation as it arises, 
and that there is no duty to behave in a conform manner when internal conflicts 
arise, but rather, to treat each conflict as singular unto itself. 
 
While the Security Council has been careful in its construction of resolutions that 
authorise the use of force, there have been gradual changes in the language used 
that may indicate that while the Security Council may not be binding itself to act 
in a particular way in regard to future situations, it may be incrementally changing 
how military intervention in a sovereign state for the protection of civilians is 
viewed within international law.  The challenge to legal intervention in a 
sovereign state, under the Charter system, has been Article 2(7).  It clearly states 
that: 
 Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene 
 in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...
462 
James Pattison makes the point that in order to gain legal authority it has been the 
case, until the intervention in Libya, that target states have given their consent for 
an intervention to take place, and in doing so, the Security Council has gained 
“legal authority” for such an intervention, without compromising state 
sovereignty.
463  
However there is no requirement under Chapter VII of the Charter 
for the target state to give consent to the Security Council for intervention to take 
place.  The giving of consent or the request for assistance has been a part of the 
Security Council's practice in authorising military intervention.  So while it may 
have been conventional for consent to be present it is not actually a necessity 
under the Charter provisions.  It does indicate that there has been a consistent 
practice of acquiring consent which reinforces the notion that the authorisation of 
military intervention against a target state is tempered by the respect for 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all states. 
 
In reality, States that do commit gross human rights abuses, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, genocide, or ethnic cleansing, or permit these crimes to be 
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committed, still cleave to the principle of sovereignty to protect their actions.  The 
Security Council has (with the exception of Libya in 2011, and Somalia which had 
no functioning government to give consent) never militarily intervened in a Sate 
without that functioning states consent.
464
  There has been a definite shift in the 
Security Council's approach to situations which are internal armed conflicts in the 
Post-Cold War era by determining that they constitute a threat to international 
peace and security, as per Article 39.  This represents a clear departure, or a 
“constitutional evolution” from what state governments had envisioned when they 
signed the Charter in 1945.
465
  This shift has been furthered by the universal 
acceptance by all states of the concept of the Responsibility to Protect in the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document.  In 2006 the Security Council passed 
Resolution 1674 (2006) which concerned the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict and which stated that it: 
 Reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
 Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
 ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity; 
The acknowledgement of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document indicate that the Security Council views “peace and security 
and human rights” as interlinked and mutually reinforcing”. 
 
In the Post-Cold War era of the 90s, there was also a definite shift in the language 
used in resolutions, which included reference to humanitarian considerations.  
Security Council resolutions are by nature binding, and as they are binding create 
law, and even though the Security Council seeks to avoid creating precedents 
which they themselves would be bound to follow, the pattern of authorisation of 
military intervention for the protection of human rights and humanitarian values, 
at the very least “establishes a practice based on a certain interpretation of the UN 
Charter”.466  It has been stated that change is incremental, but what effect do the 
resolutions of the Security Council have on international law?  This question is 
best answered by examining some of the significant occasions where the Security 
Council has authorised the use of force. 
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5.4 Security Council Authorised Military Intervention 
If the Security Council produces resolutions that are legally binding, regardless of 
its inconsistent practice through repetition establish a “norm-creating pattern”,467 
what law is evidenced by the resolutions authorising military intervention, and 
what sort of norm creating pattern is established by these resolutions?  During the 
Cold War period the two instances are hardly indicative of any sort of consistent 
practice, but post-Cold War era Security Council practice, the language used 
becomes more consistent in its application. 
 
5.4.1 Authorisation During the Cold War 
In the Cold War period Security Council authorisation for military intervention 
was rare, and on its first occasion, took advantage of the rift in the Council 
between the former Soviet Union and the United States, when the use of force was 
authorised under Resolution 83 (1950).  Resolution 83 (1950) provided the 
mandate for a United States led military coalition to aid Korea in repelling armed 
attacks made against it by North Korea.  Resolution 83 first determined that a 
breach of the peace had occurred,
468
 and that North Korea had failed to comply 
with Resolution 82 (1950)
469
 which now meant that “urgent military measures” 
were required.
470
  The use of force was then authorised without reference to 
Chapter VII, or Article 42, the phrasing used by the Security Council was that it:  
 Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the 
 Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore 
 international peace and security in the area.
471 
One possible explanation for the exclusion of Chapter VII or Article 42 in the text 
of Resolution 83 is that this resolution was not intended to be a binding 
decision.
472
  The exact meaning and scope of the phrase “furnish such assistance” 
is unclear, it is also unclear whether the recommended action was enforcement 
under Chapter VII, or whether its legal basis was founded under Article 51.
473
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The language is not mandatory, and an obligation is not created as the language 
used to create a “binding formulation” has not been used.474  Regardless of the 
lack of clarity, and the doubtful nature of the obligation created by Resolution 83, 
a United States led military coalition operation was carried out in order to “restore 
international peace and security”.475  
 
Sixteen years later, the use of force was again authorised in Southern Rhodesia 
under Resolution 221 (1966).
476
  This resolution established that the situation was 
determined to be a “threat to the peace”, an oblique reference to Article 39, and as 
such, brought the resolution within the purview of Chapter VII.  Resolution 221 
authorised a specific Member State, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, to use force if necessary to prevent the arrival of vessels in 
Beira.  It also created a negative obligation on the Portuguese government, and 
other Member States generally, to not provide assistance to Southern Rhodesia.  
The language authorising the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland is more specific than that used in Resolution 82: 
 Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
 to prevent, by the use of force if necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably 
 believed to be carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia and empowers the United 
 Kingdom to arrest and detain the tanker known as the Joanna V upon her departure from 
 Beira in the event her oil cargo is discharged there.
477 
Even though force was authorised, the naval blockade used to enforce Resolution 
221, ultimately failed as force was never employed to support it.
478
  
 
Both Resolution 83 (1950) and Resolution 221 (1966) authorise the use of force, 
but in each situation the use of force is authorised to prevent either further acts of 
aggression, or the prevention of supplies reaching an illegal regime.  The 
protection of civilians in these situations was not the primary consideration for the 
authorisation of the use of force.  This position was reinforced by the International 
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Court of Justice in its judgment in the Nicaragua case.  In the court's view, the use 
of force was not appropriate to ensure respect for human rights, nor was it in 
keeping with a humanitarian objective.
479
  The ICJ, as previously mentioned, also 
made the point of stating that a prohibited intervention was one that had a direct 
bearing on a sovereign states ability to freely choose its political, economic, social 
and cultural systems, and its formation of foreign policy.  However, following the 
end of the Cold War, Security Council decision making was no longer stagnated, 
and as the following examples will show, Security Council practice has evolved 
over time to include and respond to humanitarian crises with authorised military 
intervention. 
 
5.5 Post-Cold War Era Authorisations 
5.5.1 Iraq 
The first example of military authorisation following the end of the Cold War, 
against Iraq in 1990, set the pattern for subsequent authorisations.  Resolution 678 
(1990) explicitly states that it is  
 Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,480 
and as such, clearly places the sanctions contained in the resolution under the 
legal authority of Chapter VII.
481
  Resolution 678 (1990) also used obligatory 
language in its authorisation of military force, stating that it: 
 Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant 
 resolutions,
482 
This created an obligation on Iraq to comply, and if it did not within the “pause of 
goodwill” offered by the Security Council, it then- 
 Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait unless Iraq on or 
 before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above mentioned 
 resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) 
 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in 
 the area.
483 
Resolution 678, similar to Resolution 83 (1950) is aimed at a situation that 
involves an act of aggression by one sovereign state (Iraq) against another 
(Kuwait).  It is specific in its authorisation, by clearly stating that it is acting under 
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Chapter VII, and it is also the first instance where the phrase “all necessary 
means” is utilised, which sets a pattern for future resolutions. 
 
Resolution 678 did not refer to humanitarian concerns or the protection of 
civilians in any direct way.  There is no direct authorisation for military 
intervention based on humanitarian considerations, and the reason for this is 
largely political.  Western states did not seek a specific mandate from the council 
to militarily intervene for the protection of the Iraqi civilian population due to the 
staunch position of the Soviet Union and China who would exercise their veto 
power to preserve Article 2(7).
484  
During the Security Council meeting regarding 
the adoption of the resolution, states took issue with the language used to frame 
the resolution, in particular the lack of reference to a specific Chapter VII article, 
as well as the broad description of the use of force,
485
 while Cuba described the 
resolution as a “virtual declaration of war” and a violation of the Charter itself.486  
The majority of states though were concerned with the breaches of international 
law committed by Iraq when it invaded Kuwait, violating its territorial integrity, 
political independence, and state sovereignty. 
 
Resolution 678 (1990), as stated, did not include specific reference to a particular 
article under Chapter VII as the basis under which it was authorising the use of 
force.  However, neither Resolution 83 (1950) or Resolution 221 (1966) contained 
direct reference to either Chapter VII or its relevant articles.  The argument that 
resolutions that authorise force without direct reference to Chapter VII or its 
articles lack legal basis is not a reflection of Security Council practice, but 
perhaps political rhetoric.
487
  Another aspect of these three resolutions is the 
nature of the obligation upon Member States to participate in military intervention 
action.  In Resolution 83 (1950) States were generally called upon to provide 
assistance, as was the case in Resolution 678 (1990).  In Resolution 221 (1966) 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was specifically called 
upon to provide naval assistance.  The more generalised form of calling upon 
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Member States has become the pattern since Resolution 678 (1990), and it 
indicates that Member States are empowered, if they choose to do so in their 
sovereign capacity, to act, but not obliged to act,
488
 even though decisions made 
by the Security Council are binding on all Member States.
489
 
 
5.5.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, and Rwanda 
Following on from Iraq and Resolution 678, three situations presented new 
challenges to the Security Council's approach to the maintenance and restoration 
of international peace and security.  Humanitarian crises that featured the 
devastating consequences of ethnic cleansing and genocide, did not so much 
galvanise the Security Council into action, but did gradually widen the 
interpretation of what constituted a threat to international peace and security, and 
in some ways formed the basis for the authorisation of military force under 
Chapter VII. 
 
Resolution 787 (1992) concerned the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 
particular the shipping of essential resources to the former Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, but was also the first in a number of resolutions to authorise the use of 
force for humanitarian purposes.
490
  Resolution 794 (1993) established the 
mandate for the use of force in order to create a secure environment for the 
delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia, and Resolution 929 (1994), concerning 
the situation in Rwanda, was a direct response to France volunteering to 
coordinate an operation in Rwanda to provide security for refugees and civilians. 
 
5.5.3 The authorisation of force in unforeseen circumstances 
Each of the resolutions from this period of activity follows similar phrasing as that 
used in Resolution 678 when authorising the use of force, and it has become a 
pattern not just in Post-Cold War resolutions concerning the use of force to use 
this phrasing, but also resolutions passed in the twenty-first century.  The phrase 
“all necessary means” or “all necessary measures” and its variations within the 
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text of resolutions, have become a “code phrase”491 for the authorisation of the use 
of force.  Some authors are critical of the language used in resolutions and that it 
must be clear so that the scope of the mandate within the resolutions directly 
reflect the intention of the Security Council's decision.
492
  The danger of 
ambiguity is that resolutions may be used as a legal basis for the use of force in 
situations where it was not the Security Council's intent, however, the omission of 
the phrase “use of force” when force is been authorised is a diplomatic tactic to 
obtain support from states that are not in favour of the use of force in the internal 
jurisdiction of sovereign states.
493
  
 
The following resolutions present a pattern where the use of force has been 
authorised by the Security Council utilising the same, or similar language as that 
used in Resolution 678.  This emerging pattern an emerging practice, where the 
Security Council has consistently applied the same, or similar phrasing with 
which to authorise the use of force for military intervention.  Resolution 787 
(1992) “acting under Chapters VII and VIII” called upon States to: 
 … use such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary 
 under the authority of the Security Council …
494
 
It also reaffirmed the responsibility of riparian States to “take necessary 
measures”495 to ensure compliance with previous resolutions regarding shipping. 
 
Again, in Resolution 794 (1992), regarding the situation in Somalia, the Security 
Council states that it is acting under Chapter VII, and authorised Member States 
who were cooperating to implement the resolution, to  
 use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for 
 humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.
496
 
 
Resolution 929 (1994) varied the language slightly in its authorisation, again 
acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council again authorised Member States 
to, 
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 … conduct the operation referred to in paragraph 2 above using all necessary means to 
 achieve the humanitarian objectives ...
497
 
While these resolutions present a consistent practice by the Security Council in 
terms of the language used to authorise military force, these resolutions are also 
examples of the emergence of humanitarian considerations, and the significance 
that they play in determining a threat to international peace and security. 
 
 
5.5.4 Determining a threat in unforeseen circumstances 
The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a result of the disintegration of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  The European Community (the EC, which later 
transformed into the European Union) attempted to use diplomatic political tools 
to reach some form of peace, but was ill equipped for the task.
498
  The escalation 
of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, particularly between three parties – 
Bosnian-Serbs, Bosnian-Muslims, and Bosnian-Croats – in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina remained unresolved after various “peacemaking initiatives”, and the 
international community turned to the UN to provide assistance in terms of 
humanitarian relief.   
 
Resolution 752 (1992) called on parties to allow for the delivery of humanitarian 
aid.
499
  Despite this the number of displaced persons (many becoming refugees 
from the war) in Bosnia and Herzegovina reached over 2 million, and mass 
atrocities were committed following a referendum held on February 29 1992.  
Bosnian-Serbs boycotted the referendum and refused to accept the independence 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, what followed was a systematic military campaign of 
ethnic cleansing, “removing” non-Serbian civilians from Serb-designated 
territories.
500
  Resolution 787 acknowledged the practice of ethnic cleansing, 
taking territory by force, and forcible removal of citizens, it:  
 Reaffirms that any taking of territory by force or any practice of “ethnic cleansing” is 
 unlawful and unacceptable, and will not be permitted to affect the outcome of the 
 negotiation on constitutional arrangements for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
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 and insists that all displaced person be enabled to return in peace to their former homes;
501 
However, the resolution did little to clarify the meaning of “ethnic cleansing” nor 
did it make specific reference to which groups were the targets, and which group 
were the perpetrators of the crime.
502
 
 
In Resolution 787 (1992) the Security Council reaffirmed that the situation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  constituted a threat to the peace, and also reaffirmed that 
the, 
 provision of humanitarian assistance in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is an 
 important element in the Security Council's effort to restore peace and security in the 
 region.
503
 
The resolution went on to “note with grave concern” the systematic violations of 
human rights, and grave violations of international humanitarian law,
504
 and also, 
 Condemns all violations of international humanitarian law, including in particular the 
 practice of “ethnic cleansing” and the deliberate impeding of the delivery of food and 
 medical supplies to the civilian population of the Republic of Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina ...
505
 
While Resolution 787 (1992) was the first instance where the Security Council 
authorised the use of force, or “all necessary means” for humanitarian purposes.506   
 
In many ways, while Resolution 787 acknowledged the ethnic cleansing and 
humanitarian concerns in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its construction was more 
substantially concerned with strengthening the guidelines of the sanctions.  Also, 
unlike subsequent resolutions, the Security Council did not qualify the situation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as “exceptional” or “unique”, which perhaps suggests 
that it did not perceive its actions to be radical, or, as an expansion of what 
constituted a threat to international peace and security, despite explicit reference 
to what was a humanitarian crisis. 
 
Seventeen days after Resolution 787, the Security Council passed another 
significant resolution concerning the situation in Somalia.  The Security Council 
under Resolution 794 (1992) determined, 
 that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further 
                                                 
501
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 exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, 
 constitutes a threat to international  peace and security,
507
 
Somalia presented yet another humanitarian crisis for the Security Council to deal 
with, however unlike the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “exceptional” and 
“unique” became the buzz word for authorisation of military intervention by the 
Security Council in Somalia, both in the text of the resolution, and in the debates 
of the Security Council.  The “exceptional” nature of the situation in Somalia, not 
just the military intervention in an internal armed conflict, but also the first 
instance of the authorisation of the use of force without a functioning 
government's consent, which for the Security Council became an “exceptional 
response”.508  The political view was that since there was no functioning 
government to consent to the proposed intervention, then the relevant 
considerations regarding the principle of non-intervention appeared to become 
moot.
509
 
 
The humanitarian imperative behind Resolution 794 was a combination of the 
number of civilian casualties from the conflict, and famine caused by drought, but 
also the “CNN” effect, the “CNN” effect resulted in pressure on political 
representatives to address the humanitarian crisis unfolding, and readily accessible 
to media.
510
  Resolution 794 does not mention the impact that refugee flow was 
having on Somalia's neighbouring states, which would bring an international 
character to the conflict.   
 
The focus of Security Council debates centred on the internal violence and 
destruction of Somalia, the external impact was recognised, but the subsequent 
military intervention was primarily due to the determination that the internal 
conflict required action.
511
  However, this does not necessarily indicate that there 
has been a widening of the Security Council's understanding of Article 39.  The 
Security Council's circumspection, (by describing the situation in Somali as 
“unique” and “exceptional”), of creating any kind of precedent for interference in 
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the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state during an armed conflict,
512
 did not 
alter its interpretation of Article 39, or create an obligation that would be binding 
in future for the Security Council to act in the domestic affairs of a sovereign 
state.
513
 
 
The interim government of Rwanda had given its consent for military intervention 
to take place and the Security Council passed Resolution 929, for the protection of 
of civilians suffering from the effects of the genocide taking place.  Resolution 
929 stressed that the military operation was “strictly humanitarian”514 in character, 
and, expressed deep concern “at the continuation of systematic and widespread 
killings of the civilian population in Rwanda,” in this regard, the Security Council 
determined, 
 that the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and 
 security in the region,
515
 
but also stated that the situation in Rwanda 
 constitutes a unique case which demands an urgent response by the international 
 community,
516 
 
The Security Council resolution appears to give great consideration to the human 
tragedy that was the genocide in Rwanda.  But in reality it had been a difficult 
task to even get the situation in Rwanda onto the Security Council's agenda.
517
  
The mandate for intervention in Rwanda is as much an example of the political 
dynamics at work in the Security Council as it is an intervention with 
humanitarian purpose.  Resolution 929 was only passed after civil conflict had 
resumed and the genocide was in full flight.  Though the use of force was not 
employed strategically, and the resulting casualties of the Rwandan genocide saw 
little assistance from the resolution, it is still an instance where, humanitarian 
language has been used to justify the use of force for a military intervention. 
 
The creation of any form of binding precedent is actively avoided, in Resolution 
929, as it was in Resolution 794.  But each of these examples represent a 
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previously unseen level of military intervention in sovereign states.  Somalia is 
unique in that it did not have a functioning or legitimate government at the time.  
However, under customary international law, the state is not synonymous with 
government, a legitimate government is merely an aspect of the criteria which 
forms statehood.  The lack of government in Somalia, arguably did not equate to a 
lack of statehood “in a juridical sense.”518  If the lack of functioning government 
had been relied on by the Security Council as its legal basis, it would have, 
according to Wheeler, “exceeded its legal competence”.  But by coupling the lack 
of government with the extreme level of human suffering and loss of life 
experienced in the internal conflict in Somalia, this provided the Security Council 
with sufficient grounds to determine that there was a threat to the peace, and 
therefore was well within its legal competence to authorise military 
intervention.
519
 
 
5.5.5 Haiti 
In 1991 the first democratically elected President of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide 
was overthrown by the Armed Forces of Haiti, an “illegal de facto”520 military 
authority.  Security Council Resolution 940 (1994) authorised Member States to 
form a multinational force in order to create the necessary conditions for the 
departure of an “illegal de facto regime” and the reinstatement of the 
democratically elected regime.  This is a notable resolution as it was the first time 
the authorisation for military intervention was made in the Western hemisphere, 
but even more significantly, was the Security Council's willingness to authorise 
force to: 
 facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the 
 Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and 
 the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti.
521 
The language is cautious, it is not authorising the armed intervention for the 
purposes of a regime change, but to restore democracy and the “legitimately 
elected” Presisdent.522 
 
Several factors came in to play with regard to the adoption of this resolution.  The 
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first is the Governors Island Agreement which was intended to end the Armed 
Forces of Haiti's control, and reinstate President Aristide; the humanitarian 
situation and the systematic violations of civil liberties; the restoration of 
democracy; and the commitment to assisting and supporting the economic, social 
and institutional development of Haiti.
523
  Each of these factors played a part in 
the Security Council's determination that the situation in Haiti was a threat to 
“peace and security in the region.”524 
Some states argued that the crisis in Haiti remained within its internal jurisdiction, 
the Czech Republic was the only State to assert that the situation was a “real and 
growing threat to peace, security and stability in the region”.525  Significantly 
though, the Haitian representative used the Haitian constitution which declared 
that “national sovereignty resides in the entirety of the citizens”.  The premise that 
sovereignty was held by the people was also supported by the United States
526
 and 
Argentina.
527
 
 
Similar to the Resolution 794, Resolution 940 recognised the, 
 unique character of the present situation in Haiti and its deteriorating, complex and 
 extraordinary nature, requiring an exceptional response;
528
  
This paragraph is another indicator that the Security Council consistently avoids 
the creation of precedent.  The authorisation of the use of force contained 
reference to Chapter VII, and the phrase “all necessary means.” 
 Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes Member States 
 to form a multinational force under unified command and control and, in this framework, 
 to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, 
 consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately 
 elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of 
 Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit 
 implementation of the Governors Island Agreement, on the understanding that the cost of 
 implementing this temporary operation will be borne by the participating Member 
 States;
529 
 
These examples of Security Council authorisation provide evidence of a pattern, 
not just of the terms and language used to authorise force, but also, that the barrier 
that the wording of Article 39 seemed to impose when authorising force in 
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internal conflicts, is no longer an obstacle.
530
 
The change in approach to internal conflicts represents a departure in the practice 
of the Security Council.  The inviolability of the principles of non-intervention in 
a sovereign state, and the prohibition on the use of force against or within a 
sovereign state are no longer unbreakable under Charter law.  However, post-
1994, following the disastrous outcomes in Somalia and Rwanda, the Security 
Council authorised military operations and measures in a more restricted way, 
targeted sanctions, if they were applied, were limited to specific people and 
sectors of the State's economy.  The intention behind this was to reduce the 
harmful effects that such sanctions could have on the civilian population.
531
  
However, as the example of Haiti provides in certain situations the Security 
Council would still authorise armed intervention.  Which only reinforces the 
inconsistency of its practice. 
 
5.6 Security Council Authorisation for Military Intervention in the 21
st
 
 Century 
As the end of one century neared, and the beginning of another approached, the 
authority of the Security Council was brought into question when it failed to act in 
relation to Kosovo, and its authority was undermined further when Western States 
carried out unauthorised military interventions in Kosovo in 1999, and in Iraq in 
2003.
532
  Nevertheless, the Security Council continued to develop its practice 
under Chapter VII of the Charter from the late 1990s and into the 21
st
 century.
533
  
Many of its resolutions that authorised military intervention for the protection of 
human rights, and humanitarian principles, indicate that the practice of the 
Security Council depends on a “certain” interpretation of the Charter, and this in 
turn affects the “scope and import” of Charter law in Security Council practice.534 
 
The Security Council continued to make resolutions that contain reference to 
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human rights, or humanitarian crises exceptional occurrences in order to avoid 
any precedential or future obligation.  Internal armed conflicts where there are 
gross human rights abuses, can be determined to be a threat to, or breach of 
international peace and security.  It is contended that the powers available to the 
Security Council under Article 42, to authorise the use of force or military 
intervention in order to restore or maintain the peace, have evolved to include 
human rights issues especially in areas where genocide, crimes against humanity, 
ethnic cleansing or war crimes are occurring.  Although the Security Council 
continues to avoid creating any form of future obligations under which it could 
have a duty to act in similar situations highlights the discretionary nature of the 
Security Council's enforcement powers.
535
 
 
There is inconsistency in the Security Councils approach to different situations, 
considering its inaction in Kosovo, and more recently in Syria.  This inconsistency 
would suggest that there is no settled practice when it comes to military 
intervention in states experiencing internal conflict accompanied by human rights 
abuses.  However, what is consistent is the pattern that situations of internal 
conflict where humanitarian crises occur are considered to be a threat to, or breach 
of international peace and security under Article 39, and, that the Security Council 
has the legal authority to intervene militarily within or against a sovereign state, if 
it has the political will and determination to do so. 
 
In order to advance, and address, the concern that the wider international 
community had following the genocide in Rwanda, the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and in regard to the detrimental political discord within the 
Security Council, the concept of the Responsibility to Protect was introduced into 
international legal discourse.  It was (and is) seen as a way forward from the often 
limiting traditional concept of state sovereignty, and progressed the understanding 
of state sovereignty as the responsibility of the sovereign state to protect its 
civilians from the horrors of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.  The approach taken by the Security Council to the concept of 
the Responsibility to Protect has been a cautious one. 
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In the 2006 Security Council Resolution concerning the Protection of Civilians in 
Armed Conflict, Resolution 1674 made direct reference to paragraphs 138 and 
139 of the World Summit Outcome Document, reaffirming their provisions.
536
  
However, this affirmation was restricted to the responsibility on states to protect 
their civilian populations.  The secondary responsibility contained in the concept, 
that in situations where states are manifestly failing to uphold their responsibility, 
that responsibility then falls to the international community, has not been 
included.  The Security Council is acknowledged within the concept of the 
Responsibility to Protect as the most appropriate body to authorise force for the 
protection of civilian populations which are at risk or suffering from genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes.  The Security Council 
has made implicit reference was then made in the preamble of subsequent 
resolutions, resolutions 1706,
537
 1755,
538
 and 1769,
539
 concerning the situation in 
Darfur, each of which recalled Resolution 1674.   
 
Security Council resolution 1894 (2009)
540
 reaffirmed resolution 1674 (2006), and 
also reaffirmed the provisions of the World Summit Outcome Document 
contained within paragraphs 138 and 139 regarding the protection of populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.  The 
recognition of the principles contained within paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 
World Summit Outcome Document within Security Council resolutions does not 
necessarily indicate that the Responsibility to Protect has gained significant legal 
substance. 
 It cannot be argued that the concept of the responsibility to protect has gained certain new 
 characteristics and legal substance through this resolution practice.  However, a regular 
 invocation of the responsibility to protect through the Security Council may have raised 
 the pressure on the SC members to take action.
541 
The resolutions that have included reference to humanitarian crises, coupled with 
the regular inclusion of the concept of the Responsibility to Protect in resolutions 
that do not authorise the use of force have significant implications.  However the 
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cautious approach taken by the Security Council somewhat tempers the role that 
the concept plays in Security Council decisions authorising armed intervention, 
and the maintenance of collective security that includes human security.  The 
Security Council has established a pattern of behaviour where human rights, the 
protection of civilians, and human security can influence their decisions and the 
content of resolutions.  With regard to Libya, Resolution 1973 (2011) presents a 
confluence of these principles with the authorisation of military intervention. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
What is the relationship then, between the practice of the Security Council, the 
United Nations Charter law and the principle of state sovereignty in international 
law?  Article 2(4) of the Charter contains the prohibition on the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a sovereign state 
in a manner inconsistent with the Charter, by United Nations Member States.  
Article 2(7) is the embodiment within the Charter of the principle of non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state by the United Nations 
itself, but Article 2(7) does not “prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII.”  The prohibition on the threat or use of force, and 
the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, are 
fundamental tenets of the principle of sovereignty in international law, and exist to 
protect the territorial integrity and political independence of the State.   
 
Both Article 2(7) and 2(4), within the framework of the Charter regime, no longer 
reflect or defend an “absolute conception of state sovereignty,”542 and this 
deterioration or derogation from the absolute principle on non-intervention, or the 
use of force within or against a sovereign state (military intervention) is evidenced 
by the Security Council's continued practice of intervening militarily in sovereign 
states under its powers contained in Chapter VII of the Charter.  However, it is 
Member States themselves that have conferred the responsibility of the 
authorisation of the use of force for the purposes of intervention within another 
state on to the Security Council.  The Security Council becomes the forum for 
determining when a situation in a sovereign state becomes a threat, or breaches, 
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international peace and security.  It also becomes the forum in which state 
sovereignty is either protected, or rejected in favour of collective security. 
 
The ground breaking resolutions of the 1990s, have led to an evolution of the 
approach to collective security that the Security Council takes in its function to 
maintain and restore international peace and security under the United Nations 
Charter.  Greater consideration for the plight of civilians within armed conflict has 
resulted in the growing importance of the individual within international law, 
which reflects a shift in the changing values of the United Nations system and the 
international community in general. 
 This leads to an emphasis on an individually oriented rather than state-oriented, 
 international law, which has led, inter alia, to the concept of human security and justice, a 
 link which was deliberately set aside when article I(I) was drafted in San Francisco; and to 
 the growing importance of international law as a guiding framework for collective 
 security and the resulting transposition of the rule of law concept to international 
 relations.
543 
The authorisation of military intervention in sovereign states for humanitarian 
purposes establishes a pattern, that the wider effects of conflict on civilians, the 
threat to human security, is now considered to be as much a threat to, or breach of, 
international peace and security – or rather, state security – as the conflict itself.   
 
In this regard, the decisions produced by the Security Council may be politically 
motivated, but they also have significant “legal consequences that affect the rights 
of states and individuals.”544  However, the political motivation of States should 
not be dismissed.  Criticism is often levelled at the Security Council for its failure 
to act, or the lack of forceful action used when force has been authorised.
545
  The 
lack of action, or failure to take more aggressive action, is often a direct result of 
the political dynamics within the Permanent Five members of the Council, but 
also, the responsibility must fall on the ten non-permanent members who partake 
in the decision making process in authorising a military intervention.   
 
It is not just hypothesis to say that international peace and security goes beyond 
considerations for state sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence, 
but that it now includes consideration for human security in situations where 
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genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and gross human rights 
violations are being committed.  It is proven by Security Council practice, it is not 
precedential case law, it does not give rise to future obligation or create a formula 
with which to predict the Security Council's future behaviour, however it is a 
pattern, which has been building over time, and it cannot be overlooked. 
 
The recognition by the Security Council in resolutions, that states bear the 
primary responsibility of protecting their civilian population, coupled with the 
pattern contained in Security Council resolutions authorising military intervention 
in internal armed conflicts for humanitarian purposes, supports the premise that 
human security is now a part of the collective security system within the United 
Nations.  This is reinforced by Resolution 1973, which had as its primary goal the 
protection of civilians, which will be discussed in the following section. 
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6. The Internal Conflict in Libya and the International Response 
 
6.1 Introduction 
September 1 1969, Muammar Al-Gaddafi (Colonel Gaddafi) a 27 year old 
revolutionary led a “bloodless coup” while the King of Libya, King Idris, was out 
of the country.
546
  Under Gaddafi's regime, an interim constitution was installed 
which curtailed certain human rights such as the freedom of expression, and the 
formation of new political parties was banned.
547
  In 1973 Gaddafi's theories and 
ideologies were contained within the “Green Book” which became the 
philosophical guidelines of the new “revolutionary system.”548   
 
In 1977, the Libyan government declared the establishment of the Libayn Arab 
Jamahiriya, “Jamahiriya” was a term invented by Gaddafi to describe the new 
Libyan state, and combined the Arab words for “state” and “masses” - Libya was 
now the state of the people.
549
  Externally, relationships between Libya and other 
states were strained, with Gaddafi considered be “erratic” and “inconsistent” and 
his support of international terrorism was contentious to say the least.
550
  
Internally, the revolutionary regime created a practice of gross human rights 
abuses against its own citizens that prevailed for decades: 
 The legacy of gross human rights violations committed in the past, particularly during the 
 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, continues to cast a long shadow on Libya’s human rights 
 record.
551
  
The history of the Libyan regime's committal of gross human rights violations 
helps to illuminate the historical impetus behind what appears to be a spontaneous 
outbreak of mass demonstrations. 
 
The eruption of civil war in Libya, and the response from the international 
community and the United Nations Security Council contains many remarkable 
aspects.  The conflict, initially a reaction to the arbitrary arrest of the well-known 
human rights activist Fathi Terbil, then later spurred on by the government 
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regime's violent response, founded a centralised political body – the Interim 
Transitional National Council – to give the uprising a legitimate political voice.  
Also remarkable was the broad support from regional organisations,
552
 which 
exerted pressure upon the United Nations Security Council to address the situation 
in Libya.  The Human Rights Council established a commission of inquiry to 
investigate the human rights violations, the Security Council passed Resolution 
1970 (2011) on February 26 2011 only nine days after the first protest and referred 
the situation to the International Criminal Court.  This referral to the International 
Criminal Court is only the second time in the history of the Security Council for 
this to happen.
553
  More importantly, the rapid response from the Security Council 
to authorise military intervention in a sovereign state without that state's consent, 
the first time that this has happened in the history of the Security Council's 
practice, is the most significant event in what is a very unique situation.   
 
There are political motivations behind the passing of a resolution, which reflect 
both, a member of the Security Council's perception of what action should be 
taken in response to a situation, and also the contextual elements of the conflict 
that have brought it to the attention of the Security Council.  These political 
motivations are important, and will be explored, but what results from the passing 
of a resolution is a document with legal force, and it is the legal nature of this 
document that is relevant in assessing whether the Security Council's response to 
the conflict in Libya was an exceptional occurrence or whether there are deeper 
implications for the international law as it relates to sovereignty and the 
authorisation of military intervention. 
 
6.2 From Uprising to Internal Armed Conflict in Libya 
The catalyst for the outbreak of mass demonstrations across Libya was the arrest 
of a human rights lawyer Fathi Terbil in Benghazi on February 15
th
 2011.
554
  Fathi 
Terbil represented the families of those killed in the Abu Salim prison massacre, 
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and his detention in Benghazi angered the relatives who then took to the streets 
and gathered outside the Benghazi Internal Security Office.
555
  Hundreds more 
joined them including writers and activists chanting slogans like “No God but 
Allah, Muammar is the enemy of Allah” and “corrupt rulers of the country”.556  
Protests, especially one as spontaneous as this, were rare in a country that has 
radically curtailed freedom of speech, freedom of association, and peaceful 
assembly.
557
  The Libyan government under Gaddafi's rule has a history of 
intolerance of dissent,
558
 and this initial protest was no exception.   
 
Internal security forces responded with tear gas, batons, and water canons, and 
rubber coated steel bullets.
559
  The spontaneous protest in Benghazi sparked mass 
demonstrations across Libya the following day.  As the number of protesters grew, 
the government bureaus and security offices were ransacked, and many military 
officers defected and joined the protesters.
560
 
The death toll rose and by February 17
th
 24 people had been killed,
561
 by February 
20
th
 that number had risen dramatically to at least 233 people.
562  
 
The first warnings from the Gaddafi regime that mass violence against civilians 
would take place came from Gaddafi's son Saif Al-Islam” 
 Libya is at a crossroads. If we do not agree today on reforms, we will not be mourning 84 
 people, but thousands of deaths, and rivers of blood will run through Libya,
563 
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The protests became increasingly violent when security forces and mercenaries 
used live ammunition on unarmed peaceful demonstrators.
564
  Mass protests took 
place across Libya, with tens of thousands gathering on the streets of Benghazi.
565 
  
Protesters were killed, many more were injured and widespread arbitrary arrests 
also took place.
566
   
The hospitals in Tripoli ran out of blood yesterday evening.  … Men wearing civilian 
 clothing in the square were shooting at us.  We heard later that Abu Salim hospital was 
 broken into.  I saw guys taking off their shirts and exposing their chests to the snipers.  
 I've never seen anything like it, I was very ashamed to hide under a tree but I am 
human.
567 
The Libyan government attempted to squash the protests using brutal means to 
punish and deter demonstrators, Gaddafi deployed his air force, issuing orders to 
bomb Benghazi and other cities experiencing mass protests.
568 
 Triggered by the 
escalation of violence, senior military officers defected,
569 
and Libyan foreign 
diplomats around the world resigned in protest at the regime's treatment of Libyan 
civilians.
570
   
 
Towards the end of February protesters began to organise themselves into an 
opposition force and take offensive action against Libyan security forces, and 
seizing parts of Libyan territory.
571
  With the increasingly violent clashes between 
government forces and opposition forces, and consistent calls for action from 
human rights groups and regional organisations, as well as the broader 
international community, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted 
Resolution 1970 (2011)
572 
on February 26th, only 6 days after the rebels seized 
control of Benghazi, and only 11 days after the demonstrations began.   
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The violence only intensified following the passing of Resolution 1970, and the 
political pressure from regional organisations and United Nations officials became 
more prominent.  The landmark events of the Libyan conflict have influenced the 
political motivations behind the adoption of Resolution 1973.  The relationship 
between the events, the position of regional organisations require consideration, 
particularly as the events were used to reinforce regional organisations, and 
Member states position that Gaddafi's government had lost its legitimacy.  The 
loss of legitimacy is the key factor in the authorisation of armed intervention 
under Resolution 1973. 
 
6.3 The Loss of Legitimacy 
In the Security Council meeting regarding the passing of Resolution 1973, states 
regularly referred to the Libyan government's loss of legitimacy.
573
  There were 
several contributing factors to the assessment by some states that the Libyan 
government was no longer a legitimate political interlocutor for the Libyan state. 
 
A major contributing factor in the loss of the Libyan government's legitimate 
authority was the establishment of the Interim Transitional National Council 
which issued its founding statement on March 5 2011.  It declared that it was the 
“sole representative of all Libya” and that its own legitimacy was derived from 
city councils established after February 17 2011, and now running “liberated 
cities”.574   
It also sought to establish international recognition of the Interim Transitional 
Council and created delegates that would meet and negotiate with “international 
communities”.575   The European Union stated that it would treat the Interim 
Transitional National Council as the political interlocutor for Libya: 
 The European Union welcomes and encourages the interim transitional national council 
 based in Benghazi, which it considers a political interlocutor.
576 
Germany also stated within the Security Council meeting for Resolution 1973 
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that: 
 In this process, the people of Libya, who have so clearly expressed their aspirations to 
 freedom and democracy, need to succeed. With this aim in mind, we regard the Interim 
 Transitional National Council as an important interlocutor.
577 
The Transitional Council's primary aim was to create a sense of cohesion to what 
was primarily, a popular uprising.
578
  It provided a political face for the 
opposition, and provided states with an alternative political body which it could 
engage with. 
Another primary factor in establishing the loss of legitimacy of the Libyan regime 
was the failure by the Libyan government to uphold its responsibility to protect its 
civilian population from acts of violence, and for carrying out acts of violence 
against the civilian population.  Members of Libya's own government had 
resigned from their roles as foreign diplomats in protest of the violence committed 
by the Libyan authorities against the civilian population.
579
   
 
States clearly connected the violence perpetrated by the Libyan government 
against its people with the loss of its legitimacy.  The representative for Lebanon 
stated: 
 Today’s resolution essentially takes into account the calls by the people of Libya and the 
 demands by the League of Arab States for an end to the violent acts and atrocious crimes 
 being carried out by Libyan authorities against their people. As indicated in the Arab 
 League’s statement, those authorities have lost all legitimacy.580 
Portugal stated that the Libyan government had lost its legitimacy both with its 
own population, and within the international community. 
 Since the outset of the Libyan popular uprising, Portugal has consistently condemned the 
 indiscriminate violence against civilians and the gross and systematic violation of human 
 rights and of humanitarian law perpetrated by a regime that has lost all its credibility and 
 legitimacy vis-à-vis its own population and the international community.
581  
 
Even Germany, which abstained from voting on the resolution recognised that the 
Libyan government's use of force against its own people had damaged its 
legitimacy. 
 Our intention is to stop the violence in the country and to send clear messages to Al-
 Qadhafi and his regime that their time is over. Muammar Al-Qadhafi must relinquish 
 power immediately. His regime has lost all legitimacy and can no longer be an 
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 interlocutor for us.
582 
 
As previously noted, legitimate government is only one aspect of sovereignty, 
however, with each of these factors undermining the Libyan government's 
legitimacy, regional organisations and Member States within the Security Council 
were more willing to intervene without consent, and used their collective power to 
push for military measures authorised by the Security Council. 
 
6.4 The Influence of Regional Organisations 
One of the more influential political aspects of the passing of Resolution 1973 
was the vocal support for intervention from regional organisations.  This is 
reflected within the text of the resolution, as multiple references are made to these 
organisations in three separate paragraphs.
583
   
 
Each regional organisation added to a collective regional dialogue that represented 
a multitude of states.  The Gulf Cooperation Council and the League of Arab 
States demanded a no fly zone,
584
 and the European Union stated that the Gaddafi 
led Libyan government had lost all legitimacy and would be treating the Interim 
Transitional National Council as the new political interlocutor for Libya.  The 
African Union was more cautious in its support for the people of Libya, it 
acknowledged the “legitimacy of the aspirations of the Libyan people” but wanted 
an approach that did not include recourse to the use of force, but rather diplomatic 
measures.
585
 
 
The influence of regional organisations was immense, but the political dynamics 
shifted within the Security Council towards military intervention once the League 
of Arab states passed a resolution
586
 deciding - 
 To call on the Security Council to bear its responsibilities towards the deteriorating 
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 situation in Libya, and to  take the necessary measures to impose immediately a no-fly 
 zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling 
 as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign 
 nationals residing in Libya, while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
 neighboring States,
587 
The response from these regional institutions represent over 60 states.
588
  It would 
have been difficult for the Security Council to ignore such a large proportion of 
states advocating for strong measures in response to the Libyan crisis. 
 
The combination of regional support, the overt threat of mass violence against 
civilians, and the establishment of the Interim Transitional National Council, all 
factored into a collective understanding that the Gaddafi led Libyan government 
was no longer a legitimate government from the perspective of other states.  For 
the members states of the Security Council that voted in favour of the resolution, 
the factors that led to a loss of legitimacy allowed for military intervention to be 
authorised.  For the states that abstained
589
 from the vote, they had deep 
reservations about the use of force used against a sovereign state, the breach of its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and advocated for the resumption of 
diplomatic measures.  India stated: 
 It is of course very important that there be full respect for the sovereignty, unity and 
 territorial integrity of Libya.
590
 
 
The representative of Brazil stated that: 
 We are not convinced that the use of force as provided for in paragraph 4 of the resolution 
 will lead to the realization of our common objective – the immediate end to violence and 
 the protection of civilians.
591
 
 
The Chinese representative maintained that -  
 China has always emphasized that, in its relevant actions, the Security Council should 
 follow the United Nations Charter and the norms governing international law, respect the 
 sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Libya and resolve the current 
 crisis in Libya through peaceful means.
592
 
                                                 
587
 The Council of the League of Arab States Meeting at the Ministerial Level on the Implications 
of the Current Events in Libya and the Arab Position (March 12 2011) 
<http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Arab%20League%20Ministerial%20level%20statement%2
012%20march%202011%20-%20english%281%29.pdf>. 
588
 It should be noted that at the passing of these resolutions in the Arab regional organisations, 
not all States were present, and not all states agreed – Luke Glanville “Intervention in Libya: 
From Sovereign Consent to Regional Consent” (2013) 14 International Studies Perspectives 
325 at 334. 
589
 Brazil, China, Germany, India and the Russian Federation. 
590
 India S/PV.6498 at 6. 
591
 Brazil S/PV.6498 at 6. 
592
 China S/PV.6498 at 10. 
 121 
 
 
The states that abstained from voting had real concerns about the content of the 
resolution and the scope of the authorisation it provided, and in the case of China 
and Russia, preserved the position their states hold concerning intervention and 
the use of force against or within another states territory.
593
  However, not one 
state voted against the resolution, and Russia, China, and Brazil all noted the 
request from the League of Arab States in their statements during the Security 
Council meeting, with the Chinese representative stating that China attached 
“great importance to the relevant position by the 22-member Arab League”.594  It 
is likely that the widespread regional support for the establishment of a no-fly 
zone over Libya prevented the use of the veto, and any negative votes from the 
states that abstained from voting. 
 
 
6.5 The Imminent Threat of Large Scale Loss of Life 
The final factor that prompted the swift reaction from the Security Council to 
authorise military intervention was the very real and imminent threat of mass 
violence made by Colonel Gadaffi against the Libyan people.  The belief that 
Gaddafi intended a mass atrocity is supported by the fact that only hours before 
the Security Council passed Resolution 1973 Gaddafi addressed the Libyan 
people and informed them: 
 It's over ... We are coming tonight," he said. "You will come out from inside. Prepare 
 yourselves from  tonight. We will find you in your closets.595 
The threat to the civilian population was made via radio address, there was no 
mistaking his intention, mass atrocities would be committed against the Libyan 
people.
596
 
 
The resulting resolution was detailed in its construction with an emphasis on the 
protection of civilians rather than the responsibility of the Libyan government to 
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protect its civilian population.  It  was targeted at both the Libyan authorities as 
well as individuals and institutions.  The threat of mass atrocities that could 
amount to crimes against humanity was acknowledged within the text, as were the 
political influences that motivated the swift passage of the resolution in the 
Security Council.   
 
6.6 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 
Significant to the premise of this thesis is the effect that Resolution 1973 has had 
on international law, with respect to sovereignty, or whether it represents an 
exceptional instance of the authorisation of the use of force for the protection of 
civilians.  Resolution 1973 provides a mandate for Member States to specifically 
use military force for the protection of civilians during the Libyan conflict.  Does 
the mandate for military intervention stretch the contours of sovereignty as it is 
currently understood?  Or does it embrace the concept of the Responsibility to 
Protect which provides that a state holds the responsibility to protect its civilian 
population from crimes against humanity, genocide, ethnic cleansing and war 
crimes, and if a state cannot, or will not uphold its responsibility, then a secondary 
responsibility arises, in which states of the United Nations must step in if a state is 
exposing its population to any of those four crimes.  The Security Council has 
tacitly accepted the concept of the Responsibility to Protect.  It first referred to the 
concept in its resolution on the protection of civilians – Resolution 1674 (2006), 
however it is parties to a conflict that bear the primary responsibility of protecting 
civilians, not the broader spectrum of states.
597
 
 
6.6.1 The Threat to International Peace and Security 
The Security Council determined in Resolution 1973 that the situation in Libya 
constituted a threat to peace and security in the following way: 
 Determining that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to constitute a 
 threat to international peace and security,
598 
The use of the word “continues” suggests that the situation in Libya had 
previously been determined to be a threat by the Security Council.  However 
Resolution 1970 (2011) contains no reference to such a determination.  The threat 
that the situation can be inferred from the preamble of the resolution itself.  The 
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extreme violence, systematic human rights abuses, and the potential for crimes 
against humanity, could be the trigger for the determination that the situation was 
indeed a threat to international peace and security.
599
 
 
This inference suggests that the systematic abuse of human rights, crimes against 
humanity, and extreme violence perpetrated by the regime are intrinsically 
connected with the maintenance of international peace and security.  This notion is 
supported by the history of the Security Council's practice where it has considered 
situations involving internal armed conflicts that attack civilian populations or 
groups as threats to international peace and security, and authorised armed 
intervention.
600
 
 
6.6.2 Protection of Civilians and the Responsibility to Protect 
Authorisation for military measures was given for three different situations, two 
of which were specifically for the protection of civilians.
601
  The first 
authorisation was contained under the sub-heading 'Protection of civilians' and the 
second was contained under the sub-heading 'No Fly Zone'.
602
  Authorisation 
under the 'Protection of civilians' stated that the Security Council: 
 Authorizes Member States … to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 
 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of 
 attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign 
 occupation force of any form on part of Libyan territory, …
603
 
Authorisation takes place using the familiar “code phrase” of 'all necessary 
measures', significantly though, these measures authorised are for the protection 
of civilians, and civilian populated areas including Benghazi “under threat of 
attack”.  The inclusion of Benghazi within the parameters of authorisation indicate 
two possible factors behind the intention of this inclusion.   
 
The first, is that it had been reported that Gaddafi's forces were poised and ready 
to take back Benghazi on the day that Resolution 1973 was passed,
604
 and the 
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specific inclusion of Benghazi within authorisation would focus military 
assistance in this area.  The second, is that including Benghazi as a particular area 
that required protection, the Security Council recognised that Benghazi was the 
centre point of “command and control” for the rebel forces, but also that civilians 
may be actively engaging in self-defence.
605
  It could be argued that by providing 
protection to civilians in Benghazi support was being provided to the rebel forces.  
However, by providing military assistance to the civilian population in order to 
prevent a potential crime against humanity, or rather, providing any military 
assistance to the civilian population in Libya would simultaneously weaken 
Gaddafi's own forces and strengthen the opposition's stance.
606
  Should 
authorisation for military intervention have been with-held from the civilian 
population in case it became advantageous to the opposition forces? 
 
The military measures provided for the protection of civilians would not doubt 
have benefited the opposition.  In some ways this would suggest that a change in 
regime would have been a foreseeable consequence of the intervention.  
Resolution 1973 aimed to protect the civilian population, and respond in a way 
that addressed the legitimate demands of the people.
607
  There no doubt as to 
whether the legitimate demands of the people of Libya could have been met 
without the overthrow of Gaddafi and his regime.
608
  The arms sanctions and the 
authorisation of the use of force were intended to halt the Libyan government's 
attacks against the civilian population.  They would have severely weakened the 
government's economic and military power.  No doubt this would have been 
advantageous to the opposition.  Security Council resolutions have far reaching 
legal consequences, and one of these is the potential for a regime change when 
military force is used for the protection of civilians and their human rights.  
However, this could be tempered by targeted government's exercising restraint 
when using force against its civilian population. 
 
The use of the words “under threat of attack” when authorising military measures 
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for the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas seems to provide 
flexibility those who commit to providing military support to the Security Council 
resolution.
609
  Force has rarely been authorised before an attack has occurred, in 
this instance though, the threat of violence made by Gaddafi the same day this 
resolution was passed, was an unusually candid display of violent intent which 
could not go unrecognised by the Security Council.   
 
 
6.6.3 The Responsibility to Protect...Or not? 
The Security Council had demanded an end to the violence under Resolution 1970 
(2011)
610
 and the Libyan governments continual resort to force against its own 
population would be a violation of that decision which it is bound to uphold.  The 
flexibility arises in the interpretation of “under threat of attack”.  Depending on 
how it is interpreted, force could be employed against “objects, facilities, actions, 
and people”611 that were less direct threats to the civilian population than intended 
depending on how the risk was determined.
612
  The authorisation provided in 
paragraph 4 can be construed as a more “open ended” military intervention for the 
protection of civilians.
613
 
 
The Security Council response to the conflict in Libya has been described as the 
“proving ground”614 for the concept of the Responsibility to Protect, and that 
Resolution 1973 “explicitly invoked” the concept as the prime motivator for the 
authorisation of military intervention.
615
  Resolution 1973 is often seen as further 
acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect by the international community of 
states and further evidence of its growing normative status.  However, reference to 
the concept only occurs in the preamble of the text, and not as part of the 
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operative paragraphs that provide the legal basis for military intervention.
616
   
The reference within Resolution 1973 to the “Libyan authorities to protect the 
Libyan population” is in keeping with previous resolutions that contain reference 
to the Responsibility to Protect, but limits its application to the First Pillar – the 
national responsibility of protection.
617
   
 
This leans towards an interpretation that the Security Council has not wanted to 
go too far beyond its prior practice on the occasions that it has referred to the 
Responsibility to Protect in previous resolutions.
618
  It also leads to a conclusion 
that the Security Council and its Member States did not want its actions, or 
Resolution 1973 to be perceived as founded on the secondary responsibility under 
the Responsibility to Protect: that where a state is manifestly failing in its duty to 
protect its population this responsibility will then fall to the international 
community to uphold.  Instead the language of Resolution 1973 is predominantly 
termed in human rights and humanitarian language, which has been a cautious, 
and political approach.
619
 
 
The response from regional organisations could be read as the fulfilment of the 
secondary responsibility under the Responsibility to Protect.  Yet reference to the 
responsibility to protect was only made by two states in the Security Council 
meeting for the resolution.
620
  When the regional organisations issued official 
documents regarding their position on the Libyan conflict, no mention was made 
to the Responsibility to Protect.  The behaviour of states and regional 
organisations appears to support an analysis that the Responsibility to Protect was 
influential in their decision making behaviour.  However, it is more likely that the 
isolation that Gaddafi had created for his government in Libya, his government 
and leadership was viewed as a pariah within the Arab community.
621
  This 
isolation only made it easier for regional organisations to advocate for the 
                                                 
616
 Andrew Garwood-Gowers “The Responsibility to Protect and the Arab Spring: Libya as the 
Exception, Syria as the Norm?” (2013) 36 UNSW L J 594 at 605. 
617
 Simon Chesterman “Leading From Behind” The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama 
Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention after Libya” (2011) Ethics & International Affairs 
279, at 280. 
618
 Thielborger, above n 618, at 44. 
619
 Thielborger, at 44. 
620
 France S/PV.6498 at 2; Colombia S/PV.6498 at 7. 
621
 Thomas H. Lee, above n 616, at 298. 
 127 
 
establishment of a 'no fly zone' and for the Security Council to break with its 
tradition of not authorising military intervention without the target states consent. 
 
Resolution 1973 creates a positive affirmation for the protection of civilians in 
internal armed conflicts.  It was a swift and forceful response to a situation that 
could have resulted in a large scale crime against humanity.  It is a legal document 
that has authorised an armed intervention for the protection of civilians.  It is an 
armed intervention for humanitarian purposes and draws upon the Responsibility 
to Protect and the past practice of the Security Council.  But what does it mean for 
the principle of state sovereignty within international law? 
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7. Conclusion 
The concept of sovereignty has evolved over time in an incremental fashion.  The 
evolution took place in two ways.  The first was the introduction, and then 
expansion of its meaning by legal theorists and jurisprudential thought based in a 
European context.  The second is through its practical use in the international 
relations between states.  The concept of sovereignty began as a reaction to war 
fare, and it remains a key consideration in the maintenance of international peace 
and security.  It is a theoretical concept that has been refined by its practical use. 
 
The establishment of the United Nations, and the Security Council provide a 
forum for collective security based on the principle of sovereign equality.  The 
concept of sovereignty has often acted as a shield for the violent actions of 
repressive governments.  As the collective security system within the United 
Nations developed, respect for sovereign equality has become more and more 
entrenched.  However, the destructive nature of internal armed conflicts that have 
posed a lethal risk to civilian populations have caused states, international lawyers 
and scholars, to query how to respond to these humanitarian crises. 
 
Interventions carried out for humanitarian purposes since the establishment of the 
United Nations have been responses to internal armed conflicts where wide spread 
violence, gross human rights breaches, genocide, and mass atrocities have been 
present.  The instances where the Security Council has carried out an intervention 
for humanitarian purposes, such as in Iraq, Somalia, and Rwanda, provides an 
example of State's positions regarding contravening the prohibition on the use of 
force contained in Article 2(4) of the Charter, and the principle of non-interference 
contained in Article 2(7). 
 
When considering to use force against a sovereign state perpetrating gross human 
rights abuses consideration of Articles 2(4) and 2(7) become enmeshed.  They are 
both closely linked when the Security Council considers to authorise military 
intervention within or against a sovereign state.  Armed intervention inevitably 
impacts upon a State's internal jurisdiction, its territorial integrity, political 
independence and of course its right of sovereign equality, which is why achieving 
consensus in authorising the use of force within the Security Council is never 
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assured. 
The need for consensus in authorisation (by majority at least) is a necessity in 
addressing humanitarian catastrophes within the Charter system.  When States act 
unilaterally and carry out armed intervention without Security Council 
authorisation, as they did in Kosovo in 1999, consensus within the Security 
Council becomes stifled and its effectiveness is severely limited due to the 
political repercussions.  A lack of support for armed intervention, as was the case 
in Rwanda, leads to an ineffective intervention that can have been devastating 
effects. 
 
However, sovereignty, non-intervention and the prohibition on the use of force 
remain fundamental principles in international law, and continue to guide the 
approach taken to internal conflicts experiencing humanitarian crises.  The 
inconsistent approach and response to humanitarian crises has led to the 
development of the Responsibility to Protect which has provided a new term, and 
re-conceptualised the mode by which states hold their sovereignty.  Sovereignty 
remains as a manifestation of state power and state control internally, but the 
protection it provides – according to the concept – is contingent upon states 
protecting their populations from the genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.  With regard to the exercise of external sovereignty, the 
Responsibility to Protect requires states to step in and protect civilians within 
another state's internal jurisdiction if it is manifestly failing to uphold its 
responsibility. 
 
The Security Council is pivotal, both in terms of authorising intervention for 
humanitarian purposes, and the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect.  
The practice that it has developed over time regarding the authorisation of armed 
intervention for humanitarian purposes is inconsistent, but it is in keeping with the 
rules of the Charter.  It has proved, even through its inconsistent practice, that the 
principle of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence does not 
prevent the Security Council from authorising military intervention against a state 
and within its internal jurisdiction.  The absolute conception of state sovereignty, 
as it was first imagined by Bodin, has given way to a context specific form of 
armed intervention.  In situations where there is internal armed conflict, the 
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Security Council will, if there is political consensus, intervene with armed force. 
 
Decisions of the Security Council are political ones, but the resolutions that 
contain them bear legal consequences that affect the rights and obligations of 
states, and the rights of individuals within those states.  Collective international 
peace and security now goes beyond considerations for state sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, or political independence.  It must now consider the plight and 
harm visited on civilians by their own governments – particularly where the threat 
of mass atrocity is present.  Human security, the security of individuals and 
groups, has now become a part of the collective security system within the United 
Nations.   
 
Whether Resolution 1973 has substantially developed the principle of sovereignty 
to the extent that armed intervention for the protection of civilians is permissible 
without regard for sovereignty is unconvincing.  It appears to be a miraculous 
incident where principle and political will coincided and armed intervention for 
the protection of civilians was considered to be the appropriate course of action.  
The aim of the armed intervention was to protect civilians, not to compromise 
Libyan sovereignty.  It was an authorised humanitarian intervention, but it is not a 
direct reflection of the concept of the Responsibility to Protect.   
 
Considering the ponderous development of the principle of sovereignty from its 
earliest entry into political legal discourse, the unconventional development of 
humanitarian intervention, the impact that Resolution 1973 will have on 
sovereignty within international law will take time to measure.  Each time the 
Security Council authorises armed intervention contributes to the development of 
its practice, and in turn the development of perceptions around sovereignty and 
intervention for the protection of civilians. 
 
The response from the Security Council to the excessive use of force, and the 
widespread systematic attacks against the civilian population by the Libyan 
government indicates that the protection provided by the principle of state 
sovereignty and sovereign equality under the Charter is undergoing a period of 
change.  This is in part influenced by the concept of the Responsibility to Protect, 
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and the Security Council's practice. The violent and systematic attacks by the 
Libyan government, and the imminent threat of a widespread massacre, 
destabilised the legitimacy of the Gaddafi led government, as perceived by 
regional organisations, and Member States of the United Nations, and Security 
Council.  The repetitive refrain that Gaddafi's regime had lost all legitimacy 
through its violent actions, is compatible with the element of the Responsibility to 
Protect that requires state governments to protect their population from such 
violence that may constitute one of the four specified crimes.  The loss of the 
Libyan government's legitimacy would have made it difficult for Libya to exercise 
its external sovereignty without an internationally recognised political 
interlocutor, but not its internal sovereignty.   
 
However, sovereignty cannot exist in an internal form alone.  The purpose of the 
formation of the United Nations is collective peace and security, which requires 
states to behave in accordance with certain customary laws and recognised 
principles, such as respect for sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and political 
independence.  Respect or regard for internal sovereignty no longer seems to 
extend to situations where an excessive level of systematic violence is committed 
by a state authority, at least, not in the context of the Libyan conflict.   
 
It would appear, based on the examination of the situation in Libya, that the 
Security Council is prepared to intervene militarily in a sovereign state in order to 
protect civilians from its own government's actions.  However, like resolutions 
before it that were passed based on humanitarian concerns, Resolution 1973 
(2011) is one more example in a long line of inconsistency.  Post-Resolution 1973, 
the Security Council has failed to act in a similar fashion with regard to the 
ongoing internal conflict in Syria.    
 
Resolution 1973 makes a substantial contribution to a growing and developing 
practice within the Security Council, that the authorisation of military intervention 
for the purposes of protecting civilians will not always be hampered by the 
principle of sovereignty.  Sovereignty itself is becoming imbued with the notion 
that power is not wielded in an unlimited and violent fashion but is contingent 
upon respect for humanity.  The original purpose of sovereignty was to protect a 
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nation's people from harm from external forces.  Now it is slowly becoming the 
power in which a nations people are protected not just from external forces, but 
from unlimited violent sovereign power. 
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